Swanson, Matter of
| Citation | 115 Wn.2d 21,793 P.2d 962 |
| Decision Date | 05 July 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 56459-1,56459-1 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Detention of Lonnie SWANSON. En Banc |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n, Patrick M. Long, Seattle, for appellant.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Katharine Wilcox, Deputy, Seattle, for respondent.
After being held on a 72-hour emergency detention, Lonnie Swanson was brought before a judge to determine if probable cause existed to commit him for further treatment. At that time, Swanson moved for dismissal, claiming that the statutory time limit for the hearing had expired. His motion was denied, and he was committed for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. Swanson appealed and respondent Harborview Medical Center (Harborview) joined in requesting that this court define the time parameters of the civil commitment statute.
Although technically moot, we agreed to decide this case because it involves matters of continuing and substantial public interest. We hold that dismissal is not required under the facts of this case. We also take this opportunity to clarify the time at which detention begins.
On November 19, 1987, at approximately 11 a.m., Lonnie Swanson arrived at the Harborview Medical Center Emergency Room. He was seen by Joan Clement, the senior social worker on duty, who found him to be agitated and hostile. He refused all psychiatric treatment. Based on his behavior, Ms. Clemens concluded that, in her opinion, Swanson was paranoid, psychotic, a threat to himself and to others, and in need of inpatient psychiatric treatment. Dan Roscoe, a King County designated mental health professional, evaluated Swanson and determined that, as a result of a mental disorder, Swanson was a danger to himself and gravely disabled. Roscoe then prepared a petition for initial detention. He served Swanson with a copy of the petition, a notice and statement of rights and notification of attorney, and a notice of emergency detention. Roscoe indicated that he served Swanson at 2:50 p.m. that day. Swanson was detained at Harborview Medical Center. The completed evaluation and treatment facility notice of acceptance indicates that Swanson was "detained at facility at 1630" (4:30 p.m.). The notice and statement of rights, which was given to Swanson, stated in part that he would
be released within a period of 72 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, unless a judicial hearing is held. The hearing must be held within 72 hours after your initial detention to determine whether there is probable cause to detain you for up to an additional 14 days.
(Italics ours.)
At 3:30 p.m. on Monday, November 23, 1987, a petition for 14-day involuntary treatment was filed, alleging that Swanson was a danger to others and gravely disabled. At approximately 9 a.m. on Tuesday, November 24, 1987, Swanson was brought to the King County Superior Court at Harborview Health Hall for a probable cause hearing before Judge Terrence Carroll. The trial judge called the cases to be heard that day and Swanson's counsel answered that he was ready to proceed on Swanson's case. Several cases were on the calendar and Swanson's was the last. His hearing began at 4:50 p.m. Swanson's attorney then moved to have the petition dismissed and Swanson released. He asserted that dismissal was required because the 72-hour period had expired and, as a result, the court had no jurisdiction to hear Swanson's case. Swanson's attorney renewed his motion prior to the court's ruling. The court denied the In denying the motion, the court did not make any findings of fact as to when Swanson was served or detained. 1 The court stated that the "72 hour rule has to be read in the context of the Court's calendar" and "the common sense ruling of law would say that as long as [the probable cause hearing is] held during that day within which the 72 hours falls [it] is adequate, particularly where we're [sic ] with a calendar the size that we have."
motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Swanson, as a result of a mental disorder, presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. The court ordered Swanson to undergo inpatient involuntary treatment for up to 14 days.
Swanson appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. He is not contesting the substantive factual basis for the 14-day order. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot in an unpublished opinion filed August 7, 1989. This court granted Swanson's petition for review.
As noted above, this case is technically moot because the detention that is the subject of this appeal has long since ended. Thus, this court cannot provide the basic relief that appellant originally sought. In re LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wash.2d 832, 838, 676 P.2d 444 (1984); In re Cross, 99 Wash.2d 373, 376-77, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). However, the parties request that we decide this case on its merits because the issues presented are of continuing public interest and there is a need for guidance in applying the statutory civil commitment scheme. We agree.
This court may decide a moot case if it involves matters of continuing and substantial public interest. We consider the following criteria in determining whether or not a sufficient public interest is involved (1) the public or private nature of the question presented; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination which will provide future guidance to public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur.
McLaughlin, 100 Wash.2d at 838, 676 P.2d 444.
This court has recognized that " 'the need to clarify the statutory scheme governing civil commitment is a matter of continuing and substantial public interest.' " LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d at 200, 728 P.2d 138 (quoting McLaughlin, 100 Wash.2d at 838, 676 P.2d 444). Additionally, the fact that both parties are requesting review in this case indicates that there is need for guidance in this area and that these issues are likely to re-occur. Therefore, although technically moot, we decide this case because it involves issues of substantial and continuing public interest. In so doing, we in no way detract from the holding in Hart v. Social & Health Servs., 111 Wash.2d 445, 759 P.2d 1206 (1988).
The parties agree that the trial court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this case up until the 72-hour period expired. They also agree that Swanson's case was on the court calendar, which began within the 72-hour period, but that his particular hearing began after that period had lapsed.
Harborview argues that substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient to avoid dismissal. They point out that, according to their calculations, Swanson's hearing took place only 20 minutes late. 2 Conversely, Swanson contends that, because our civil commitment statute must be strictly construed, the trial court had no jurisdiction other than to dismiss his case. Under Swanson's construction, the petition must be dismissed if any individual hearing is commenced beyond 72 hours, regardless of the reason.
As argued by the parties, this case turns solely on whether the statute requires strict construction or substantial compliance. Our analysis, however, does not end there.
In addition to resolving the statutory construction issue, we must also determine when Swanson's hearing began for the purpose of satisfying the statute.
Turning first to the issue of statutory construction, we begin with a review of the applicable statutes. Within the civil commitment statutes, a number of sections expressly limit the initial detention to 72 hours:
[A person may] be taken into emergency custody in an evaluation and treatment facility for not more than seventy-two hours as described in RCW 71.05.180.
RCW 71.05.150(2).
If the evaluation and treatment facility admits the person, it may detain him for evaluation and treatment for a period not to exceed seventy-two hours ...
RCW 71.05.180.
Whenever any person is detained for evaluation and treatment pursuant to this chapter, [the person] ... shall be advised ... that unless the person is released or voluntarily admits himself or herself for treatment within seventy-two hours of the initial detention:
(a) That a judicial hearing in a superior court ... shall be held not more than seventy-two hours after the initial detention to determine whether there is probable cause to detain the person ... for up to an additional fourteen days ...
A person who has been detained for seventy-two hours shall no later than the end of such period be released, unless referred for further care on a voluntary basis, or detained pursuant to court order for further treatment as provided in this chapter.
RCW 71.05.210.
If a petition is filed for fourteen day involuntary treatment or ninety days of less restrictive alternative treatment, the court shall hold a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours of the initial detention of such person as determined in RCW 71.05.180, as now or hereafter amended....
RCW 71.05.240.
The statutory scheme clearly contemplates an initial detention period not to exceed 72 hours (excluding weekends and holidays), with a judicial hearing required before any more lengthy commitment. Moreover, on their Strict construction is also supported by Washington case law. In In re Eastman, 151 Wash. 321, 275 P. 724 (1929), this court vacated an order committing a woman to a state custodial school without the appointment of a guardian or notice to relatives or friends as required by law. The court stated:
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Table of Cases
...(2010), review denied, 170 Wn.2d 1019 (2011): 21.12(1)(b) Sutton v. Hirvonen, 113 Wn.2d 1, 775 P.2d 448 (1989): 5.2(1)(a) Swanson, In re, 115 Wn.2d 21, 804 P.2d 1 (1990): 4.3(8) Sylvester v. Pierce County, 148 Wn. App. 813, 201 P.3d 381 (2009): 21.11(4), 21.14(3) T _________________________......