Demeulenaere v. State, 99-107.
Decision Date | 26 January 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 99-107.,99-107. |
Citation | 995 P.2d 132 |
Parties | Tyrone Gerald DEMEULENAERE, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellant Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument presented by Mr. Roden.
Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley; Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Devon O'Connell Coleman, Student Director. Argument presented by Ms. Coleman.
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.
This matter comes before the Court as a question certified to us by the district court for resolution under W.R.A.P. 11. The appellant is Tyrone Gerald Demeulenaere (appellant) and the appellee is the State of Wyoming (State). As rephrased by this Court, the question to be decided is:
Whether justice court convictions for possession of a controlled substance [under Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) as that statute existed between 1985 and 1995] before the statute was amended can be used to enhance the penalty for possession of a controlled substance in District Court under [Wyo. Stat.] § 35-7-1031(c)[(i) (Michie 1998 Supp.)]?
We answer the certified question in the affirmative and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In accordance with W.R.A.P. 11.03(b), the district court provided this statement of all facts relevant to the question certified:
At the time of his 1993 and 1994 convictions, Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1031(c) (Michie 1988) provided:
(c) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both. Any person convicted for a third or subsequent offense under this subsection shall be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not more than five (5) years, fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both.
As applicable to the offense that is the subject of this certified question, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (LEXIS 1999) now provides, in pertinent part:
The gist of the appellant's argument is that any enhancement of the penalty for a third or subsequent conviction of possession of a controlled substance must be premised on convictions for possession of a controlled substance obtained under the most recent amendments to § 35-7-1031(c). The conclusion the appellant asks us to reach is that his 1993 and 1994 convictions may not serve to enhance his penalty because they were not obtained under the most recent version of that statute. Continuing, the appellant contends that if the Court adheres to its well-established principles of statutory construction and governing case law, we are required to answer the question in the negative, i.e., in a manner favoring the appellant.
In response, the State contends that those same principles of statutory construction and governing case law require that we conclude that convictions for possession of controlled substances, such as those obtained against the appellant in 1993 and 1994, can serve to enhance punishment under the most recent version of § 35-7-1031(c).
The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain, if possible, what the legislature intended by the language it used. We begin with an inquiry into the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed by the legislature, according to the manner in which those words are arranged. Farmer v. Department of Transportation, 986 P.2d 165, 166 (Wyo.1999). If the legislative pronouncements are written in unambiguous terms, then we are bound by those words. Moreover, we construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia. Vineyard v. Jenkins, 983 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wyo.1999)
.
Appellant relies in significant part on our holding in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 741-742 (Wyo. 1983), where we held that Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-5-233(e) and 31-7-127, as they were formulated at that time, would not permit the courts or the Motor Vehicle Division to rely on "driving while under the influence" (DWUI) convictions from other jurisdictions, or convictions had under a municipal ordinance, for the purpose of enhancing the penalty for that offense. The basis for that holding was that those statutes were unambiguous in providing that only convictions resulting from a violation of § 31-5-233 were to be considered in enhancement of penalty or revocation of a driver's...
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