Desarno v. Jam Golf Management, LLC

Decision Date03 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. A08A2438.,A08A2438.
Citation295 Ga. App. 70,670 S.E.2d 889
PartiesDeSARNO et al. v. JAM GOLF MANAGEMENT, LLC.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Winburn, Lewis & Stolz, Athens, Robert J. Grayson, for appellant.

Hicks, Casey & Foster, Richard C. Foster, Zachary M. Matthews, Marietta for appellees.

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

In this nuisance and trespass action, James and Susan DeSarno sued the owner and operators of a golf course for injunctive relief and damages arising out of numerous errant golf balls (originating from defendants' adjacent golf course) striking their residence. Finding that their residence was subject to an express easement allowing the golf balls, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, which the DeSarnos appeal. Because we agree with the trial court that the express easement precluded the DeSarnos' action, we affirm.

Summary judgment is only proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a denial of summary judgment. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp.1

So viewed, the evidence shows that in 1999, the owner of a large tract of land (which the owner intended to develop into residential lots) agreed to subject those lots to an easement in favor of adjacent property being developed as a golf course. The written and recorded easement permitted as to each lot "golf balls unintentionally to come upon the Lot . . ., and for Golfers at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner to come upon the exterior portions of a Lot . . . to retrieve errant golf balls." The easement also provided that "[u]nder no circumstances shall the . . . Golf Course Owner . . . be held liable for any damage or injury resulting from errant golf balls or the exercise of these easements." The easement did not, however, "relieve golfers of liability for damage caused by errant golf balls."

The golf course was completed in 1999 and began operating. In 2003, the DeSarnos contemplated purchasing an undeveloped residential lot adjacent to the fairway of the ninth hole of the golf course. They were not only aware of the golf course but considered its presence an amenity, as they liked the view of the golf course and as the husband himself was a golfer. They were aware of the golf ball easement and anticipated that some errant golf balls would come onto their lot. Indeed, the husband expected that drives from the tee of the ninth hole would be about even with his lot, and that sliced drives would hit the to-be-developed home.2 They consulted with no one from the golf course about their anticipated purchase. They purchased the lot, receiving a deed that expressly stated the conveyance was subject to all easements of record affecting the lot.

The DeSarnos had a home built on the lot and began residing in the home in September 2003. For a period of time, the husband became of member of the golf course and played the course some 15 to 20 times. As time went on, the golf course's business increased dramatically until about 30,000 rounds of golf were played each year, resulting in the number of errant golf balls increasing such that the DeSarnos were receiving about ten to fifteen errant balls into their yard each day. Over two and a half years, they experienced twenty-three broken windows, twenty-six chips or breaks on the siding of their house, two dents in their truck, broken outside lights, and several near misses with their children. For safety reasons, the children were not allowed to play in the yard.

The DeSarnos sued the operator of the golf course (Jam Golf Management, LLC), the owner of the golf course (Chuck Clancy Golf LLC), the trade name3 under which the owner and operator did business (Creekside Golf & Country Club), and the general manager of the owner of the golf course (Jeffery Clancy, both individually and as manager), asserting against all defendants jointly claims of trespass and nuisance arising from the errant golf balls coming onto the DeSarnos' property.4 All of these entities were separate from the entity that sold the DeSarnos their lot. The DeSarnos sought to enjoin play on the ninth hole and further sought to recover for the damage to their property. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, giving rise to this appeal.

The key to this case is the express easement. Without addressing the other defenses asserted in the court below (such as "coming to the nuisance" and assumption of risk5), we hold that because the easement in this case explicitly permitted the complained-of conduct and indeed exonerated the golf course owner from any liability for damages caused by the errant golf balls, no claim for trespass or nuisance could be maintained. An express easement permitting conduct that would otherwise constitute trespass or nuisance precludes such claims by the owner of the servient estate against the owner or legal occupant of the dominant estate for engaging in such conduct. See Segars v. City of Cornelia.6 As the easement here was properly recorded and clearly burdened the DeSarnos' property, it was constructive notice to the world. See Security Union Title Ins. Co. v. RC Acres, Inc.7 In any case, the DeSarnos had actual notice of the easement. Thus, they bought the property with full knowledge of the easement and took the property subject to it.

Citing Nussbaum v. Lacopo8 (homeowners on golf courses "must accept the occasional, concomitant annoyances") and other foreign cases, the DeSarnos nevertheless argue that the extremely large number of errant golf balls coming onto their property constituted an "excessive use" of the easement (and therefore a nuisance), in that the number increased dramatically over time from an occasional ball now and then to the current constant barrage. However, in not one of these foreign cases cited by the DeSarnos was the court faced with an easement expressly permitting errant golf balls onto the plaintiff's property. See, e.g., id.; Curran v. Green Hills Country Club;9 Fenton v. Quaboag Country Club;10 Mish v. Elks Country Club;11 Sans v. Ramsey Golf & Country Club.12 Moreover, the concept of "excessive use" of an easement relates not to the number of times an easement is used but rather to a use of the easement that exceeds the scope of the easement or that is intended to benefit a property that is not the dominant estate. See People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Younger13 ("[u]se of an appurtenant easement for the benefit of any property other than the dominant tenement is a violation of the easement because it is an excessive use") (punctuation omitted); Phillips Natural Gas Co. v. Cardiff14 ("[w]hen the instrument in unambiguous language limits the use to the carrying of crude oil by a 30-inch pipe, then that is the extent of the use, and any other use is excessive and beyond the scope of the easement"); Reed v. A.C. McLoon & Co.15 (easement to maintain gasoline storage tank was subjected to "excessive use" when defendant used the tank for kerosene storage); Z.A. Sneeden's Sons, Inc. v. ZP No. 116, LLC16 ("[i]f the easement holder makes an unwarranted use of the land in excess of the easement rights held, such use will constitute an excessive use and may be enjoined") (punctuation omitted).

So long as there is no limit set forth in the easement, a dominant estate may use an express easement an ever increasing or larger number of times without fear of liability to the servient estate. See Hill-Creek Acres Assn. v. Tomerlin17 ("no unlawful burden is placed on a servient estate by increasing the volume of traffic on an unlimited easement"). "Cases involving a change in the character of the easement are, therefore,...

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6 cases
  • New Manchester Resort & Golf, LLC v. Douglasville Dev., LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 16 Agosto 2010
    ...consent that defeats the Plaintiff's state law claims for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. See DeSarno v. Jam Golf Mgmt., LLC, 295 Ga.App. 70, 72, 670 S.E.2d 889 (2008). Although the Defendants have the right to discharge runoff, this right is not unlimited and does not authorize dischar......
  • Flyboy Aviation Props., LLC v. Franck (In re Flyboy Aviation Props., LLC)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 16 Enero 2015
    ...for takeoff and landing, he was acting within his rights under the Easement and was not trespassing. DeSarno v. Jam Golf Mgmt., LLC, 295 Ga.App. 70, 670 S.E.2d 889 (Ga.App.2008) (no trespass where an easement permits the complained of conduct). On the six to ten other occasions when Defenda......
  • Flyboy Aviation Props., LLC v. Franck (In re Flyboy Aviation Props., LLC)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • 16 Enero 2015
    ...for takeoff and landing, he was acting within his rights under the Easement and was not trespassing. DeSarno v. Jam Golf Mgmt., LLC, 295 Ga.App. 70, 670 S.E.2d 889 (Ga.App.2008) (no trespass where an easement permits the complained of conduct). On the six to ten other occasions when Defenda......
  • Crabapple Lake Parc Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Circeo
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 19 Mayo 2014
    ...lines was a permissible change in the manner, frequency, and intensity of the use of the easement). Compare DeSarno v. Jam Golf Mgmt., LLC, 295 Ga.App. 70, 73, 670 S.E.2d 889 (2008) (“the concept of ‘excessive use’ of an easement relates not to the number of times an easement is used but ra......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Real Property - Linda S. Finley
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 61-1, September 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...Id. at 198-99, 671 S.E.2d at 249. 171. Id. at 199, 671 S.E.2d at 249. 172. Id. 173. Id. 174. Id. at 199-202, 671 S.E.2d at 249-51. 175. 295 Ga. App. 70, 670 S.E.2d 889 (2008). 176. See id. at 72-74, 670 S.E.2d at 892. 177. Id. at 71, 670 S.E.2d at 889. 178. Id. (alterations in original). 17......
  • Zoning and Land Use Law - Dennis J. Webb Jr., Marcia Mccrory Ernst, Davene D. Walker, and Kelley B. Gray
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 61-1, September 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...S.E.2d at 139-40. 175. Id. at 422, 677 S.E.2d at 141. 176. Id. at 422-23, 677 S.E.2d at 141. 177. Id. at 423, 677 S.E.2d at 141. 178. 295 Ga. App. 70, 670 S.E.2d 889 (2008). 179. Id. at 71, 670 S.E.2d at 889-90. 180. Id., 670 S.E.2d at 890. 181. Id. at 72, 670 S.E.2d at 890. 182. Id. 183. I......

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