Deutsch v. Shein

• Decision Date: 11 March 1980
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
• Parties: Patricia M. DEUTSCH, Movant, v. Melvin SHEIN, M.D. and Melvin Shein, M.D., P.S.C., Respondent.

Page 141

597 S.W.2d 141

Patricia M. DEUTSCH, Movant, v. Melvin SHEIN, M.D. and Melvin Shein, M.D., P.S.C., Respondent.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

March 11, 1980.

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1980.

Edward M. Post, Taustine, Post, Berman, Fineman & Kohn, Louisville, for movant.

John T. Ballantine, Stephen A. Watkins, Ogden, Robertson & Marshall, Louisville, for respondent.

LUKOWSKY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which dismissed the claim of Mrs. Deutsch for damages from Dr. Shein for physical and mental pain and suffering. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages only.

On January 22, 1974 Mrs. Deutsch visited Dr. Shein, a board certified internist, for diagnosis and treatment of the cause of her nausea, weakness, and other symptoms. The circumstances of this consultation were hotly disputed. What is not in dispute, however, is that Mrs. Deutsch was not tested for pregnancy, that she was hospitalized from January 23-29, and that numerous diagnostic x-rays and other radiological tests were performed on her person. Mrs. Deutsch's complaints continued unabated and she again visited Dr. Shein on February 5.

She went to see Dr. Levine, the obstetrician/gynecologist who had delivered her first two children, on February 18. Dr. Levine's examination revealed she was about ten weeks pregnant. Mrs. Deutsch became upset upon learning of her condition, explaining to Dr. Levine she had seen various articles which stated that x-rays administered to a pregnant woman could injure the fetus she carried. Dr. Levine inquired into the diagnostic x-rays given Mrs. Deutsch and determined there was a serious risk her fetus had been damaged. He recommended that if Mrs. Deutsch decided upon an abortion, it should be performed within the week.

Mrs. Deutsch consulted her pediatrician who also stated that an abortion was "medically indicated," but refused to advise her to have or not have an abortion. She then visited with her priest, who emphasized the Church's negative position on abortion. She also discussed her situation with relatives. Mrs. Deutsch decided to terminate her pregnancy by abortion on February 22.

At trial Dr. Shein introduced respectable medical testimony to the effect that the amount of diagnostic radiation administered to Mrs. Deutsch did not warrant a therapeutic abortion. The case was submitted to the jury upon special interrogatories. The jury found that Dr. Shein failed to use that degree of care and skill which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner specializing in internal medicine, acting in the same or similar circumstances, by not obtaining a pregnancy test before Mrs. Deutsch was administered x-rays. The jury further found, however, that Dr. Shein's failure to obtain a pregnancy test, coupled with the administering of x-rays, was not a substantial factor in causing the injury of which Mrs. Deutsch complained.

Neither party to this appeal disputes the correctness of so much of the verdict as found Dr. Shein to be negligent. This contested point was resolved by the jury against Dr. Shein. Further, as to the standard of care, Dr. Shein's own testimony established that if Mrs. Deutsch's version of the visit was believed his handling of the case did not meet the standard of care. Necessary expert testimony to establish that the defendant failed to conform to the required standard of care may consist of admissions by the defendant doctor. Jarboe v. Harting, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775, 778 (1965). There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's finding of negligence. This portion of the judgment must stand.

Mrs. Deutsch maintains that the evidence conclusively establishes that as a matter of law Dr. Shein's negligence was a substantial factor in causing her mental and physical pain and suffering. We agree that reasonable minds cannot differ on the conclusion that the negligence of Dr. Shein was a substantial factor in causing the irradiation of Mrs. Deutsch during an early period of her pregnancy, for which she sought further medical advice and services and, therefore, in causing her at least some trauma. The extent of Mrs. Deutsch's damages must be determined at a new trial. For the reasons set out below, this portion of the judgment must be reversed.

The breach of the required standard of care by an actor can produce a result similar to that of a snowball rolling down a hill. The initial consequence of the snowball may be slight. But as the snowball rolls down the hill its increasing size and momentum take on a character of their own which can cause injury of a magnitude far beyond the imagination of the one who set the snowball in motion. Nevertheless, the law is that between the negligent actor and the injured innocent, the innocent should recover compensation, unless the law cuts off the expansion of the negligent actor's liability as a matter of public policy. For instance, the law might not, as a matter of policy, impose liability where the snowball has roared to the foot of the hill and disintegrated sending several rocks to neighboring peaks to begin the process anew.

Liability for a negligent act follows a finding of proximate or legal cause. Proximate cause is a legal term which defies precise definition, though many have valiantly tried. See discussion in Dale v. E. R. Knapp & Sons, Inc., Ky., 433 S.W.2d 880, 883 (1968). The Restatement of Torts, Second sec. 431 analyzes proximate cause so "What Constitutes Legal Cause

The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if

(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and

(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm."

The Restatement, Second analysis represents a conversion of the substantial factor test from another ineffective test for proximate cause into a vehicle used to find causation in fact. Proximate cause, then, consists of a finding of causation in fact, i. e., substantial cause, and the absence of a public policy rule of law which prohibits the imposition of liability. See 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence, sec. 147. This substantial cause is explained:

"In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent. (T)his is necessary, but it is not of itself sufficient. The negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. The word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' which includes every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes."

Restatement of Torts, Second sec. 431, Comment a.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin expressly stated, "(P)ublic policy considerations are regarded as an element of legal cause, although not a part of the determinations of cause in fact, which this court refers to as 'substantial factor.' " Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 63 Wis.2d 515, 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (1974). Other jurisdictions are not as blunt, however, and couch the public policy considerations in terms of "forseeability of injury," "orbit of risk," "zone of danger," or "intervening and superseding causes." See 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence sec. 174. The use of such terms is an attempt to develop public policy in the form of rules of substantive law to insure certainty of decision and predictability of result. The use of "public policy" in the raw as a liability limitation is a more flexible approach.

This court in Claycomb v. Howard, Ky., 493 S.W.2d 714, 718 (1973) approved the Restatement 2d sec. 431 substantial factor test as a means by which the jury could find legal cause and therefore fix responsibility for the harm done to the plaintiff. Implicitly reserved in that decision but expressly declared in other opinions, are the collective substantive policy rules which limit responsibility for a negligent act. For example: Donegan v. Denny, Ky., 457 S.W.2d 953 (1970) defined a superseding cause, and House v. Kellerman, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 380 (1975) held that whether a particular act was a superseding cause is a matter of law; Dale v. E. R. Knapp & Sons, Inc., supra, discussed the relationship of "forseeability" to proximate cause; and City of Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237, 133 S.W.2d 49 (1939) with Brown Hotel Company v. Marx, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 911 (1967) allow the injured plaintiff to recover for aggravation of the original injury by subsequent negligent medical treatment. While this collection is not intended to be exclusive, it does serve to demonstrate how, sub silentio, this court has followed the Restatement 2d approach to proximate cause employing "substantial factor" to find causation in fact and therefore proximate cause where there is no substantive rule of law liability limitation.

In House v. Kellerman, supra at 382 n. 2, we suggested, but had no occasion to decide, that basic causation itself should be treated as a matter of law, leaving the issues of negligence only to the jury. Because our resolution of this case does not necessitate expression upon this point, we likewise decline to do so here. We simply point out that legal cause currently presents a mixed question of law and of fact.

We believe that once the jury found Dr. Shein to have been negligent in not administering a pregnancy test to Mrs. Deutsch, reasonable...