Delgue v. Curutchet
Citation | 677 P.2d 208 |
Decision Date | 31 January 1984 |
Docket Number | 5832,Nos. 5831,s. 5831 |
Parties | Guillaume DELGUE, Appellant (Defendant), v. Alvina CURUTCHET, Appellee (Plaintiff). Florence BORDARRAMPE, Executrix of the Estate of Peter Bordarrampe, Florence Bordarrampe, and Dean Smith, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Alvina CURUTCHET, a/k/a Mrs. Arnaud Curutchet, Appellee (Defendant). |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Henry A. Burgess and Hayden F. Heaphy, Jr., of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellants.
Lawrence A. Yonkee of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellee.
Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, * THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, JJ.
The essential substantive question which is presented by these cases involves the right of a lessee to make use of an appurtenant easement established by prescription in favor of the lands which he is leasing. In order to resolve this essential substantive question the court must first concern itself with whether the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude an attempt by the lessee to establish his right to use of the easement because of language in the judgment establishing the easement which purports to exclude lessees. The trial court ruled that the owner of the dominant estate and her current lessee both were precluded by the prior judgment from attempting to establish the right of the current lessee to make use of the easement. It is our conclusion that the current lessee is not precluded by the prior judgment, and that he has the right to use the appurtenant easement in connection with his lease of the dominant estate. To that extent we shall reverse the district court. We have been unable to discern any rule which permits the owner of the dominant estate to pursue this issue by simply filing a new complaint in the prior action, and consequently, being persuaded that she failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, we shall dismiss her appeal.
The appellant, Bordarrampe, the owner, and Delgue, the current lessee, state the issues in these cases in their joint brief as follows:
The appellee, Curutchet, the owner of the servient estate, has summarized her argument in her statement of the issues as found in her brief, in this way:
In late 1974, there occurred a disagreement between neighboring landowners, Alvina Curutchet and Pete and Florence Bordarrampe together with their lessee, Dean H. Smith, over the use of a road which ran across the Curutchet lands from a county road to the lands owned by the Bordarrampes. The Bordarrampe lands had been leased to Dean H. Smith earlier in 1974, and Mrs. Curutchet objected to Smith's use of the road across her land, although it had been used for many years by the Bordarrampes and their predecessors in interest. Mrs. Curutchet advised Mrs. Bordarrampe that Smith could not use the road but would have to use a different road instead, and at that time Mrs. Bordarrampe asserted that Smith had a right to use the road. Thereupon, Mrs. Curutchet padlocked a gate across the road. An action then was brought by the Bordarrampes and Smith, seeking to establish on behalf of the Bordarrampes and Smith a prescriptive easement in their favor over the road across the Curutchet property.
That dispute was resolved by the district court in 1976. The district court found the requisite prescriptive use by the Bordarrampes and their predecessors in interest and in its conclusions of law stated in the part pertinent to this dispute:
The effect of the last sentence of these conclusions of law was to exclude Smith from use of the prescriptive easement.
Pete Bordarrampe had died during the course of the litigation, and his estate was substituted as a party. After the entry of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Florence Bordarrampe and Smith filed a Motion for Reconsideration to adjust paragraph VI of the legal conclusions so that it would reflect that the easement extended to "the Bordarrampes, their lessees, * * * and their successors in title." The court denied this motion and entered its final judgment in that litigation. That judgment provided in the part pertinent to these cases as follows:
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, FLORENCE BORDARRAMPE, her successors in title and assigns, and employees, suppliers, social guests, truckers, and drovers of livestock belonging to the Plaintiff or her successors and assigns, but not lessees shall, and do hereby have, a permanent and perpetual easement across the lands of the Defendant, Alvina E. Curutchet, for general ranch and social purposes, the approximate width of a motor vehicle along the center line as described as follows * * *."
None of the parties took an appeal from the 1976 judgment.
After Dean H. Smith's lease expired, the Bordarrampe ranch was leased to the appellant Guilluame Delgue. According to the agreed facts, as expressed in the pleadings now before this court as a part of the record, Delgue used the road in issue to travel across the Curutchet lands to the Bordarrampe lands until early in June of 1982. Mrs. Curutchet then caused a padlocked chain to be placed across the road, making it impossible to use it in connection with the operations of the Bordarrampe ranchlands. She followed this action by filing a suit against Delgue in which she complained of his use of the road; alleged notification to Delgue that he was a trespasser; and sought relief in the form of an injunction restraining Delgue's use of the road during the pendency of the action and permanently thereafter and for compensatory and exemplary damages which were alleged to be $1,000 and $10,000 respectively. Delgue responded by filing an answer and a counterclaim in which he asserted that he had a right to use the easement across the Curutchet lands as a lessee of the Bordarrampe lands. In his counterclaim he sought a decree establishing his right to quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the easement, together with damages caused to him by denial of the right to use the road. In a separate complaint, which was filed approximately a month later in the court file in the prior case, Florence Bordarrampe sought equitable relief and a modification of the earlier judgment on the grounds of mistake or clerical error. Alternatively she prayed for an amendment to the earlier judgment so that it would reflect that it was personal to Dean H. Smith and did not affect the right of any present or future lessees of the Bordarrampe ranchlands to use the easement. In answering this complaint Mrs. Curutchet relied upon the defense of res judicata. She also relied upon the prior judgment in replying to the Delgue counterclaim pointing to the restrictive language relating to lessees.
The district court consolidated the two cases, and a hearing was held on September 14, 1982. The parties agreed that the issue essentially was one of law and that the only record necessary for disposition was the record of the proceedings in the earlier action. At the conclusion of the hearing the district court made an oral finding to the effect that the easement established in the prior case was personal to the owners of the Bordarrampe property and would not be extended to include lessees of that property. There followed a formal judgment dismissing the complaint of Florence Bordarrampe and permanently enjoining Delgue from using the road over which the easement had been established or from entering the Curutchet property. It was from this judgment that these appeals have been taken.
At the heart of this controversy there can be discerned a confusion on the part of the district court between appurtenant easements and easements in gross. If a prescriptive easement is recognized which is appurtenant to the land the right to use that easement is an indivisible aspect of the right to use the land to which it is appurtenant. That right obviously encompasses lessees from the record owners. Restatement of Property, § 487, comment (f) (1944).
The judgment establishing the prescriptive easement in this case contains language that affords the appellant Bordarrampe "her successors in title and assigns * * * but...
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