Dawson Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Dawson Forest Holdings, LLC

• Decision Date: 29 October 2020
• Docket Number: A20A0934, A20A0935, A20A0936, A20A0937
• Citation: 357 Ga.App. 451,850 S.E.2d 870
• Parties: DAWSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al. v. DAWSON FOREST HOLDINGS, LLC and vice versa (four cases).
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

357 Ga.App. 451

850 S.E.2d 870

DAWSON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS et al.

v.DAWSON FOREST HOLDINGS, LLC and vice versa (four cases).

A20A0934, A20A0935, A20A0936, A20A0937

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 29, 2020

Jarrard & Davis, Angela E. Davis, Paul B. Frickey, for Dawson County Board of Commissioners et al.

Miles Hansford & Tallant, Joshua A. Scoggins, Lauren C. Giles, R. Cameron Kline, Jonah B. Howell, for Dawson Forest Holdings, LLC.

McFadden, Chief Judge.

In Lathrop v. Deal , 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017), our Supreme Court reconsidered the law of sovereign immunity and held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity extends generally to suits against the state, its departments and agencies, and its officers in their individual capacities for injunctive and declaratory relief from official acts that are alleged to be unconstitutional. In so holding, however, the Court recognized the availability of other means by which aggrieved citizens may obtain relief from unconstitutional acts, including prospective relief from the threatened enforcement of unconstitutional laws. Id. at 409, 801 S.E.2d 867. The question before us today is how, under Lathrop , a landowner may challenge the constitutionality of a zoning classification. The trial court correctly held that, where enforcement authority is reposed in a county commission, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief may be brought against the commissioners in their individual capacities to prevent its enforcement.

After the Dawson County Board of Commissioners ("the Board") denied its rezoning requests, Dawson Forest Holdings, LLC ("Dawson Forest"), brought two actions in the superior court against the Board¹ and against its commissioners in both their official and individual capacities. In the actions, which were substantively the same except as to the specific property at issue,² Dawson Forest asserted that the current zoning classification was unconstitutional and sought prospective relief to prevent its enforcement. The defendants moved to dismiss the actions, asserting among other things that the doctrines of sovereign immunity and legislative immunity barred the actions and that the complaints failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. These related appeals and cross appeals concern the trial court's rulings dismissing the actions against the Board and its commissioners in their official capacities (Cases No. A20A0936 and A20A0937) but declining to dismiss the actions against the commissioners in their individual capacities (Cases No. A20A0934 and A20A0935).

As detailed below, the trial court did not err in any of her rulings. Sovereign immunity bars the actions against the Board and its commissioners in their official capacities. But neither sovereign immunity nor legislative immunity bars the actions for prospective relief against the commissioners in their individual capacities for allegedly unconstitutional acts, and the complaints stated claims for such prospective relief. So we affirm in all four cases.

1. Facts and procedural history.

On review of the trial court's rulings on the motions to dismiss, we accept as true all well-pled material allegations in the complaints and resolve any doubts in favor of Dawson Forest.

Williams v. DeKalb County , 308 Ga. 265, 270 (2) n. 3, 840 S.E.2d 423 (2020). Dawson Forest alleged the following facts in its first amended complaints.

In 2016, Dawson Forest filed with the Dawson County Planning and Development Department applications seeking to rezone property that it owned from a Residential Agricultural (R-A) classification to a Residential Multi-Family (RMF) classification. The county's planning and development director recommended that the Board approve the rezoning requests, subject to certain conditions, finding that the proposed use of the properties conformed to the county's Comprehensive Plan and Future Land Use Map, was suitable and consistent with surrounding land uses, would be in keeping with the welfare of the community, and would promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public interest. The Board, however, denied the rezoning requests.

Dawson Forest then filed actions in superior court challenging the constitutionality of the properties’ R-A zoning classification. It took the position in those actions that the denial of the rezoning applications was void ab initio because the county did not follow certain mandatory requirements contained in its Land Use Resolution. On September 25, 2017, the superior court entered consent orders remanding the rezoning applications to the county for reconsideration.

Later in 2017, Dawson Forest submitted revised rezoning applications for the properties. At that time, it also delivered to the Board "Constitutional Objections" asserting that the continued classification of the properties as R-A would violate Dawson Forest's rights under the state and federal Constitutions.

Dawson Forest asserted in its amended complaint that the revised applications were "filed in accordance with all applicable laws, [were] complete, met all applicable requirements, and [were] duly processed for review by the Planning Department." There was no substantive difference between those revised applications and the applications filed in 2016; they sought the same reclassification and proposed the same site plans. Nevertheless, the county's planning director made different findings regarding the appropriateness of rezoning than he had made in response to the 2016 applications, and he recommended that the 2017 revised applications be denied.

In January 2018, after a public hearing on the applications, the Board voted to deny the applications, leaving in place the R-A zoning classification of the properties. As a result of this classification, Dawson Forest asserted in its amended complaint that it "cannot economically or feasibly develop or sell the [properties]" and has been "deprive[d] ... of any reasonable use and development of the [properties]."

Among other things, the Board has the power to implement and enforce the county's zoning laws. Dawson Forest asserted in its complaints that it will be harmed by the Board and its commissioners’ continued, unconstitutional imposition and enforcement of the R-A zoning classification on the properties. Dawson Forest sought relief in the form of a declaration by the trial court that the denial of the rezoning applications and the continued enforcement of the R-A zoning classification of the properties are unconstitutional; an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the current land use restrictions on the properties; a writ of mandamus directing the Board and the commissioners to rezone the properties "to a constitutional zoning classification"; and attorney fees and expenses of litigation.

The trial court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss Dawson Forest's claims. She dismissed all of the claims against the Board and against the commissioners in their official capacities on the ground that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred those claims. She dismissed the claim for writ of mandamus against the commissioners in their individual capacities on the ground that Dawson Forest had adequate legal remedies to challenge the constitutionality of the zoning restrictions on its properties. But she denied the motion to dismiss the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the commissioners in their individual capacities, as well as the derivative claims for attorney fees and costs of litigation, concluding that the complaints sufficiently stated those claims and the claims were not barred by any immunity.

In Cases Nos. A20A0934 and A20A0935, we granted interlocutory appellate review to the commissioners, who challenge the rulings denying the motions to dismiss the claims against them in their individual capacities. In Cases Nos. A20A0936 and A20A0937, Dawson Forest cross-appeals, challenging the rulings dismissing the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board and the commissioners in their official capacities. (Dawson Forest does not challenge the dismissal of its mandamus claim.) As detailed below, we find no error in any of these rulings.

2. Sovereign immunity bars the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board and the commissioners in their official capacities.

We first address Dawson Forest's challenge to the trial court's conclusion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board and against the commissioners in their official capacities (as well as the derivative claims). We find no error in that conclusion in light of our Supreme Court's decision in Lathrop , supra, 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867. The Court held in Lathrop that

[t]he constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity bars any suit against the [s]tate to which it has not given its consent, including suits against state departments, agencies, and officers in their official capacities, and including suits for injunctive and declaratory relief from the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws. If the consent of the [s]tate is to be found, it must be found in the Constitution itself or the statutory law.... There are, however, prospective remedies that [a] plaintiff[ ] may pursue against state officers in their individual capacities.

Id. at 444 (IV), 801 S.E.2d 867. Dawson Forest's claims fall within the rule articulated in Lathrop —the claims seek injunctive and declaratory relief from the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance (the zoning classification as applied to the properties) against the Board and its commissioners in their official capacities. See generally Harry v. Glynn County , 269 Ga. 503 (1), 501 S.E.2d 196 (1998) (counties are entitled to sovereign immunity); Bd. of Commrs. of Glynn County v. Johnson , 311 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1), 717 S.E.2d 272 (2011) (county...