Denney v. Northwestern Credit Ass'n

• Citation: 104 P. 769,55 Wash. 331
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Decision Date: 25 October 1909
• Parties: DENNEY v. NORTHWESTERN CREDIT ASS'N et al.

104 P. 769

55 Wash. 331

DENNEY v. NORTHWESTERN CREDIT ASS'N et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 25, 1909

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; M. L. Clifford Judge.

Action by William A. Denney against the Northwestern Credit Association and others. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

A. A Howell, for appellant.

Gordon & Remann and Ellis, Fletcher & Evans, for respondents.

CHADWICK J.

We are asked to determine the sufficiency of the complaint in this action. It is alleged, in substance: That the defendant the Northwestern Credit Association maintains a collection agency and had for collection an account against plaintiff. That a part of its business was to give a commercial rating to individuals and firms. That the Northwestern Credit Association published a book called the 'Northwestern Credit Book,' also called the 'Confidential Credit Reference Book,' which is distributed among its subscribers in the cities of Tacoma and Seattle. That among others the name of plaintiff appears therein as follows: "C.' Wm. A. Denney, 3415 N. 26th St.' That a key appeared in the book, a part of which is as follows: 'A Key to Rating. 'A', Generally prompt. 'B', Good, somewhat slow. 'C' Inquire at office; it must be distinctly understood that this does not indicate a credit rating, but the information we have is such that in justice to the party and the association we prefer to furnish it upon application.' That such publication was false and libelous and willfully published by defendant association, being aided and assisted by the other defendants, for the purpose of coercing payment of a disputed account. Plaintiff further alleges that he has been refused credit and injured in his feelings and reputation, for all of which he claims general damages.

The trial court evidently sustained the demurrer of the several defendants upon the theory that the words published were not actionable per se, and, for the want of an allegation of special damages, the complaint did not state a cause of action. The general rule is that all words alleged to be libelous should be considered by the court in their natural and obvious sense unless they be ambiguous. Urban v. Helmick, 15 Wash. 155, 45 P. 747. The office of the innuendo in pleading is to apply the libel to a person, or to connect such person with a place or thing of evil repute, and cannot be relied on to make words otherwise unobjectionable the basis of a recovery. 25 Cyc. 449, 450; Newell, Slander & Libel, p. 619; Odgers, Libel & Slander, p. 106 et seq.; Townsend, Slander & Libel, § 335. In all charges of this kind, it is the duty of the court to regard the words spoken or written as might a stranger to the parties, and if they be in themselves and without the aid of the innuendo otherwise innocent, and if they do not in themselves and without the aid of the special knowledge possessed by the parties concerned imply malice, or hold the party out to public contempt or ridicule, or make any charge involving moral turpitude, or touch him in his business, or subject him to an infamous punishment, it is the general rule that they are not libelous per se. If the words do not come within this rule, 'it is necessary that the declaration should set forth precisely in that way the damage resulted. It is not sufficient to allege generally that the plaintiff has suffered special damages, or that the party has been put to great costs and expenses. By general damages in such case is meant pecuniary loss.' Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 23 L.Ed. 308; 5 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 766; 25 Cyc. 455; Dun v. Maier, 82 F. 169, 27 C. C. A. 100; Bradstreet Co. v. Oswald, 96 Ga. 396, 23 S.E. 423; Newbold v. Bradstreet, 57 Md. 38, 40 Am. Rep. 426.

Within these rules we are constrained to hold with the trial court in the construction of the complaint now before us. In Woodruff v. Bradstreet Co., 116 N.Y. 217, 22 N.E 354, 5 L. R. A. 555, publication was made that a judgment had been rendered against the plaintiff. In this case the association did not give a credit rating, but indicated that in justice to plaintiff such information as it had with respect to his commercial standing would be furnished upon application to any interested subscriber. If sought, the fact would have been revealed that it held for collection a disputed account. In principle there can be no difference between these cases. The Court of Appeals in that case held: 'The meaning of wards in an action of slander or libel cannot be extended by innuendo beyond their import, aided, as they may be, by extrinsic facts with which they are connected. Its use or purpose is to explain the application of words by connection with such facts and circumstances as are alleged. There are none alleged here which will justify the inference that the publication issued by the defendant carried with it any meaning essentially different than it would have taken from any other source. The fact that its apparent authenticity may have been greater is not important. The information sought to be given by the report was that a judgment had been recovered against the plaintiff for the amount, and, as the consequence, he was charged by it with liability to that extent. That was what the defendant's subscribers were permitted, from its report, to...