Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd.
| Citation | 330 N.W.2d 267 |
| Decision Date | 16 February 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 67094,67094 |
| Parties | POLK COUNTY Iowa, Appellant, and George Wennerberg, Linda Davis, Steven Elliot, Fred D. Carl, Virginia Rogers, and Marilyn Straw, Intervenor-Appellants, v. IOWA STATE APPEAL BOARD, Appellee, and Polk-Des Moines Taxpayers Association, and Vincent A. Ella, Richard S. Davis, Sara A. Matthews, David L. Maaha, James W. Hubbell, III, Ronald P. Morden, George F. Milligan, Helen H. Goodner, Donald R. Cook, Deloris J. Davis, Harlan Bergman, Doug Cunningham and Gerald W. Reed, on behalf of all other Petitioners, Protestor-Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Norman G. Jesse, Asst. Polk County Atty., and Curt L. Sytsma and Arthur C. Hedberg, Des Moines, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Brent R. Appel and Earl Willits, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee, Iowa State Appeal Bd.
Robert R. Rydell and Eric W. Burmeister of Tesdell, Rydell, Hall & Shinkle, Des Moines, for protestor-appellees.
Considered by LeGRAND, P.J., and McCORMICK, McGIVERIN, LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ.
The resolution of this appeal depends on the harmonization of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), Iowa Code ch. 17A (1981), and the Local Budget Law, Iowa Code ch. 24 (1981). This appeal is the latest skirmish over the Polk County budget for the 1981-82 fiscal year.
On March 16, 1981, the Polk County board of supervisors certified to the county auditor a $61,000,000 budget for fiscal 1981-82. The budget was comprised of 43 funds affecting over 1000 employees and 305,000 residents. Pursuant to section 24.27, an appropriate number of persons affected by the budget filed a written protest with the county auditor objecting to overbudgeting of cost of living allowances (COLA), social security (FICA) and Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System (IPERS) items, transfer of costs of bailiffs from the general fund to the court expense fund, and underestimation of various income items. The auditor transmitted copies of the protest and budget to the State Appeal Board (Board) as required by section 24.27. Sections 24.26-.32 are involved in this case.
A hearing was held by the Board and on June 8, 1981, the Board certified to the Polk County auditor its decision reducing the budget in several particular respects by approximately $880,000.
Petitioner Polk County and various intervenors on its behalf sought judicial review of the Board's decision under chapter 17A. These petitioners also filed an extensive application for adjudication of law points. Respondents State Appeal Board and various intervenors, including the Polk-Des Moines Taxpayers Association, filed motions to dismiss.
The district court held a hearing on these matters. On July 31, 1981, the district court, in the rulings now before us on appeal, sustained the motion to dismiss, finding that judicial review was not available under chapter 17A, and that Polk County and all except one intervenor lacked standing to contest the Board's actions. In the event it was later determined that chapter 17A judicial review was available to petitioners, the court also ruled, in the alternative, on petitioners' application to adjudicate law points. The effect of these rulings was to uphold the $880,000 reduction to the budget.
Petitioners appealed dismissal of their petition and raised the following issues:
(1) Whether Polk County and the other intervenor-petitioners have standing to seek judicial review of the constitutionality of sections 24.26-.32 and of the Board's actions;
(2) whether the review contemplated by sections 24.26-.32 is an unlawful delegation of authority by the legislature;
(3) whether sections 24.26-.32 unlawfully delegate the power to pass a local or special law (4) whether failure to adopt rules as required by section 17A.3 invalidates the action of the Board;
(5) whether the use of "final" in section 24.32 relative to the Board's decision precludes judicial review under chapter 17A;
(6) whether the hearing required by section 24.28 makes this a contested case under section 17A.2(2);
(7) whether the protest petitions were sufficient;
(8) whether the Board had jurisdiction to issue an order directing the manner of use of interest earned on revenue sharing funds; and
(9) whether salaries of bailiffs are properly paid from the court expense fund.
We reverse in part the rulings of the district court but affirm the result it reached in upholding the decision of the Board.
I. Mootness. Before reaching the issues raised by petitioners, we make the initial observation that the outcome of this appeal can have no practical effect on the 1981-82 Polk County budget. Taxes and expenditures for fiscal 1982 were collected and made pursuant to the Board's directive. The budget for 1983-84 soon will be certified by the Polk County board of supervisors. However, as budget battles show no signs of subsiding, this appeal raises recurring issues of considerable public interest which call for resolution. We therefore consider the merits of several of the issues raised in petitioners' appeal. See Beam v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 264 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Iowa 1978). We do not decide those issues which are unlikely to arise again in the future.
II. Standing. Prior to reaching the merits of this case, we must also deal with the challenge to petitioners' standing to obtain judicial review of the Board's actions. Of the petitioners presently before us, the district court ruled that standing could be conferred only on intervenor Steven Elliot, who intervened in his own behalf and in his capacity as President of AFSCME, Local No. 1868, an "employee organization" as defined in Iowa Code section 20.3(4) (1981), and on behalf of the members thereof who are Polk County employees. Motions to dismiss the petition as to the remaining petitioners, including Polk County, were sustained on the basis of lack of their standing to contest the Appeal Board's actions.
We agree with the district court that Elliot is the only petitioner-intervenor who has standing. We disagree with the court's ruling dismissing Polk County entirely from the case; as to certain issues Polk County has standing.
A. Polk County. Whether Polk County has standing depends on the type of issue it seeks to raise. In the present case, the issues raised may fall into one of three categories: (1) constitutional challenge--a challenge of the constitutionality of sections 24.26-.32; (2) challenge of agency's authority--a challenge as to the Board's authority or proper procedure under chapter 24; and (3) challenge of the agency's discretion--a challenge which attacks the results of the Board's decision. 1 All of these categories ordinarily would be reviewed under the judicial review provisions of chapter 17A. See § 17A.19(8). However, a person or party must first show that it has standing as one "who is aggrieved or adversely affected by [the] final agency action" for the purposes of section 17A.19(1), before being entitled to raise these issues.
Polk County falls within the IAPA's definition of a "person." Iowa Code § 17A.2(6) (). The determinative issue regarding whether it has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute is the requirement of section 17A.19(1) that it be aggrieved or adversely affected by the Board's action.
Our cases have held uniformly that a county lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of state statutes. Board of Supervisors of Linn County v. Department of Revenue, 263 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 1978); Warren County v. Judges of Fifth Judicial District, 243 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Iowa 1976); C. Hewitt & Sons v. Keller, 223 Iowa 1372, 275 N.W. 94 (1937). The reasons for this longstanding rule are explained in Board of Supervisors of Linn County. These reasons need not be reiterated here, and are not changed, as Polk County suggests, by the 1978 adoption of the Home Rule Amendment. Iowa Const. art. III, § 39A.
The Home Rule Amendment allows counties to exercise power over local affairs in regard to which there is no overriding legislative directive. Counties remain the creatures of the legislature and, therefore, must accept as final the acts of their superior, the legislature.
We hold that a county has no interest in defeating a statute duly enacted by the legislature. As a result the constitutionality of sections 24.26-.32 and the Board's actions under them and the provisions of chapter 17A do not give rise to situations in which Polk County becomes an aggrieved or adversely affected "person" within the meaning of section 17A.19(1).
Consequently, Polk County lacks standing to raise the following constitutional issues: (1) that review by the State Appeal Board, as contemplated by Iowa Code sections 24.26-.32, is an unlawful delegation in violation of article III, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution; (2) that as interpreted and applied by the Board, sections 24.27-.32 are unconstitutional because they purport to delegate local or special lawmaking which the legislature is prohibited from doing under article III, section 30, of the Iowa Constitution; and (3) that the Board's failure to adopt rules as required by section 17A.3 denies Polk County due process of law and invalidates action taken by the Board.
Under the IAPA, however, counties may challenge the nature and extent of the authority or procedures of a state agency under relevant or enabling legislation. See Southeast Warren Community School District v. Department of Public Instruction, 285 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Iowa 1979) (). The issues raised in this category of cases are sufficient to bring the county within the requirements of section 17A.19(1). They give the county a "specific, personal, and legal interest" which has...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Iowa Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Envtl. Prot. Comm'n & Iowa Dep't of Natural Res.
...[of agency action] lies in the due process afforded to parties involved in contested case proceedings.”); Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 276 (Iowa 1983) (same); Lunde v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 487 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Iowa Ct.App.1992) (“ ‘Other agency action’ entitles the ......
-
Dickey v. Iowa Ethics & Campaign Disclosure Bd.
...Behavioral Care Corp. of Iowa v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs. , 553 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Iowa 1996) ; see also Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd. , 330 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Iowa 1983). Notably, "a person may be a proper party to agency proceedings and not have standing to obtain judicial review." R......
-
Burroughs v. City of Davenport Zoning Bd. of Adjustment
...is especially true in contested cases in which the parties partake in an evidentiary hearing. See Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd. , 330 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Iowa 1983) (defining contested case within the meaning of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA)). The purpose of an evidentiar......
-
Bailiff v. Adams County Conference Bd.
...pleadings, the only facts that were material and relevant to the Court's decision were undisputed. 9. Citing Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 271-72 (Iowa 1983), plaintiff argues "[d]efendants cannot challenge their own action of duly reappointing Plaintiff to an additi......