Dimke v. Finke
| Citation | 295 N.W. 75,209 Minn. 29 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 32664.,32664. |
| Parties | DIMKE et al. v. FINKE, Director of Social Welfare, et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Appeal from District Court, Otter Tail County; D. M. Cameron, Judge.
Action under the declaratory judgments statute by John Dimke and Rosalia Dimke, husband and wife, against Walter W. Finke, Director of Social Welfare of the State of Minnesota, and others, to determine the constitutionality of the Old Age Pension Act, which imposes a lien in favor of the state on all realty belonging to a recipient of old age pension benefits. From a judgment denying relief, the plaintiffs appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
Leonard Eriksson, of Fergus Falls, for appellants.
J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Chester S. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Kent C. van den Berg, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., and Wm. P. Berghuis, Co. Atty., of Fergus Falls, for respondents.
This is an action under the declaratory judgments statute to determine the constitutionality of L.1939, c. 315, § 1, 3 Mason Minn.St.1940 Supp. § 3199-26, which amends 3 Mason Minn.St.1938 Supp. § 3199-26 (Ex.Sess.L. 1935-1936, c. 95, § 16), known as the old age pension act, by imposing a lien in favor of the state upon all real estate belonging to a recipient of old age pension benefits. Section 2 of the act (1940 Supp. § 3199-18 [b]) increases the net value of the property or the net value of the combined property which a husband and wife may have, and still be eligible to benefits, from $3,500 to $5,000.
Plaintiffs, John and Rosalia Dimke, are husband and wife. John owns a house and a small tract of land in Otter Tail county which they occupy as a homestead. Shortly after the passage of the old age assistance act they both applied for and were granted benefits. In January, 1940, after the amendment became effective, John accepted and cashed a benefit check containing the following endorsement "By this endorsement I acknowledge notice that the State of Minnesota has a lien upon all my property in the state as provided by law [L.1939] under Chapter 315, for this and future payments of old age assistance to me."
Rosalia accepted a check in January, 1940, but was unable to cash it because of her refusal to sign the endorsement thereon.
In this proceeding plaintiffs seek: (1) To have the act declared unconstitutional in so far as it attempts to impose a lien upon their homestead; (2) to have the existing lien against their homestead expunged from the record; and (3) an order requiring defendants to continue the payment of old age assistance benefits to them. The trial court held the act constitutional and ordered judgment denying all of the relief demanded in the complaint. This appeal is from the judgment entered pursuant to that order.
Under the original act, Ex.Sess.L.1935-1936, c. 95, § 15 (1938 Supp. § 3199-25), on the death of a recipient of old age assistance "or on the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received such old age assistance," the total amount paid to either or both becomes allowable as a claim against the estate of such "person or persons" by the court having jurisdiction of the estate.
The amendment here under attack, L. 1939, c. 315, § 1, gives to the state a lien on all of the real estate of a recipient of old age benefits for the amount paid to such recipient after January 1, 1940. The material parts of c. 315, § 1, appear in the margin.1
On the questions presented we are concerned only with whether the legislature acted within constitutional limits when it wrote into the law the sections providing for the imposition of a lien upon the real estate of a recipient for the amount of the benefits paid to him. The homestead, not being excluded from the effect of the lien, is subject to it if the amendment is valid.
The rules by which this court must be guided in determining whether an act of the legislature is constitutional are well established. Every law is presumed to be constitutional in the first instance. An act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity appears clearly or unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it violates some constitutional provision. The power of the court to declare a law unconstitutional is to be exercised only when absolutely necessary in the particular case and then with great caution. 6 Dunnell, Minn.Dig. 2d Ed. & Supps., §§ 8929, 8930, and 8931; State ex rel. Hildebrandt v. Fitzgerald, 117 Minn. 192, 134 N.W. 728; Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102; Muller v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 197 Minn. 608, 268 N.W. 204; State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 157, 202 N.W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548. Aided by these principles, we proceed to a consideration of the grounds upon which appellants base their claim that L.1939, c. 315, is unconstitutional.
1. It is first urged that the law violates the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Const. Minn. art. 1, § 2; Const.U.S.Amend. 14. Appellants argue that in enacting Ex.Sess. L.1935-1936, c. 95, the legislature created or defined a class of citizens whose economic condition justified the expenditure of public funds for their relief; that the all-embracing fact justifying the payment of public money for private use is "need"; that the legislature established a formula for determining who are in need, which formula included persons having property worth up to $3,500 (now $5,000); and that all persons found to be in "need" regardless of whether they own or do not own real estate are within the class covered by the act. It is then urged that by enacting c. 315, which provides for the imposition of a lien upon the real estate of those persons having it, the legislature imposed upon them special burdens from which others in the class, namely those in need but not having real estate, are exempt.
Legislation which selects particular individuals from a class and imposes upon them special burdens from which others in the same class are exempt is class legislation, violative of the equal protection clause of the federal constitution and of the uniformity clause of the state constitution. Const. art. 9, § 1. Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102; 1 Dunnell, Minn.Dig., 2d Ed. & 1932 Supp., § 1668; State ex rel. Bd. of C. & C. H. Com'rs v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540, 58 N.W. 150; State ex rel. Beek v. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 80 N.W. 633, 778, 1134, 46 L.R.A. 442, 77 Am.St.Rep. 681; State v. Broden, 181 Minn. 341, 232 N.W. 517. These constitutional limitations do not curtail the power of the legislature to classify and to adopt different rules for different classes. They both require, however, that the classification be not unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, but that it operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar circumstances, Reed v. Bjornson, supra; that it be reasonable and based upon actual differences, Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628, L.R.A.1915F, 829; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327; State v. Pehrson, 205 Minn. 573, 287 N.W. 313.
Classification is, in the first instance, a legislative matter; and it must be borne in mind that "there is a strong presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds." Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157, 39 S.Ct. 227, 229, 63 L.Ed. 527. If the classification be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another, it is not violative of the constitutional provisions even though some inequalities may result. State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 202 N.W. 714, 42 A.L.R. 548; Seamer v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 Minn. 376, 172 N.W. 765; Magoun v. Illinois T. & S. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 300, 18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 1037; Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 35 S.Ct. 345, 59 L.Ed. 632.
It has been frequently held that classification for tax purposes may be based upon ability to pay. State ex rel. Foot v. Bazille, 97 Minn. 11, 106 N.W. 93, 6 L.R. A.,N.S., 732, 7 Ann.Cas. 1056; Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. County of Martin, 104 Minn. 179, 116 N.W. 572; Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102; Apartment Operators Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 191 Minn. 365, 254 N.W. 443. It is not required of a classification for purposes of social legislation that every evil be reached. It is enough that the legislature sees a specific evil and remedies it. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327. Governmental aid may be granted to those having no property, and denied to those having property. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628, L.R.A.1915F, 829.
To declare an act unconstitutional, we must say that the legislature could not reasonably and intelligently make the classification it did. Gunderson v. Williams, 175 Minn. 316, 317, 221 N.W. 231; Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609, 23 S.Ct. 168, 47 L.Ed. 323; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 34 S.Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539; Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 36 S.Ct. 440, 60 L.Ed. 771, Ann.Cas.1916D, 548; Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 37 S.Ct. 227, 61 L.Ed. 498. By c. 315, the legislature imposed a lien against the property of those having or thereafter acquiring real property for the amount of benefits actually paid out. Having power to grant assistance to those without property and to withhold it from those with property, Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 35 S.Ct. 342, 59 L.Ed. 628, L.R.A.1915F, 829, the legislature clearly had power to give assistance payments to those with property conditioned upon the imposition of a lien to the state for the amount of the grant. We find no improper classification in so...
To continue reading
Request your trial