O'Dell v. Walsh
Decision Date | 24 June 1955 |
Citation | 81 So.2d 554 |
Parties | W. M. O'DELL and James M. O'Dell, Appellants, v. Spencer WALSH, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Carroll W. Fussell, Bushnell, for appellants.
P. B. Howell, Bushnell, for appellee.
The appellants pose three questions but we think it will be necessary to answer only one of them because it constitutes a challenge of the right of the appellee to bring the suit-a challenge which we think must be sustained.
The appellee sought an injunction against the obstruction by the appellants of a certain public road, and a mandatory writ requiring them to remove the barricade they had placed across it. He described himself as a citizen and resident of Sumter County, and alleged that he had been employed by a lumber company to cut trees and deliver them to the company's mill. In carrying out the undertaking it was necessary, so appellee alleged, for him to use the road the appellants had blocked.
The chancellor found that the question whether or not the appellee was qualified by interest to bring the suit was not presented to him, although he had the view that the appellee had 'a special and valuable interest at stake in keeping the road open.'
We agree with the appellants in their contention that an issue relative to appellee's right to sue was formed by the portions of their answers containing averments that there had been a failure to state a cause of action entitling the appellee to any relief; that the appellee owned no land bordered by the road involved and did not live on the road; and that an adequate, practical and better way was available to him for use in hauling his logs 'therefore plaintiff (appellee) is an improper plaintiff and has no right to maintain this suit.' (Italics supplied.)
The appellee testified that he lived in another county, had not lived in the county of Sumter for seven years, and had never lived on the road in question. He admitted he could 'take the other end' of the road which was the same type as the road in dispute. He was asked: 'As a matter of fact, would it be about the same distance to the hard road as the other way?' and he answered: 'Yes I guess it would.' He was then asked: 'Would that (the other road) be available to you at all times?' and he answered: 'Yes it has been available.' Later, in reply to a question whether or not he owned property facing the road, he said: 'No, I don't own any real estate on it, I just think it ought to be open, that's the road I...
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