Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1987
• Docket Number: Nos. 52153-1,51151-9,s. 52153-1
• Citation: 107 Wn.2d 563,731 P.2d 497
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: , 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 784, 1 A.D. Cases 1012 Julius REESE and Betty H. Reese, a marital community, Appellants, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., Respondent. William BEAUCHAMP, Appellant, v. COLUMBIA LIGHTING, INC., Respondent.

Page 563

107 Wn.2d 563

731 P.2d 497, 51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 784,

1 A.D. Cases 1012

Julius REESE and Betty H. Reese, a marital community, Appellants, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., Respondent.

William BEAUCHAMP, Appellant, v. COLUMBIA LIGHTING, INC., Respondent.

Nos. 52153-1, 51151-9.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Jan. 22, 1987.

Thomas Geisness, Seattle, Lonnie Davis, Disabilities Law Project, Tacoma, for appellants Reese.

Stiley & Kodis, P.S., Gather M. Kodis, Spokane, for appellant Beauchamp.

Seth Dawson, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Marya J. Silbernale, Deputy County Prosecutor, Everett, Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Susan Rae Sampson, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, amici curiae for respondents.

Charles K. Wiggins, Seattle, Gary N. Bloom, Spokane, Douglass A. North, Seattle, amici curiae on behalf of Washington Trial Lawyers Ass'n Kenneth Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Winslow Whitman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Brian J. Linn, Seattle, amici curiae for appellants.

Lee, Smart, Cook, Martin & Patterson, P.S., Inc., Michael A. Patterson, Seattle, for respondent Sears.

Winston & Cashatt, Charles Matthew Andersen, Beverly L. Anderson, Spokane, for respondent Columbia Lighting.

UTTER, Justice.

Julius and Betty Reese and William Beauchamp appeal summary judgment dismissals of their employment discrimination claims. Their appeals have been consolidated because they raise an identical question of law: whether the exclusive remedy provision of the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), RCW 51.04.010 et seq., bars employee actions against their employers for disability discrimination under the Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. Reese and Beauchamp argue that the two acts in question have significantly different purposes and seek to remedy different types of injuries. They contend that an IIA claim for a physical injury suffered on the job should not bar an action to recover for the additional harm suffered from management's subsequent, and allegedly discriminatory, response to the resulting disability. We agree, and because we reject additional arguments made in support of the trial court by respondent employers, Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Columbia Lighting, Inc., we reverse the trial courts and remand for trial.

The facts, taken from the complaints and affidavits of the nonmoving parties and viewed in a light most favorable to appellants, are as follows.

Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

Julius Reese had been employed by Sears as a warehouseman since 1968. In April 1980, he began receiving medical treatment for chronic foot pain and could no longer do the heavy work assigned to him. Reese's physician advised Sears that Reese should receive light duty work. Sears refused to allow Reese to return to work until he could "work full capacity." Soon thereafter, Reese filed a workmen's compensation claim based on his foot injury. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals approved Reese's claim, and on January 4, 1984 a King County Superior Court affirmed the Board of Appeals order.

After suffering the injury to his foot, Reese sought to continue work "by performing Grade 12 clerical and light manual work." Sears refused to make any accommodation for Reese's new handicap, and on January 14, 1982, refused to continue employing Reese absent a full medical release, which Reese's physician could not give. As a result of Sears' 1982 decision to terminate Reese's employment, Reese and his wife brought this action for handicap discrimination under RCW 49.60, alleging that Sears had failed to reasonably accommodate Reese's (heel/foot) disability.

Sears moved for summary judgment, offering three legal theories to support its contention that Reese's discrimination action was barred as a matter of law. The King County Superior Court granted Sears' summary judgment motion, and dismissed Reese's claim, but did not indicate which legal theory supported its decision.

Reese appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals, but on October 18, 1985, that appeal was administratively transferred to this court.

Beauchamp v. Columbia Lighting, Inc.

William Beauchamp was employed as a fabricator by Columbia Lighting, Inc. (Columbia), pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. This agreement provided for a 1-year leave of absence by an employee for medical reasons. It also provided for a 5-step grievance procedure should any dispute arise between the parties based on the interpretation or application of any part or portion of the agreement. On February 20, 1981, Beauchamp took a leave of absence for chronic bronchitis. He immediately filed a workmen's compensation claim under the IIA alleging that toxicity in the air at Columbia caused his bronchitis. Beginning March 21, 1981, Beauchamp has received time-loss benefits for his condition. Columbia has appealed the Department of Labor and Industries' determination that Beauchamp's injury (i.e., the bronchitis) resulted from toxicity at Columbia. Beauchamp's workmen's compensation claim is still in dispute.

On February 19, 1982, within the 1-year period for medical leaves of absence, Beauchamp presented Columbia with a letter from his physician stating that Beauchamp could return to work if he wore a "gas mask." Columbia refused to accommodate Beauchamp's need to wear a gas mask, and refused to allow him to return to work. On June 23, 1982, as a result of management's decision, but without pursuing the contract grievance procedure, Beauchamp brought this suit, alleging that Columbia's failure to return him to work constituted a refusal to accommodate his asserted handicap in violation of RCW 49.60. Columbia moved for summary judgment, offering three legal theories to support its motion. The Spokane County Superior Court granted Columbia's motion for summary judgment, but did not specify which legal theory it found persuasive.

Beauchamp appealed directly to this court, but his appeal was transferred to Division Three of the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, Beauchamp's appeal was transferred back to this court and consolidated with the Reese appeal.

Summary judgment is appropriate only if, after considering all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Here, the trial courts dismissed appellants' claims because they found them barred as a matter of law. Since neither trial court indicated which legal theory it relied upon, this court must review the five theories offered at trial: (1) Both employers argue that the exclusive remedy provision of the IIA precludes their employees' discrimination claims; (2) Sears argues that Reese's claim is barred by the election ofremedies doctrine; (3) Sears also argues that Reese's claim is barred because he was unable to perform the duties of his previous position; (4) Columbia argues that the exclusive remedies of the collective bargaining agreement barred Beauchamp's discrimination claim; and (5) Columbia argues that Beauchamp failed to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination.

I

To support their contention that the IIA exclusive remedy provision barred their employees' discrimination actions, respondents characterized the discrimination claims as arising out of the same injuries and set of facts as the IIA claims. We disagree. Appellant employees claim to have suffered two separate and distinct injuries: a physical injury suffered in the workplace and actionable under the IIA; and a subsequent injury allegedly caused by the employers' handicap discrimination, which is actionable under the Law Against Discrimination. When viewed as appellants contend, no conflict exists between the two laws in question. The Legislature enacted the laws to remedy the two very different kinds of injuries the employees claim to have suffered.

In enacting the IIA in 1911, the Legislature noted how ineffective the common law had been in redressing worker claims for injuries they suffered in the workplace:

The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received in employment is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. In practice it proves to be economically unwise and unfair. Its administration has produced the result that little of the cost of the employer has reached the worker and that little only at large expense to the public. The remedy of the worker has been uncertain, slow and inadequate. Injuries in such works, formerly occasional, have become frequent and inevitable. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and even more upon the welfare of its wage worker....

Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 1 (codified at RCW 51.04.010). To address this problem the Legislature provided "sure and certain relief for workers" and provided for the exclusivity of workmen compensation actions. Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 1 (codified at RCW 51.04.010). The statutory language demonstrates that, from its inception, the IIA was designed to remedy only physical injuries. See, e.g., Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 3. So narrow was the statutory definition of "injury" that even some physical ailments were not remedied under the act. See, e.g., Depre v. Pacific Coast Forge Co., 145 Wash. 263, 259 P. 720 (1927). While the definition of "injury" has been expanded,see RCW 51.08.100, and an additional basis for IIA recovery has been added, see RCW 51.08.140, the Legislature's intent to remedy physical injuries remains untouched.

Enacted in 1949, the Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60, sweeps more broadly than the IIA. The Legislature declared the purpose of RCW 49.60 as:

[A]n exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil rights. The...