Denton v. State
Decision Date | 06 December 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 1038-94,1038-94 |
Citation | 911 S.W.2d 388 |
Parties | Steven Wayne DENTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Allan K. Butcher, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Elizabeth A. Martin, Asst. Dist. Atty., Fort Worth, Robert A. Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. After he entered pleas of "True" to the enhancement paragraphs setting out two prior felony convictions, he was sentenced by the trial judge to 40 years confinement. On appeal, he claimed the evidence was insufficient to prove that he "operated" the complainant's vehicle. The conviction was affirmed and appellant filed a petition for discretionary review, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the term "operate" as used in the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle statute, extends to the exertion of power or influence over the vehicle.
Complainant, awakened in the night by the sound of his pick-up's engine, ran outside to find appellant seated behind the wheel. Appellant had broken into the truck and started the engine, only to find that despite his best efforts to accelerate, the vehicle would not budge. According to complainant, the truck required a few minutes' warm-up time before it could be driven. Appellant claims his actions did not constitute operation, since the truck was never actually moved from a stationary position. He defines operation as "causing a vehicle to function in the manner in which it was intended to function." He claims that in the case of a car or truck this means "to drive," which in turn means to cause the vehicle to move. Relying on this definition, he contends he committed only an attempt at operation, since movement was never actually accomplished.
Section 31.07(a) of the Texas Penal Code provides:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly operates another's boat, airplane or motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner.
Because the term "operate" is not defined in the Penal Code, the Court of Appeals relied on the plain meaning of the word to answer the question presented. See, e.g. Howard v. State, 690 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). That Court, referring to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, chose to define "operate" as the "exertion of power or influence." The Court of Appeals addressed the cases cited by Appellant in support of his definition of "operate" and found the facts of those cases distinguishable from the facts of this case. We agree with the Court of Appeals.
In several of the cases offered by appellant, evidence of driving was held sufficient to prove operation, while in others a lack of such evidence was held to result in insufficient evidence to prove operation. Appellant contends these holdings indicate that "driving is the gravamen of the offense." For instance, appellant notes that in Galan v. State, 301 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Crim.App.1957), it was held that "drive" and "operate" are synonymous terms. However, we find a more accurate interpretation of the cases to be that while driving does involve operation, operation does not necessarily involve driving.
In the cases appellant cites in which evidence was held to be insufficient, the issue was the identity of the person behind the wheel, not whether operation had in fact occurred. For example, in one case where the evidence was held insufficient, appellant was seen exiting from the passenger side of the vehicle immediately after it came to a stop. Because there were two possible drivers in the car, the evidence was held insufficient to show that the defendant was driving and therefore operating the vehicle. On the other hand, in Dickson v. State, 642 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, pet. ref'd.), appellant was seen exiting the driver's side door of a stolen van immediately after it came to a stop. This evidence supported an inference that defendant was driving and therefore operating the van. See also, Protz v. State, 681 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, rev. ref'd) and Middlebrook v. State, 803 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1990, rev. ref'd). Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Because the meaning of "operate" was not at issue in those cases, we find they do not support appellant's argument.
We are, instead, persuaded by several DWI cases where the definition of "operate" was directly at issue. For instance, in Barton v. State, 882 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1994, no pet.), the defendant was found asleep at the wheel of his still but idling automobile, his feet depressing the brake and clutch. When awakened by an officer, the defendant immediately attempted to engage the clutch, change gears and restart the engine. The defendant claimed he was not operating the car because he exerted no personal effort to cause its movement or non-movement. The court held:
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York v. State
...asleep with the engine running has been held to be an indication that a person had operated his car earlier. See Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388, 389–90 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (a person “operates” a motor vehicle for purposes of DWI when he takes “action to affect the functioning of his vehicl......
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State v. Bolles
...defined are to be given their common, ordinary, or usual meaning).45 Kirsch , 357 S.W.3d at 650 (citing Denton v. State , 911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ); Green v. Texas , 476 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (noting that undefined words are to be "understood as ordinary ......
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Kinnett v. State
...that would enable the vehicle's use.’ " Kirsch v. State , 357 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Denton v. State , 911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ). Courts consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conclusion th......
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In re Puente-Salazar
...take action that would affect the functioning of the vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle's use. See Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Furthermore, the Service disagrees with the respondent's conclusion that because his conviction does not include an affir......
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Table of cases
...§7:124 A-4 Texas DWI Manual Delane v. State , 369 S.W.3d 412 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], pet. ref’d), §§9:70, 13:55 Denton v. State , 911 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995), §13:20 Derichsweiler v. State , 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011), §3:131 Dhillon v. State , 138 S.W.3d 583 (Tex.Ap......
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Offenses against public health, safety, and morals
...enable the vehicle’s use” in order to assess the sufficiency of the evidence to support proof of that element. See Denton v. State , 911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex.Crim. App. 1995). In the Kirsch case, involving a motorcycle as the motor vehicle, the trial judge adapted this definition for use in......
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Table of cases
...2006), §7:124 Delane v. State , 369 S.W.3d 412 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.], pet. ref’d), §§9:70, 13:55 Denton v. State , 911 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995), §13:20 Table of Cases A-525 Derichsweiler v. State , 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011), §3:131 Dhillon v. State , 138 S.W.3d 583 ......
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Table of cases
...v. State 266 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954) 3:1770 Denham v. State 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) 3:650, 3:660 Denton v. State 911 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) 11:705 Devine v. State 786 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) 6:2440 Dickey v. State 22 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1......