DeVries v. State
| Decision Date | 12 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-173,95-173 |
| Citation | 909 P.2d 977 |
| Parties | Jennifer K. DeVRIES, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Dan O. Caldwell III, Thermopolis; and William L. Miller of Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for Appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Lou Piccioni, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.
Appellant Jennifer DeVries appeals from her convictions for two counts of receiving and/or concealing stolen property as defined in WYO.STAT. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (1984).
We affirm.
Appellant presents a single issue for our review:
Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion for Acquittal and Defendant's Renewed Motion for Acquittal?
Appellant grew up on the 71 Ranch located near Elko, Nevada, where her father worked In March of 1993, Appellant received a Nevada brand certificate which allowed her to use the Slant 8 Arrow brand. Appellant's father branded the two Holstein heifers with Appellant's brand. In the spring of 1993, Appellant's parents purchased the Owl Creek Angus Ranch located in Hot Springs County, Wyoming. On June 26, 1993, the two Holstein heifers, along with some other cattle, were shipped from the 71 Ranch in Nevada to the Wyoming ranch. Appellant signed the brand inspection certificate 1 in Nevada, representing that she owned the cattle. Once the cattle arrived at the Wyoming ranch, they were branded with Appellant's father's J Lazy S brand.
as a ranch manager. All the cattle on the 71 Ranch belonged to the ranch owner except for two Holstein heifers which a former ranch employee's sister owned.
On February 7, 1994, Appellant shipped another fifteen head of cattle which bore the Slant 8 Arrow brand from Nevada to herself at the Wyoming ranch. She was present in Nevada when the cattle were inspected, and she again signed the required brand inspection certificate, certifying that she was the owner of the cattle.
Upon realizing that the Holstein heifers were missing, the brother of the heifers' owner reported that fact to the district brand inspector. The heifers were eventually returned. Since they had been branded with the Slant 8 Arrow and J Lazy S brands, the Nevada livestock investigators became suspicious of the configuration of the various brands and asked a Wyoming livestock investigator to check the cattle which had been shipped from Nevada to the Wyoming ranch. The inspection of the Wyoming ranch supported the Nevada livestock investigators' concerns, and a search warrant was obtained. The search revealed that the 71 Ranch's 7 Lazy S brand had been converted to the Slant 8 Arrow brand on the cattle kept at the Wyoming ranch.
An information was filed, charging Appellant with two counts of unlawfully receiving and/or concealing stolen property as defined in § 6-3-403(a)(i) and with one count of conspiracy to unlawfully receive and/or conceal stolen property as defined by § 6-3-403(a)(i) and WYO.STAT. § 6-1-303(a) (1983). A jury trial was held during which Appellant moved at the close of the State's case for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the conspiracy charge, but it denied the motion as to the other charges. Appellant did not present any evidence, and the case went to the jury. The jury convicted Appellant of the two counts of receiving and/or concealing stolen property pursuant to § 6-3-403(a). Appellant renewed her motion for a judgment of acquittal, and the trial court once again denied her motion. Appellant appeals from the denial of her original and renewed motions for a judgment of acquittal.
We have often stated the standard of review which we use when we are reviewing a denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal:
[W]e accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, together with all logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, leaving out entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict.
(citations omitted) Leppek v. State, 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 (Wyo.1981).
Apodaca v. State, 796 P.2d 806, 807 (Wyo.1990) (citation omitted).
In analyzing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument:
This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did.
Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo.1995) (citation omitted).
Section 6-3-403(a)(i) provides:
(a) A person who buys, receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty of:
(i) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more;
* * * * * *
The essence of Appellant's argument is that, if she committed any crimes, she committed them in Nevada. She claims that the evidence does not show that she acted in Wyoming to receive and/or conceal the stolen property.
"Concealment is generally defined to mean 'to prevent disclosure or recognition of' or 'to place out of sight.' " Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 717 (Wyo.1985) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1979)).
When used in a legal sense, the word concealment means more than to place out of sight or to prevent recognition. It means to place out of sight of the owner, or to prevent recognition by the owner.
State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 325 A.2d 199, 212 (1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 291, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973) [ (...
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