Dickey v. Iowa Ethics & Campaign Disclosure Bd.

• Citation: 943 N.W.2d 34
• Decision Date: 01 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-0094,19-0094
• Parties: Gary DICKEY Jr., Appellant, v. IOWA ETHICS AND CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE BOARD, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

943 N.W.2d 34

Gary DICKEY Jr., Appellant,

v.IOWA ETHICS AND CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE BOARD, Appellee.

No. 19-0094

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed May 1, 2020

I. Introduction.

At the end of 2017, the Governor and her spouse traveled to Memphis, Tennessee, on a corporate jet. An individual donor to her campaign paid for the trip. While in Memphis, the Governor engaged in activities related to her 2018 election campaign and also attended the Liberty Bowl football game. Her campaign committee reported the trip as a $2880.00 campaign contribution from the individual, relying on an Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board (Board) rule that requires a candidate who receives noncommercial air transportation from a corporation to reimburse the corporation at the rate of the undiscounted coach class airfare.

An attorney with campaign finance experience complained to the Board that the Governor had underreported the fair market value of the trip. When the Board dismissed the complaint, the attorney petitioned for judicial review pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19 (2017). The district court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, and the court of appeals affirmed.

On further review, we affirm the judgment of the district court and the decision of the court of appeals, substantially for the reasons set forth in their cogent opinions. We conclude the attorney is not an "aggrieved or adversely affected" party within the meaning of Iowa Code section 17A.19. While parties who allege they are missing information that the campaign laws require to be disclosed may have standing, see FEC v. Akins , 524 U.S. 11, 21, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998), this case is different. The attorney in this case does not allege he is lacking any relevant information and merely voices a disagreement over the reporting method used by the candidate committee.

II. Facts and Procedural History.

On December 30, 2017, the Governor and her spouse traveled to Memphis, Tennessee, on a corporate private jet.¹ The jet was owned by Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.—a Memphis-based company that does business with the state, administering workers’ compensation claims filed by injured state employees. Sedgwick's President and CEO, David North, paid for the flight by reimbursing the company for the cost of the private jet service provided. While in Memphis, the Governor engaged in activities related to her election campaign and also attended the Liberty Bowl football game in which Iowa State University was a participant.²

To comply with campaign disclosure requirements, on its January 19, 2018 disclosure report, the Kim Reynolds for Iowa candidate committee reported an in-kind contribution of $2880.00 as the fair market value of the airfare. See Iowa Code §§ 68A.402 –.402A (2017) (outlining disclosure requirement and information to be disclosed). The committee listed the donor, North; the description of the in-kind contribution, travel/flight; and the estimated fair market value, $2880.00.

After a news article appeared regarding the Governor's late-December trip, attorney Gary Dickey filed a complaint with the Board. In the complaint, Dickey alleged the committee underreported the fair market value of the in-kind contribution from North. Dickey claimed that the fair market value of the round-trip service for the Governor and her spouse on the private jet was higher than $2880.00. To support this assertion, Dickey attached three round-trip quotes for private charter seats on a Gulfstream G200, the kind of jet on which the Governor and her spouse had flown to Memphis on December 30, 2017.

The matter went before the Board on September 20, 2018. After discussion, the Board dismissed the complaint. In its written order of dismissal, the Board relied in part on Iowa Administrative Code rule 351—4.47(4)(a ), which states that when a candidate "uses noncommercial air transportation made available by a corporate entity," the candidate shall reimburse the corporate entity in advance for "the coach class airfare (without discounts)" if the destination is served by regularly scheduled commercial service. The Board added,

While the rule expressly allows a candidate ... to reimburse a corporate entity for the use of a corporate airplane, we never intended for this rule to prohibit a candidate's committee or permissible contributor to similarly reimburse a corporation for the fair market value of the use of an airplane.

In sum, the Board found no indication that the Governor's campaign committee had violated any law.

On October 9, Dickey filed a petition for judicial review in the District Court for Polk County. The petition alleged that the Board had improperly relied on rule 351—4.47(4)(a ) and Internal Revenue Service regulation 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-21. According to Dickey, based on quotes from three private jet service providers, the value of the December 30, 2017 round-trip flight was "far in excess of $2,880.00." Dickey sought reversal and remand.

The Board filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss. It urged that Dickey lacked standing to seek judicial review of the Board's ruling. Dickey resisted the motion, and the court heard oral argument on November 16, 2018. Thereafter, on December 26, the district court granted the Board's motion. The court reasoned in part as follows,

Regardless of which party is more correct about valuation, Mr. Dickey has not been injured by the Board's action. The committee has reported the in-kind contribution and its estimated value. Mr. Dickey has access to that reported value and is free to disagree with that reported value....

....

... Mr. Dickey has not been deprived of any information. He simply disagrees with the reported valuation. The quotes he obtained demonstrate that he can independently evaluate the reported value.

Dickey filed a notice of appeal on January 16, 2019. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. On September 11, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Dickey's petition. The court concluded, "We agree with the district court Dickey has not demonstrated ‘a specific and injurious effect’ such that he may obtain judicial review of the Board's ruling."

On October 1, Dickey applied for further review, and we granted his application.

III. Standard of Review.

"We review a decision by the district court to dismiss a case based on the lack of standing for errors at law." Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib. Inc., v. Iowa Educators Corp. , 812 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Godfrey v. State , 752 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Iowa 2008) ).

IV. Analysis.

Iowa Code section 68B.33 provides that "[j]udicial review of the actions of the [B]oard may be sought in accordance with chapter 17A." The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), chapter 17A, provides that "a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such agency action." Iowa Code § 17A.19. Thus, to have standing to challenge an administrative action in court under the IAPA, "the complaining party must (1) have a specific, personal, and legal interest in the litigation; and (2) the specific interest must be adversely affected by the agency action in question." Medco Behavioral Care Corp. of Iowa v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. , 553 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Iowa 1996) ; see also Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd. , 330 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1983). Notably, "a person may be a proper party to agency proceedings and not have standing to obtain judicial review." Richards v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin. , 454 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1990).

A "general interest" in the proper enforcement of the law cannot support standing to obtain judicial review. Id. "A general interest shared by all citizens in making sure government acts legally is normally insufficient to support standing ...." Godfrey , 752 N.W.2d at 423–24. For example, in Richards , we held that an individual's interest in seeing the tax laws properly enforced was not enough to support standing, but the pecuniary effects of a higher tax burden due to the improper grant of a tax exemption to somebody else could be sufficient. 454 N.W.2d at 575–76.

In this case, Dickey's petition alleges the Governor and her spouse flew to Memphis on December 30, 2017, to attend a campaign event and watch the Liberty Bowl. They traveled on a 2010 Gulfstream jet owned by Sedgwick, a Memphis-based company that administers workers’ compensation claims filed by injured state employees. The chief executive officer of the corporation, North, personally reimbursed the corporation for the use of the plane, and the Governor's candidate committee reported the trip as a contribution from the CEO with an estimated fair market value of $2880. The petition alleges that the value of the flights taken by the Governor and her spouse was actually "far in excess of $2,880."

The petition seeks review of the Board's decision that the Governor's candidate committee properly reported the fair market value of the flights taken by the Governor and her spouse. The Board found the fair market value of the trip could be reported using coach class airfare between Des Moines and Memphis, based on the Board's own rule 351—4.47(4).³ Dickey alleges that rule 351—4.47(4) was inapplicable and that the candidate committee "underreported" fair market value.⁴

Critically, for standing purposes, Dickey does not allege that he lacks any relevant information concerning this December 30 campaign contribution that took the form of a plane trip. In fact, Dickey includes considerable detail in his petition and also incorporates by reference a newspaper article with additional detail. Dickey contends only that a higher value of the flights should have been reported than actually was reported.

Dickey's declaration is of the same ilk. It too does not suggest that he personally is injured by deficient campaign reporting concerning the December 30 flight. Dickey instead recites in three paragraphs his prior expertise in advising...