Depre v. Pacific Coast Forge Co.

• Decision Date: 04 October 1927
• Docket Number: 20508.
• Citation: 145 Wash. 263,259 P. 720
• Parties: DEPRE v. PACIFIC COAST FORGE CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

259 P. 720

145 Wash. 263

DEPRE v. PACIFIC COAST FORGE CO.

No. 20508.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 4, 1927

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, Judge.

Action by Andrew Depre against the Pacific Coast Forge Company. From a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer to the complaint was sustained, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Guie &amp Guie, of Seattle, for appellant.

Bogle Bogle & Gates and Edwin G. Dobrin, all of Seattle, for respondent.

John H Dunbar, Atty. Gen., and Mark H. Wight, Asst. Atty. Gen., amici curiae.

ASKREN J.

Plaintiff was employed by the defendant for a period of 23 months in a room where there was a tank into which was poured each day a large quantity of sulphuric acid and muriatic acid. He brought this action for damages, claiming that gases and vapors were released in the room where he worked which inflamed and affected his lungs and lessened his resistance to tuberculosis, as a result of which he contracted that disease rendering him permanently incapacitated. The complaint charged negligence in failing to provide the workroom with sufficient ventilation, and alleged a request for such ventilation and a promise by the defendant to provide it. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and, plaintiff refusing to further plead, judgment of dismissal was entered. This appeal followed.

Respondent, in seeking to uphold the judgment of the trial court, insists that the Workmen's Compensation Act (Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 7673-7796) is a complete defense to the action, and that appellant, by its terms, is entitled to compensation from the state. The Workmen's Compensation Act has been in existence some 16 years, and in all the numerous cases brought to this court this is the first time it has been contended that a disability such as appellant suffered came under its provisions. It is also a matter of common knowledge, of which we will take judicial notice, that the commission empowered with the duty of administering the act has never recognized such cases as within the purview of the legislative enactment. There has been no change in the provisions as to such cases during that time, and it must therefore be logically assumed that its administration has been in accord with the intent of that body.

These recited facts indicate very strongly that the present action is not one that comes within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

To justify its contention, respondent cites liberally from several of our decisions construing the act, notably State ex rel. Davis v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466, where we said that its purpose is to furnish a remedy 'regardless of the manner in which the injury was received'; Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 136 P. 685, L. R. A. 1916A, 358, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 154, where we said that the act substituted a new remedy 'reaching every injury sustained by any workman while employed in any such industry, regardless of the cause of the injury or the negligence to which it might be attributed'; and Ross v. Erickson Construction Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155 P. 153, L. R. A. 1916F, 319, where the act was said to be 'designed to compensate an injured workman without reference to the manner of his injury. * * *' These statements, of course, are general in character, and refer only to such injuries as are covered by the act. Rem. Comp. Stats. § 7675, designates and interprets the word 'injury' as used in the act, as follows:

'The words 'injury' or 'injured' as used in this act refer only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction of disease. * * *'

We have had occasion to interpret the phrase 'fortuitous event'...