Di Maggio v. Mystic Bldg. Wrecking Co.

• Citation: 340 Mass. 686,166 N.E.2d 213
• Parties: Domenic DI MAGGIO v. MYSTIC BUILDING WRECKING CO., Inc.
• Decision Date: 11 April 1960
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 213

166 N.E.2d 213

340 Mass. 686

Domenic DI MAGGIO v. MYSTIC BUILDING WRECKING CO., Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 10, 1960.

Decided April 11, 1960.

Morris Michelson, Boston, for plaintiff.

Irving Goodman, Boston, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN and CUTTER, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

Two counts in this action of tort were tried: court 7 for trespass and damage to real estate, on which there was a verdict for the defendant (Wrecking), and count 8 for conversion of personal property on which the plaintiff (DiMaggio) had a verdict. The action, originally brought also against the city of Boston (the city) and its building commissioner (the commissioner), was discontinued against them. DiMaggio's exceptions are to the denial of requested instructions in connection with count 7 and to the instructions given. Wrecking's exceptions are to the denial of motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial on count 8.

DiMaggio owned the land and a fire damaged building at 19 Linwood Street, Roxbury. Wrecking razed the building under a contract with the city. It defended its action on the ground that the commissioner had ordered the building demolished under the Boston building code, St.1938, c. 479, § 116(d). ¹ Related sections of c. 479 are set out in the margin. ² Cf. G.L. c. 143 §§ 6, 8, 9, as amended; Silverblatt v. Livadas, Mass., 164 N.E.2d 875. See as to an earlier statute applicable to Boston, New England Trust Co. v. City of Boston, 300 Mass. 321, 326-329, 15 N.E.2d 255. The commissioner had examined the property about December 17, 1956, and found the building to be unsafe and dangerous. Photographs of the premises which form part of the record show a very dilapidate shell of a part brick, part wood house with many broken, unboarded windows, and a roof apparently partly open to the skies. The house was close to a brick building (which in photographs looks like an apartment house) and reasonably could have been regarded as a fire, and perhaps vermin, risk if allowed to remain in this state long.

A notice dated December 31, 1956, was mailed by certified mail on that day to DiMaggio at 201 Hampden Street, Roxbury, where he lived, referring to § 116(d), stating as reasons for the notice, 'Building badly gutted by fires. Roof destroyed, first floor partially destroyed. Beyond normal repair. To remedy this condition: Raze building. Unless this unsafe and dangerous condition shall have been corrected by 12 noon, January 7, 1957, the * * * commissioner * * * will * * * raze the structure. The cost of this work will be billed to the owner and will become a lien on the property.' The letter containing the notice was returned marked 'unclaimed.' 'When the letter * * * came back * * * [the head of construction and safety in the building department] tried to telephone' DiMaggio 'but never went to * * * [his] home or office or to any job that he was on.' A copy of the notice was posted on the building at 19 Linwood Street. Permission of the mayor to make the building safe or to remove it was obtained.

Wrecking submitted a bid for the work of destroying the building after one of its officers examined it. This officer testified that he found in the basement 'rubble, paper, charred timbers, [and] rubbish.' It received a contract for this work, under which Wrecking agreed 'to raze the building and remove all materials from the premises, * * * materials to become * * * [its] property.' Demolition was started on January 28 and completed on January 31. Wrecking removed 'all materials from the premises.' One of its officers testified that 'none of the material of the building came to * * * [its] yard as it was worth nothing.'

DiMaggio testified that he had stored heavy lumber and other building materials worth $5,087.32 in the heavily padlocked basement of the building for the purpose of remodelling the building and for his general work. He found the padlock unbroken and still intact in the debris remaining after the demolition of the building, indicating to him that they 'couldn't open the lock. They had to break * * * around it.' There was evidence from which it could have been found that there was no danger that the building would tumble down and that there had been only smoke damage to the outside structure and bearing walls. DiMaggio had purchased the building after a fire to remodel it, had 'cleaned out the building, boarded it up, and put roof rafters in the roof, but didn't repair the roof.'

1. With respect to count 7, DiMaggio requested the judge to instruct the jury that the 'adjudication by the building commissioner that the building should be demolished is not conclusive and his order to demolish it is no defence if in fact public safety did not require it to be demolished.' The judge did not give this instruction but, instead, after outlining the steps required by § 116(d), said that if these were 'done and the city then makes a contract with a wrecking company to tear the building down, then the wrecking company which tears it down after such compliance with the statute is justified in tearing it down and there is no liability on the city or the wrecker.' ³

We take judicial notice of all the provisions of St.1938, c. 479, a public act of the Legislature of general application in Boston. See Brodsky v. Fine, 263 Mass. 51, 54, 160 N.E. 335; Davenport v. Town of Danvers, 332 Mass. 580, 581, 126 N.E.2d 530. See also Forbes v. Kane, 316 Mass. 207, 210, 55 N.E.2d 220. On the evidence, the jury could have found that there had been proper compliance with the procedural provisions of § 116(d), not excluding the requirement of notice, even if the notice was mailed and not received. See Durkin v. Siegel, Mass., 165 N.E.2d 81. The giving of notice by mailing and posting was expressly authorized by the section. The question for decision thus is whether the propriety of the commissioner's judgment that the building was unsafe may be attacked collaterally and retried in this action against one carrying out the commissioner's decision.

DiMaggio relies, to establish the propriety of his requested instruction, primarily upon Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100, 10 L.R.A. 116. ⁴ See Stone v. Heath, 179 Mass. 385, 387-388, 60 N.E. 975; North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 314, 317-320, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53 L.Ed. 195; New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray, 7 Cir., 105 F.2d 212, 216-218. See also Belmont v. New England Brick Co., 190 Mass. 442, 446, 77 N.E. 504; Stiles v. Municipal Council of City of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 182-183, 123 N.E. 615, 4 A.L.R. 1365. Cf. Burofsky v. Turner, 274 Mass. 574, 580-582, 175 N.E. 90; Jaffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 405-408, 183 N.E. 110, 85 A.L.R. 293. Cf. also Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 252-253, 75 N.E. 619, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 752 (as to quasi legislative action). Miller v. Horton dealt with St.1887, c. 252, § 13, which authorized certain commissioners 'in all cases of * * * glanders * * * having condemned the animal infected therewith [to] cause such animal to be killed without appraisement.' A bare majority of this court decided that the commissioners' determination that a particular horse had the glanders was not conclusive and that the issue might be retried in an action against those who killed the horse pursuant to the order. It was said by Holmes, J. (152 Mass. at page 548, 26 N.E. at page 103) that the 'jurisdiction of the commissioners to condemn the * * *horse under section 13 was conditional upon its actually having the glanders. * * * [T]heir order would not protect the defendants in a case where the commissioners acted outside their jurisdiction.'

Statute 1887, c. 252, contained no requirement of notice to the owner of the horse. It gave no reasonable opportunity for a hearing at any stage, or for an appeal and review of the commissioners' decision by an independent administrative board, or for a court review on question of law. The 1938 Boston building code, on the other hand, contains the provisions already summarized (see footnote 2, supra) affording to the owner an appeal to, and a right to be heard before, the board of appeal. The court review on questions of law by certiorari, under G.L. c. 249, § 4 (as amended through St.1953, c. 586, § 1), includes the opportunity 'to contend * * * that the evidence which formed the basis of the action complained of or the basis of any specified finding or conclusion was as matter of law insufficient to warrant such action, finding or conclusion.' See Tracht v. County Com'rs of Worcester, 318 Mass. 681, 686-687, 63 N.E.2d 561. The 1938 building code is thus in material respects distinguishable from the 1887 statute. This is essentially the distinction of Miller v. Horton, based upon the right to be heard and appropriate review, outlined by Brandeis, J., dissenting in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 89, footnote 24, 52 S.Ct. 285, 307, footnote 55, 76 L.Ed. 598. There may be some suggestion of a similar reasoning in Stevens v. City of Worcester, 219 Mass. 128, 130-131, 106 N.E. 587; Stevens, landowner, 228 Mass. 368, 373, 117 N.E. 588, and Chase v. Proprietors of Revere House, 232 Mass. 88, 96-97, 122 N.E. 162. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433-443, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834. See also Annotation 14 A.L.R.2d 73, 82, 88-90. Cf. Durgin v. Minot, 203 Mass. 26, 28-31, 89 N.E. 144, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 241. We thus need not consider whether Miller v. Horton will now be followed on its precise facts. Certainly, in recent cases, it has not been considered on the issue of its basic holding. See e. g. Trum v. Town of Paxton, 329 Mass. 434, 438-439, 109 N.E.2d 116; Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 619, 628-629, 142 N.E.2d 347. By the Boston building code the Legislature, acting within the police power, has given broad jurisdiction (cf. Forbes v. Kane, 316 Mass. 207, 215-216, 55 N.E.2d 220) to the...