Derwin v. State Employees Retirement Com'n

• Decision Date: 25 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 14980,14980
• Citation: 661 A.2d 1025,234 Conn. 411
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John T. DERWIN v. STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

Page 1025

661 A.2d 1025

234 Conn. 411

John T. DERWIN v. STATE EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT COMMISSION.

No. 14980.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 3, 1995.

Decided July 25, 1995.

Thomas P. Clifford III, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Overend, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

Gary R. Kevorkian, Granby, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

This case requires us to determine whether the decision of an administrative agency after reconsideration is appealable under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA) ¹ even though the agency decision prior to reconsideration was itself not final for purposes of appeal. The plaintiff, John T. Derwin, sought certain additional retirement benefits from the defendant, the state employees retirement commission (commission), under General Statutes §§ 5-173 and 5-192b. ² The commission denied the plaintiff's request and, after granting the plaintiff's application for reconsideration, affirmed its original decision. The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the commission after reconsideration to the Superior Court, which sustained his appeal. The commission appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. The plaintiff was continuously employed by the state of Connecticut from April, 1970, until his retirement in May, 1990, serving first as a correctional officer and then as a state police officer. ³ Because the plaintiff had accumulated over twenty years of hazardous duty service, he was entitled to hazardous duty retirement benefits pursuant to § 5-173. ⁴

Prior to his state service, the plaintiff had been employed as a police officer by the town of Windsor Locks from April, 1967, to April, 1970. During the period of his municipal service, the plaintiff had been a member of the municipal employees retirement system and had contributed to the municipal employees' retirement fund. ⁵ Because his membership in the municipal retirement system terminated upon his resignation from the Windsor Locks police department, the plaintiff petitioned the commission to transfer his municipal retirement funds to the state retirement system. See footnote 2. The commission granted the plaintiff's request on February 29, 1972.

Upon his state retirement, the plaintiff applied for and received hazardous duty retirement benefits under § 5-173. The commission, however, declined to include the plaintiff's municipal service in its calculation of the plaintiff's retirement benefits. On July 5, 1990, the plaintiff filed a claim with the commission under General Statutes § 5-155a(j) ⁶ seeking credit for his municipal service in the determination of his hazardous duty retirement benefits. The commission granted the plaintiff a hearing on his claim pursuant to § 5-155a(g) ⁷ and, on August 20, 1992, denied his request for additional hazardous duty retirement credit. The commission also voted to refund to the plaintiff all moneys that he had paid into the municipal retirement fund, with five percent annual interest from the date on which those payments were transferred from the municipal retirement fund to the state retirement fund. The plaintiff thereafter sought reconsideration of the commission's decision under § 5- 155a(k). ⁸ The commission granted the plaintiff's request for reconsideration and, after a hearing, affirmed its original decision denying the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the commission to the Superior Court under General Statutes § 4-183(a), ⁹ claiming that the commission improperly had failed to include his years of municipal service in its calculation of his hazardous duty retirement benefits. The commission filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal on the ground that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it. The trial court, on March 3, 1993, denied the commission's motion to dismiss. On August 4, 1993, the commission sought reconsideration of its motion to dismiss, citing this court's decision in Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 226 Conn. 792, 629 A.2d 367 (1993), which had been released on August 3, 1993. After denying the commission's motion for reconsideration, the trial court sustained the plaintiff's appeal and remanded the case to the commission for a recalculation of the plaintiff's retirement benefits to include credit for his prior municipal service. This appeal followed.

The commission claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal because the commission's decision upon reconsideration was not a "final decision" for purposes of the UAPA. The plaintiff maintains that the commission's denial of his claim after reconsideration was an appealable final decision under the UAPA and, further, that the trial court properly determined that he was entitled to credit for his prior municipal service in the calculation of his hazardous duty retirement benefits. We conclude that the decision of the commission after reconsideration was not a final decision and, accordingly, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal. ¹⁰

The appealability of an agency decision is governed by § 4-183(a) of the UAPA, which provides that "[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the superior court as provided in this section." (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, we have consistently held that the Superior Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from a "final decision" of an administrative agency. See, e.g., State v. State Employees' Review Board, 231 Conn. 391, 400 n. 13, 650 A.2d 158 (1994); Summit Hydropower Partnership v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 226 Conn. at 811-12, 629 A.2d 367. Under General Statutes § 4-166(3), " '[f]inal decision' means (A) the agency determination in a contested case, (B) a declaratory ruling issued by an agency pursuant to section 4-176 or (C) an agency decision made after reconsideration...." ¹¹

The plaintiff claims that the trial court correctly concluded that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal because the commission's denial of his request constituted "an agency decision made after reconsideration" within the meaning of § 4-166(3)(C). ¹² In the plaintiff's view, the language of § 4-166(3)(C) is clear on its face and, consequently, we need look no further than the words of the statute to determine its meaning. The commission, on the other hand, contends that § 4-166(3)(C), when read in context, cannot be interpreted literally to include all agency decisions made after reconsideration but, rather, must be construed to apply only to those agency decisions that were "final decisions" before reconsideration because they were made in contested cases. We agree with the commission.

Because our fundamental objective in construing a statute " 'is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature' "; Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91-92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); we will not undertake an examination of § 4-166(3)(C) "with blinders on regarding what the legislature intended [it] to mean." Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). Accordingly, our analysis of § 4-166(3)(C) is not limited solely to the words of the statute. Instead, we must also "look ... to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." State v. Metz, supra, at 409, 645 A.2d 965; Fleming v. Garnett, supra, at 92, 646 A.2d 1308.

Furthermore, we are guided by the principle that "the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law...." Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 510, 624 A.2d 876 (1993); see also Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187-88, 640 A.2d 601 (1994). Indeed, this tenet of statutory construction, which requires us to "read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter"; Simms v. Warden, supra, at 188, 640 A.2d 601; has special applicability here because the " 'main objective [of the UAPA is] uniform procedure.' " Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Windsor Hall Rest Home, 232 Conn. 181, 189, 653 A.2d 181 (1995), quoting Hirschfeld v. Commission on Claims, 172 Conn. 603, 607-608, 376 A.2d 71 (1977).

In determining the proper scope of § 4-166(3)(C), we look first to General Statutes § 4-181a, ¹³ which governs the reconsideration of agency decisions pursuant to the UAPA. Under § 4-181a(a)(1), an agency is authorized to reconsider only final decisions in contested cases. Thus, an agency decision is subject to reconsideration under the UAPA only if the decision already is a final decision for purposes of appeal. The plaintiff, however, urges an interpretation of § 4-166(3)(C) that would convert a nonfinal decision for purposes of appeal into an appealable final decision, a construction that is inconsistent with the dictates of § 4-181a. Absent a clear legislative mandate to do so, we will not construe § 4-166(3)(C) so as to render it incompatible with another provision of the same statutory scheme.

No such mandate can be found in the pertinent legislative history. On the contrary, that history squarely supports the conclusion that § 4-166(3)(C) applies only to those agency determinations that are subject to reconsideration under § 4-181a, namely, final decisions...