Debose v. State, 90-2377
Decision Date | 28 March 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 90-2377,90-2377 |
Parties | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 827 Ozell DEBOSE, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ozell Debose, Jr., Raiford, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David S. Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Ozell Debose, Jr. appeals the summary denial of his Rule 3.850 motion. He contends that applying the habitual felon law to him on the basis of prior convictions constitutes double jeopardy; 1 that the habitual offender classification was error because the prior convictions were entered on the same date; and that the court failed to provide sufficient reasons for applying the habitual felony sentencing to him. We reverse.
When a trial court summarily denies a motion for post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing or attaching portions of the record to refute the allegations, review is limited to determining whether, accepting the allegations as true, the motion shows that the defendant is not entitled to relief. Davis v. State, 571 So.2d 118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); see also Smothers v. State, 555 So.2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ( ).
In Taylor v. State, 558 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), this court held that in order to qualify as a habitual offender under the 1988 version of the habitual offender statute, the State must establish that the defendant has been convicted of two or more felonies, and the sentences on those two or more felonies must not have been entered on the same date. See also LeBoeuf v. State, 571 So.2d 559 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Bernard v. State, 571 So.2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Crews v. State, 567 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). The rationale behind these cases is that the purpose of the habitual offender statute is to protect society against habitual criminals who continue to commit crimes after having been convicted and punished for previous crimes. The statute contemplates that an opportunity for rehabilitation is to be given after each conviction. A defendant who has been sentenced the same day, even on convictions having occurred at separate times, has had no separate opportunity to reform after each conviction. See Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So.2d 304 (1947).
In 1989, section 775.084(1)(a) was amended to provide that the State need only show that the defendant was convicted of any combination of two or more felonies. The effective date of this amendment was October 1, 1989. See Ch. 89-280, Secs. 1 and 12. Since there is no reference to the date of the offense, the record does not show conclusively that the 1989 amendment applies in this case.
In its ruling, the trial court denied the motion, finding that it was an issue which could have been raised on direct appeal. While this would ordinarily act to bar claims in a subsequent 3.850 proceeding, Rule 3.850 expressly provides that "[a] motion to vacate a sentence which exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time." If appellant does not qualify as a habitual offender, the thirty year and ten year incarcerative terms he received would exceed the general statutory maximum for the two counts of burglary of a dwelling (normally second degree felonies with a fifteen year statutory maximum) and one count of burglary of a structure (a third degree felony with a five year statutory maximum). Furthermore, while appellant was sentenced before Taylor was issued, his appeal was decided after Taylor. Therefore, appellant was entitled to have Taylor applied to his case, if it was applicable. See Crews v. State, supra.
The State acknowledges that case law out of this court supports the above reading of Rule 3.850. Yates v. State, 509 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) ( ). But see Dreyer v. State, 532 So.2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
Appellant alleges that the court failed to make specific findings of fact that show an enhanced sentence was necessary to protect the public from appellant's further criminal conduct. Appellant claims that mere reference to his prior criminal...
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