Department of Developmental Services v. Ladd

• Decision Date: 27 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. AO46065,AO46065
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gloria Beale LADD et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 485

273 Cal.Rptr. 485

224 Cal.App.3d 128

DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gloria Beale LADD et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. AO46065.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Sept. 27, 1990.

As Modified Oct. 23, 1990.

Review Denied Dec. 20, 1990.

John L. Boudett, Wright and Boudett, San Anselmo, for defendants and appellants.

Latham & Watkins, William J. Meeske, Michael Scott Feeley, Los Angeles, for amicus curiae on behalf of appellants Mental Health Advocacy Services.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Stephanie Wald, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., John C. Porter, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

ANDERSON, Presiding Justice.

In this declaratory relief action the parties ask whether the state may constitutionally charge a state hospital patient for the cost of the patient's institutional care, support and maintenance following commitment pursuant to Penal Code section 1026. ¹ At issue is the fairness and rationality of a statutory scheme which does not separate out protective costs from other costs of institutional care, and which holds certain groups of patients liable for their care while exempting others. Pursuant to this statutory scheme the trial court declared the state was entitled to reimbursement for the costs of support for a mental inmate who was involuntarily confined subsequent to being found not guilty by reason of insanity for the killing of her two sons. (Her estate consisted chiefly of her inheritance from her sons.) We conclude that the legislation does not violate state or federal equal protection principles and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1975 Gloria Beale Ladd killed her two teenage sons. After finding that she was insane at the time of the killings and had not recovered her sanity, the court rendered judgment committing her to Patton State Hospital for treatment. The state later transferred Ladd to Napa State Hospital, her present placement.

Several years later this court held that former Probate Code section 258, which prohibited a person who unlawfully and intentionally caused the death of a decedent from succeeding to any portion of the decedent's estate, did not bar Ladd from inheriting her sons' estates. (Estate of Ladd (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 219, 153 Cal.Rptr. 888.) The superior court then appointed appellant David Plank as trustee of a blocked account which presently holds approximately $100,000.

In 1984 the Department of Developmental Services (Department) filed a complaint seeking to recoup from the account funds expended for Ladd's care, support and maintenance in the state institutions. In its third amended complaint the Department abandoned its demand for immediate payment and asked for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE SECTION 7275² insofar as it holds a patient committed to a state hospital pursuant to section 1026 responsible for the costs of his or her institutional care, support and maintenance. The court entered judgment declaring section 7275 constitutional to that extent.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellants, assisted by the briefing of amicus curiae Mental Health Advocacy Services, attack section 7275 on two grounds. First, they claim that under California Supreme Court authority, no one class of individuals may be taxed with institutional costs associated with the protection of society, and section 7275 does not separate out these impermissible costs from other care and maintenance expenses. Second, they assert that the law arbitrarily imposes a special financial burden--namely, the cost of institutional care and treatment--on the class of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to mental institutions. Since, they argue, the law does not require the similarly situated class of inmates committed to state prison who are later transferred to state hospitals to shoulder the cost of care and treatment, section 7275 cannot withstand equal protection scrutiny. We hold there is no constitutional impediment to charging Penal Code section 1026 patients for their own care, and further resolve there is a rational basis for treating these patients differently from their convicted, then transferred, fellow patients.

A. Charging Patients for Institutional Care

In finding section 7275 ³ constitutional, the trial court explained: "The constitutionality of Welfare and Institutions Code section 7275 has been previously ruled upon by this court insofar as it provides for patient liability. See Guardianship of Gridley (1973) 32 CA 3d 1053 at 1057-58 for a summary of the interpretations of the law." Gridley involved an appeal from a judgment ordering the patient's guardian to pay a specified sum from the assets of the patient's estate for her care at Napa State Hospital. He attacked the proceedings on the basis that he was denied a hearing on the reasonableness of the charges.

In resolving the appeal, the court alluded to the relevant law concerning patient liability: "So far as is material here, the law provides that the estate of a patient in a state hospital for the mentally disordered shall be liable for his care, support and maintenance in the state institution of which he is a patient. [Citations.] In Guardianship of Hicks [ (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 629, 39 Cal.Rptr. 698] ... the court stated, 'The liability of the estate of the incompetent for the charges made for her care at the state hospital is a statutory one and is unconditional.... When the Supreme Court, in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner [1964] 60 Cal.2d 716 [36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720] ... decided that the statutes imposing liability for cost of care of an incompetent upon certain relatives are unconstitutional, it made a distinction, as it had in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley [1963] 59 Cal.2d 247 [28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22] ... of the liability of relatives from liability of the estate, and did not overrule the [Department of Mental Hygiene v.] McGilvery [ (1958) 50 Cal.2d 742, 329 P.2d 689] case insofar as the latter held the estate liability to be unconditional....' " (Guardianship of Gridley, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1057-1058, 108 Cal.Rptr. 200.)

Appellants insist that the lower court's exclusive reliance on Gridley ignored the "protection of society" arguments which they advanced, and is not a valid summary of the law in light of the recent California Supreme Court opinions in In re Jerald C. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 1, 201 Cal.Rptr. 342, 678 P.2d 917, and County of San Mateo v. Dell J. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1236, 252 Cal.Rptr. 478, 762 P.2d 1202. They claim Gridley is "outdated authority" for distinguishing between estates of patients committed under Penal Code section 1026 and their relatives.

We begin our review by examining the rationale of Hawley and Kirchner, and then move on to discuss the more recent holdings in Jerald C. and Dell J.

(1) Hawley, Kirchner and Progeny

Over the years the courts have whittled away at the liability designated under section 7275. As applied to relatives of a defendant charged with a crime but deemed not competent to stand trial, our Supreme Court has said such relatives are not liable for the costs of support and maintenance while the accused is detained at a state hospital for treatment pursuant to Penal Code section 1368 et seq. (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, supra, 59 Cal.2d 247, 251, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22.)

The court reasoned that a person committed to a state hospital under either Penal Code section 1026 or section 1368 et seq. "is held for the primary purpose of protection of the public in the course of administration of laws prohibiting crime." (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 255, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22.) In the court's opinion, since the sequestration and treatment of persons who are dangerous to themselves or others is a state function, the expense of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should, subject to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his or her estate, be borne by the state. The court went on to state that the authority relied upon by the plaintiff involved liability of the estate of the accused pursuant to a Penal Code section 1026 commitment rather than that of "so-called" responsible relatives. (Id., at pp. 255-256, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22.)

Similarly, the next year the Supreme Court held that the reasoning of Hawley equally applied to the relatives of a patient civilly committed to a state hospital. (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, remanded at (1965) 380 U.S. 194, 85 S.Ct. 871, 13 L.Ed.2d 753 sub. opn. 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321.) There the Department sought to recover from the estate of decedent daughter for the institutional care of her mother.

The court began its analysis by pointing out that at common law there was no liability on a child to support his or her parents, or on parents to support an adult child. (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 718, fn. 4, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) The court further reasoned that the purposes of confinement and treatment of a civilly committed patient encompass the protection of society from that person, as well as his or her "own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic. Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause." (Id., at p. 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720.) Finally, crucial to this holding was the fact that the operative statute imposed absolute liability on servient relatives, without considering the patient's own assets and ability to pay, or giving the relative a right of recoupment against the patient.

Subsequently,...