Detention of R.S., In re

• Decision Date: 29 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 61266-8,61266-8
• Citation: 124 Wn.2d 766,881 P.2d 972
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re the DETENTION OF R.S. and J.M. Han NGUYEN, M.D., Gunter Hadersberger, P.H.D., Kamran Naficy, and Leslie Postovoit, Appellants, v. R.S. and J.M., Respondents.

Page 766

124 Wn.2d 766

881 P.2d 972

In re the DETENTION OF R.S. and J.M.

Han NGUYEN, M.D., Gunter Hadersberger, P.H.D., Kamran

Naficy, and Leslie Postovoit, Appellants, v. R.S. and J.M., Respondents.

No. 61266-8.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Sept. 29, 1994.

Christine O. Gregoire, Atty. Gen., Sara J. Finlay, Laura L. Wulf, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for appellants.

Dept. of Assigned Counsel, John A. McNeish, Fort Steilacoom, Stanford Opdyke, Tacoma, for respondents.

Larry Jones, Seattle, amicus curiae for respondent on behalf of the ARC of Wash. State.

UTTER, Justice.

This is an appeal of two civil commitment cases in which the Commissioner dismissed petitions for the involuntary detention of Respondents, R.S. and J.M. At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the involuntary treatment provisions of RCW Chapter 71.05 as they pertain to mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled individuals.

J.M. was admitted to Western State Hospital on July 31, 1992 after having had an acute exacerbation of psychosis and several medical complications. Clerk's Papers (J.M.), at 4. On August 13, 1992, the Petitioners for involuntary detention, Kamran Naficy, M.D. and Leslie Postovoit, Ph.D., the examining physician and mental health professional at Western State Hospital respectively, filed a petition for up to ninety days of involuntary care and treatment of J.M. on the ground he was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. Clerk's Papers (J.M.), at 1-3.

A hearing was held in Pierce County Superior Court at Western State Hospital. Dr. Postovoit testified that J.M. has hydrocephalus and schizophrenia, undifferentiated type, chronic, in remission. She also testified he requires supervision because he is mildly retarded, Report of Proceedings (J.M.), at 3, a condition she stated leads to impulsive behavior and difficulty in anticipating consequences. The Affidavit in Support of the Petition provided an example of his lack of attentiveness: On one occasion, J.M. did not notice he had set fire to his pants while smoking a cigarette. Clerk's Papers (J.M.), at 4.

She also testified that if released from Western State Hospital, J.M. would not be able to provide for his basic needs of health and safety, and as such was "gravely disabled" as a result of a mental disorder. Report of Proceedings (J.M.), at 5-6.

After hearing the evidence the court dismissed the petition on the ground that grave disability by virtue of mental disorder had not been established. Clerk's Papers (J.M.), at 7.

R.S. is mildly retarded and has borderline and antisocial personality disorder. Clerk's Papers (R.S.), at 5. He was admitted to Western State Hospital after assaulting his grandmother. Appellants Han Nguyen, M.D., and Gunther Hadersberger, Ph.D., staff psychiatrist and clinical psychologist, respectively, at Western State Hospital filed a petition to detain R.S. an additional 180 days in order to provide him with further treatment. Clerk's Papers (R.S.), at 1-3.

The petition alleged that R.S. was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder and that less restrictive alternatives to detention were not in his best interest or the best interests of others because he required intensive, supervised, 24-hour restrictive care; was not ready for less restrictive care; diligent efforts had not disclosed the availability of a suitable less restrictive alternative; and his history, including setting a fire, and assaultive behavior, created extreme difficulties in finding him a suitable placement. Clerk's Papers (R.S.), at 1-3.

The Affidavit in Support of the Petition indicated that during his time at the hospital R.S. had been "intrusive, verbally abusive, non redirectible, sexually inappropriate and incontinent...." Clerk's Papers (R.S.), at 4. The affidavit also stated his volitional control is limited by his IQ level, that his behavior is threatening, and that he has a history of assault. Clerk's Papers (R.S.), at 4. It stated further that R.S. "does not follow any social norms" and that as a result, neither his mother nor his grandmother could be considered resources. The report concluded that less restrictive placement was not recommended because he needed a high level of supervision. Clerk's Papers (R.S.), at 5.

In addition to the Petition and Affidavit, testimony was presented at the August 5, 1992 hearing that R.S. was unable to provide for his essential needs of health or safety. Report of Proceedings (R.S.) (Aug. 5, 1992), at 14, 29, 35. Uncontroverted evidence was presented that he requires a closely supervised placement competent to deal with his intermittent outbursts of inappropriate behavior, and that placements in an environment less restrictive than Western State had as yet not been located, despite efforts to do so. Report of Proceedings (R.S.) (Aug. 19, 1992), at 15-18, 35-40; see also Report of Proceedings (R.S.) (Aug. 19, 1992), at 26-27.

At the August 5, 1992 hearing the court denied the State's motion to amend the Petition to allege that R.S. presented a danger of serious harm to himself or others because he had "threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm upon the person of another or himself during the current period of [sic ] which he was detained." Report of Proceedings (R.S.) (Aug. 5, 1992), at 6. The court denied the motion although it found there was "ample information in the affidavit to put the Respondent on notice that these factors would be addressed...." Report of Proceedings (R.S.) (Aug. 5, 1992), at 8.

Appellants appealed both dismissals, as well as the Commissioner's denial of the motion to amend the petition regarding R.S., to Division Two of the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this court.

I. Mootness

This case is moot because both R.S. and J.M. have been released from detention. In Washington, a moot case may be decided if it involves a matter of continuing and substantial public interest. In re Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 804 P.2d 1 (1990). We have previously recognized the importance of clarifying the statutory scheme governing civil commitment. In re LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986) (quoting Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wash.2d 832, 838, 676 P.2d 444 (1984)). See also In re G.V., 124 Wash.2d 288, 294-95, 877 P.2d 680 (1994); In re Kirby, 65 Wash.App. 862, 829 P.2d 1139 (1992). Accordingly, we reach the issue whether the Commissioner erred in dismissing both petitions.

II. Developmental Disability as a "Mental Disorder" Under RCW 71.05.

This case concerns the proper interpretation of the involuntary treatment provisions of RCW Chapter 71.05. More specifically, the question presented is whether a developmental disability can ever qualify as a "mental disorder" supporting civil commitment under RCW 71.05.040.

RCW 71.05.040 authorizes the detention of an individual on the basis of developmental disability under two circumstances. The first is if a person is gravely disabled the second is if a developmentally disabled person, as a result of a mental disorder, is dangerous:

Persons who are developmentally disabled ... shall not be detained for evaluation and treatment or judicially committed solely by reason of that condition unless such condition causes a person to be gravely disabled or as a result of a mental disorder such condition exists that constitutes a likelihood of serious harm to self or others.

(Italics and boldface ours.) RCW 71.05.040.

RCW 71.05.020(2) defines "mental disorder" broadly, as

any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions;

A

R.S.

In the case of R.S., the Commissioner never reached the question whether R.S. was gravely disabled or whether he was dangerous to himself or others because he interpreted RCW 71.05 to prohibit the detention of developmentally disabled individuals under any circumstances. The Order of Dismissal states:

Developmental disability is not a mental disorder justifying 71.05 commitment; indefinite commitment not allowed by statute and legislature has found mental hospital is not appropriate for developmentally disabled person.

Clerk's Papers (R.S.), at 7. Order of Dismissal.

Appellants assign error to the Commissioner's conclusion in the case of R.S. that a developmental disability can never qualify as a "mental disorder" for the purpose of committing an individual pursuant to RCW 71.05.040. They ask this court to hold that a developmental disability may, under certain circumstances, qualify as a mental disorder; and that in a given instance it may partially establish the basis upon which an individual may be committed.

Appellants' position accords with RCW 71.05.040, which establishes the conditions under which a developmentally disabled person may be detained or committed, and with RCW 71.05.020(2), which defines "mental disorder" broadly. Indeed, appellants only ask this court to hold what the statute already expressly provides.

If a person's developmental disability in a given case is shown to be an organic, mental or emotional impairment which substantially affects that person's cognitive or volitional functions, then that condition qualifies as a "mental disorder" under the legal definition of that term in RCW 71.05.020(2). If, as a result of that mental disorder, an individual is dangerous to himself or others, that individual may be committed pursuant to RCW 71.05.040. ¹

Because the Commissioner erroneously concluded a developmental disability could never qualify as a "mental disorder" under RCW Chapter 71.05, we reverse his dismissal of the petition to detain R.S.

B

J.M.

Appellants also assign error to the Commissioner's dismissal of the Petition to detain J.M. The Order of Dismissal sets forth the Commissioner's reasoning as follows:

Grave disability by virtue of mental "disorder" not established. Statutes do not permit detention when only condition causing need for...