Deveines v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Motor Vehicles Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2016
• Citation: 25 N.Y.S.3d 760,136 A.D.3d 1383
• Parties: In the Matter of Dillen A. DEVEINES, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES APPEALS BOARD, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

136 A.D.3d 1383

25 N.Y.S.3d 760

In the Matter of Dillen A. DEVEINES,

v.NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES APPEALS BOARD, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Feb. 11, 2016.

Leonard & Curley, PLLC, Rome (John G. Leonard of Counsel), for Petitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jonathan D. Hitsous of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, DeJOSEPH, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the determination revoking his driver's license based on his refusal to submit to a chemical test following his arrest for driving while intoxicated. A police officer initially stopped petitioner for a traffic violation, and ultimately took petitioner into custody after petitioner exhibited signs and made statements that indicated he was intoxicated. Petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test and, based on that refusal, his driver's license was temporarily suspended. A refusal revocation hearing was thereafter held pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(c). The Administrative Law Judge revoked petitioner's license after concluding, inter alia, that the officer had lawfully stopped petitioner for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(30) because petitioner's view was obstructed by objects hanging from his rearview mirror. In affirming the determination on petitioner's administrative appeal, respondent concluded that, pursuant to People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39, the stop was lawful, i.e., the officer possessed specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the stop.

We agree with petitioner that respondent reviewed the determination under an incorrect legal standard inasmuch as, "[s]ince Ingle, ... the Court of Appeals has made it ‘abundantly clear’ ... that ‘police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime’ ... [,] or where the police have ‘probable cause to believe that the driver ... has committed a traffic violation’ " (People v. Washburn, 309 A.D.2d 1270, 1271, 765 N.Y.S.2d 76 ; see People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638 ). We nevertheless reject petitioner's contention that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination that the stop was lawful. Contrary to petitioner's contention, ...