Decker v. Square D Co.
| Decision Date | 25 August 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 974 S.W.2d 667 |
| Parties | Theodore DECKER, Appellant, v. SQUARE D COMPANY and State Treasurer, Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Respondents. 54777. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Randall B. Johnston, Columbia, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Anthony Horvath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondents.
Theodore Decker appeals the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's decision to deny him workers' compensation benefits from the Second Injury Fund. He contends that the commission's decision was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that the commission based its decision on insubstantial medical opinion testimony. We disagree and affirm the commission's decision.
On February 19, 1996, Decker complained to his employer, Square D Company, of pain and numbness in his right hand and arm. His employer sent him to consult a physician, Glen Cooper. Decker told Cooper that he felt sudden pain in his right arm and numbness in his hand when he reached into a bin. Cooper concluded that the pain was remarkable because it was sudden and without apparent cause. Cooper asked Decker to return the next day so he could determine whether the symptoms had subsided. When Decker returned the next day, Cooper opined that the injury was not related to work and advised Decker to see his family physician. Cooper said, Cooper further explained:
Some of the things that could have occurred in this gentleman that may have needed other attention would have been a stroke. The guy has a numb painful arm. He's a diabetic. They are known to have vascular events. There's many things the family doctor should consider in a painful numb arm which is why I felt that it was no longer proper to treat it in the ["]Work Comp["] venue.
On March 11, 1996, Decker again felt pain and numbness in his right hand and arm and returned to Cooper's office. Decker told Cooper that he felt pain suddenly when he used his right hand to activate a machine, which he was running. Cooper diagnosed the cause as "ulnar neuritis of undetermined origin and an insulin dependent diabetic." Cooper said that the symptoms resembled neuropathy and that he detected no pattern between this episode and the one on February 19. He said that, although the March 11 episode did not appear to be related directly to a work activity, he decided to visit Decker's workplace to investigate further.
On March 15, 1996, Cooper visited Decker's workplace and reviewed Decker's duties. Cooper decided that Decker's duties did not cause his injury. Cooper said,
On March 22, 1996, Decker went to see John Havey, an orthopedic surgeon. Havey advised Decker not to work for two weeks, and he prescribed anti-inflammatories for pain. On April 4, 1996, Havey told Decker that he should be able to return to work.
On May 6, 1996, Decker felt pain, numbness and swelling in both hands and forearms and returned to Havey's office four days later. Havey diagnosed the problem to be carpal tunnel syndrome. On May 22, 1996, Havey performed surgery on Decker's left wrist. About five months later, according to Havey, Decker still suffered carpal tunnel syndrome in his left wrist.
Decker had suffered diabetes since he was 13 years of age and was insulin-dependent. He had suffered a number of right shoulder dislocations and ganglion cysts on the right wrist, which required surgery. In 1985, Decker had surgery on his right wrist for carpal tunnel syndrome. In 1993, he was diagnosed with tendinitis and neuritis in his left wrist.
In addition to his work at Square D, Decker worked 10 to 30 hours a week, from January through May 1996, at an auto parts store as a "parts person." During December 1995 and January 1996, he rebuilt two vehicle engines.
On April 11, 1996, Decker filed a claim for workers' compensation for injuries to his "[r]ight arm, forearm from elbow to hand and fingers" which he claimed occurred on March 12, 1996, from "running trip bar assembly, placing parts into nest--repetitive motion." On July 16, 1996, he filed another claim for injuries to his "[l]eft arm, forearm from elbow to hand and fingers, bilateral carpal syndrome and the body as a whole" which he claimed was ongoing and resulted from "[r]epetitive motion of both hands and arms required by employment at Square D." The commission's administrative law judge ruled that Decker was not entitled to workers' compensation because he had not proven that his employment caused his injuries. The commission adopted the administrative law judge's decision by a 2-1 vote. Decker appeals.
Decker contends that the commission's decision is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that the commission based its decision on insubstantial medical opinion testimony. He asserts that his medical expert, Havey, testified that Decker's carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by his work and that Square D and the State Treasurer did not rebut this evidence. We disagree.
We will affirm the commission's decision if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence and is not clearly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Davis v. Research Medical Center, 903 S.W.2d 557, 571 (Mo.App.1995). In cases in which a worker seeks compensation for carpal tunnel syndrome, he or she must submit a medical expert who can establish a probability that working conditions caused the disease, even if the disease was not an injury's sole cause. Hayes v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Mo.App.1991). The evidence must establish a direct causal link between the worker's workplace or job duties and the injury-causing disease. Estes v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 34, 38 (Mo.App.1978).
Substantial and competent evidence supported the commission's decision. The decision was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Cooper testified that, in his opinion, Decker's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Roberts v. Mo. Highway and Transp. Com'n
...exhibited a bruise on his back from that fall. It was not Employer's obligation to disprove Claimant's case. Decker v. Square D Co., 974 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo.App.1998). "In cases in which more than one event could have caused a condition but only one is compensable, a claimant has the burden......
-
Bock v. City of Columbia
...Whether a particular matter is beyond lay understanding has been treated as a question of law. See, e.g. Decker v. Square D Co., 974 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo.App. W.D.1998) ("In cases in which a worker seeks compensation for carpal tunnel syndrome, he or she must submit a medical expert...."); S......
-
Lacy v. Federal Mogul
...has the burden of proving the nature and extent of disability attributable to his or her job duties or workplace." Decker v. Square D Co., 974 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo.App.1998). In Claimant's first argument, she contends that the Commission's reliance upon Dr. Wagner's improper opinion testimon......
-
Missouri Dept. of Transp. ex rel. v. Safeco, ED 79860.
...time in the reply brief, and are not properly preserved. Application of Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo.1978); Decker v. Square D Co., 974 S.W.2d 667, 670 n. 2 (Mo.App.1998). See also Elfrink v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 845 S.W.2d 607, 615 (Mo.App.1992). Accordingly, this claim wa......