Diesel Injection Sales & Service, Inc. v. Gonzalez

• Citation: 631 S.W.2d 193
• Decision Date: 25 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 2435,2435
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Parties: DIESEL INJECTION SALES & SERVICE, INC., Appellant, v. Hector GONZALEZ, John Way, and Schwing Diesel Company, Inc., Appellees.

Page 193

631 S.W.2d 193

DIESEL INJECTION SALES & SERVICE, INC., Appellant, v. Hector GONZALEZ, John Way, and Schwing Diesel Company, Inc.,

Appellees.

No. 2435.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

Feb. 25, 1982.

Andrew J. Lehrman, Sorrell, Anderson & Sorrell, Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Ron Barroso, Corpus Christi, for appellees.

Before NYE, C. J., and BISSETT and YOUNG, JJ.

OPINION

NYE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a denial of a temporary injunction. Diesel Injection Sales and Service (Diesel Injection) as plaintiff, filed suit against Hector Gonzalez, John Way and Schwing Diesel Company, Inc. (Schwing), as defendants, to enforce a non-competition covenant in Gonzalez' and Way's employment contracts. ¹ The district court denied the application for temporary injunction and plaintiff appealed.

Diesel injection is in the specialized business of diesel engine repair work, involving diesel injection services and the rebuilding of fuel injection systems on diesel engines. They also offer over-the-counter sales of diesel related parts. Gonzalez and Way, former employees of Diesel Injection, left the company and began working for Schwing in violation of their employment agreements. These agreements were to be effective for a period of two years after terminating their employment with Diesel Injection.

Testimony at the hearing reflects that Diesel Injection and Schwing are the only two diesel injection businesses in Nueces County which service the major manufacturers of fuel injection equipment. Diesel Injection asserts that in this specialized field the competition is keen, and therefore the continued violation by the appellees of their employment contracts threatens the goodwill and reputation of Diesel Injection. They seek injunctive relief to enforce their employment agreements with Gonzalez and Way and to enjoin Schwing from employing Gonzalez and Way in violation of said agreements.

The only question before the Court in a hearing on the application for a temporary injunction is the right of the applicant to a preservation of the status quo of the subject matter of the suit pending a final trial of the case on its merits. Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549 (1953); AMF Tuboscope v. McBryde, 618 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n. r. e.). To prevail on an application for temporary injunction, an applicant need only plead a cause of action and show a probable right on final trial to the relief he seeks and probable injury in the interim. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex.1968). See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.1978); AMF Tuboscope v. McBryde, supra.

The general rule of law in Texas is that a trial court is clothed with broad discretion in determining whether to issue, or not, a temporary injunction to preserve the rights of the parties pending a final trial of the case on its merits. When that discretion is exercised, it should not be overturned on appeal unless the record discloses a clear abuse of discretion. Texas Foundries, Inc. v. International Moulders & Foundry Workers' Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.1952); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Ramirez, supra. In reviewing the order denying the temporary injunction, we must draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Hartwell's Office World, Inc. v. Systex Corporation, 598 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist) 1980, writ ref'd n. r. e.). In addition, in reviewing a trial court's judgment where findings of fact and conclusions of law are not filed, this Court will uphold the judgment on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Seaman v. Seaman, 425 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.1968); Public Utilities Bd. v. Central Power & Light, 587 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n. r. e.).

In the present case, the evidence reveals that Gonzalez and Way worked for Diesel Injection as diesel engine mechanics with virtually no contact with the public. There is no evidence to indicate that Gonzalez or Way succeeded in or attempted to "pirate" away customers from Diesel Injection to Schwing. Frank Schwing, part-owner of Schwing Diesel, testified that as a result of having employed Gonzalez and Way, Schwing Diesel had not received any additional business; Gonzalez and Way had not brought Schwing Diesel any new customers; nor had Schwing Diesel obtained any new techniques, procedures or secrets.

This case is similar in all respects to a prior case appealed to this Court between Diesel Injection, as plaintiffs, and another former employee who was hired by Schwing Diesel Injection. In our decision in that case we held that Diesel Injection had...