Department of Economic and Employment Development v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 01 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 794,794
• Citation: 671 A.2d 523,108 Md.App. 250
• Parties: DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT, et al. v. Maria M. TAYLOR. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 250

108 Md.App. 250

671 A.2d 523

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT, et al. v. Maria M. TAYLOR.

No. 794, Sept. Term, 1995.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 8, 1996.

Michele J. McDonald, Staff Attorney (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General and Lynn M. Weiskittel, Assistant Attorney General on the brief for appellant, DEED) all of Baltimore, MD, John S. Mathias, County Attorney and Paul G. Zimmerman Assistant County Attorney on the brief for appellant, Frederick County, both of Frederick, MD, for appellants

No brief or appearance by appellee's counsel.

Argued Before BISHOP, WENNER and HOLLANDER, JJ.

HOLLANDER, Judge.

In this case, we must decide whether the doctrine of "constructive voluntary quit" constitutes a ground for disqualification from unemployment benefits. We conclude that it does not apply as a bar to recovery of unemployment compensation.

Maria M. Taylor, appellee, applied for unemployment benefits after she was terminated from her employment with the County Commissioners of Frederick County, Maryland ("the County"). The County discharged Taylor because her Frederick County driving permit, which she needed in order to perform her job, was revoked after Taylor was convicted for driving while intoxicated. The Board of Appeals ("the Board") of the Department of Economic and Employment Development ("DEED"), ¹ appellant, held that Taylor's loss of her driver's permit constituted a breach of "a condition of continued employment ... required by her employer," and amounted to a "constructive voluntary quit," thus disqualifying her from receiving benefits under the "voluntarily leaving work" provision of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Act, Md.Code (1991, 1995 Supp.), § 8-1001(a) of the Labor & Employment Article ("L.E.").

Taylor sought review of the Board's decision in the Circuit Court for Washington County. It reversed, holding that Taylor's actions did not amount to "voluntarily leaving work." The Board has now appealed to this Court; appellee did not

                submit a brief or appear at oral argument. 2  The Board presents the following issues for our consideration
                

I. Is the Board's determination that Appellee voluntarily left her employment by failing to meet a condition of the employment correct as a matter of law?

II. Is the Board's finding that Appellee voluntarily quit her employment supported by substantial evidence?

We hold that the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Act does not authorize the denial of benefits to a claimant on the ground of "constructive voluntary quitting." Therefore, we answer both questions in the negative and shall affirm the circuit court.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Since 1986, Taylor was employed as a laborer for the County. Her job entailed manual work for the County Department of Parks and Recreation, including a variety of parks maintenance and custodial tasks. As part of her job, she was required to operate a County vehicle, both in the parks and on public roads. Therefore, as a condition of her employment, Taylor was obligated to have a valid Maryland driver's license and, in addition, a "Frederick County Employee Driving Permit." In order for employees to retain their driving permits, the County required that the employees have fewer than six points on their driving records.

In January 1989, Taylor was stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. She refused to submit to a chemical test and her driving record indicates that she was not convicted of any alcohol-related offense. Nor was her license revoked, notwithstanding her refusal to take the chemical test. Instead, the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") restricted her driver's license to employment and educational purposes.

This apparently occurred because Earl A. Eyler, the County parks superintendent, wrote a letter to the MVA, dated February 17, 1989, informing it that Taylor needed to have a license to perform her job satisfactorily. Nevertheless, by March 1989, the County discovered that Taylor had accumulated four points on her driving record, due to prior speeding violations. Consequently, her County driving permit was placed on probationary status, and Taylor was warned that she would be terminated if her County driving permit were revoked.

Several years later, on February 2, 1993, Taylor was again arrested for driving while intoxicated and, on May 20, 1993, she was convicted. Pursuant to Md.Code (1977, 1993 Repl.Vol, 1995 Supp.), § 16-402(a) of the Transportation Article ("Transp."), twelve points were assessed on her driving record. Nevertheless, the MVA again allowed Taylor to keep her license, and restricted her driving to employment and educational purposes. See Transp. § 16-405.

During a routine check of driving records on July 20, 1993, the County discovered the points that had been assessed against Taylor's license as a result of the alcohol offense, and it revoked her County driving permit. But, for reasons that are not apparent from the record, the County continued to retain Taylor as an employee. In February 1994, however, Taylor was ordered to clear the points from her license within ninety days, which she had no authority to do. Consequently, on May 27, 1994, Eyler sent Taylor a letter terminating her employment, effective the following day. The letter stated, "[t]he ability to drive is essential to satisfactorily perform the job of parks laborer," and added, "Only a temporary accommodation of this requirement can be made for this position. I have made this temporary accommodation for a reasonable period of time."

Taylor filed for unemployment benefits under L.E., Title 8. A claims examiner concluded that "insufficient evidence has been presented to show any misconduct connected with the work." The claims examiner thus allowed Taylor's claim.

The County contested this determination and, on July 15, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before a hearing examiner. The hearing examiner found that, "as a condition of her employment," Taylor was "required to possess ... the ability to obtain ... a Frederick Employee County Permit." The hearing examiner also found that the "claimant became aware of the [C]ounty's regulation that an accumulation of more then [sic] six points on a drivers [sic] record can result in disciplinary action leading to termination of employment." The hearing examiner further noted that, although the claimant had the "legal right" to drive to and from work, she could not drive a vehicle while at work. Therefore, the hearing examiner determined that the County "was justified in discharging the claimant for her inability to continue in her work classification for lack of a valid County drivers [sic] permit...."

Although the hearing examiner concluded that Taylor's conduct constituted "misconduct connected with employment," within the meaning of L.E. § 8-1003(a), the hearing examiner rejected any finding of gross misconduct. The hearing examiner said:

Accordingly, I cannot find that the claimant's violation of the employer's rules concerning driving privileges rises to the level of gross misconduct.... But, clearly, the claimant's conduct in driving while intoxicated is a matter which is connected with the work, because she knew or should have know [sic] that the accumulation of driving points could result in termination from employment, and that she would be in violation of the employer's rules and regulations if such would occur.

Taylor was thus denied unemployment benefits for ten weeks.

Both Taylor and the County appealed to the Board. After the Board reviewed the record, it issued an opinion in which it adopted the hearing examiner's findings of fact, but disagreed with the hearing examiner's legal conclusion. The Board determined that Taylor's failure to retain her County driving permit constituted a "constructive voluntary quit" within the Taylor then sought judicial review in the circuit court, which held that the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that Taylor had voluntarily left her employment. It thus reversed the Board's decision, and remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether Taylor's actions constituted misconduct under L.E. § 8-1003(a) or gross misconduct under L.E. § 8-1002(a).

meaning of L.E. § 8-1001(a). Accordingly, the Board disqualified Taylor from receiving benefits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for our review is established by L.E. § 8-512(d), which states:

In a judicial proceeding under this section, findings of fact of the Board of Appeals are conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court is confined to questions of law if:

(1) findings of fact are supported by evidence that is competent, material, and substantial in view of the entire record; and

(2) there is no fraud.

In reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, our review is generally limited to a determination of: (1) whether the agency applied the correct principles of law; and (2) whether the agency's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. See Caucus Distributors, Inc. v. Maryland Securities Commissioner, 320 Md. 313, 323-24, 577 A.2d 783 (1990); Board of Education of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22, 35, 491 A.2d 1186 (1985); Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City v. James, 96 Md.App. 401, 418-19, 625 A.2d 361, cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 332 Md. 381, 631 A.2d 451 (1993). See generally Anderson v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 330 Md. 187, 210-13, 623 A.2d 198 (1993).

Our review of the Board's findings of fact is deferential. In the absence of fraud, our inquiry is whether the In contrast, our review of the Board's decisions on issues of law is not deferential. Columbia Road Citizens' Association v. Montgomery County, 98 Md.App. 695, 698, 635 A.2d 30 (1994). Thus, "the reviewing court may substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Liberty Nursing Center, Inc. v. Department of Health and...