DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. TINKER
| Decision Date | 13 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-CV-1020,93-CV-1020 |
| Citation | 691 A.2d 57 |
| Parties | DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant v. Joseph E. TINKER, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, CHERYL M. LONG AND PAUL R. WEBBER, III, JJ.
James C. McKay, Jr., Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Vanessa Ruiz, Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellant.
Samuel M. Shapiro, with whom David C. Merkin, Rockville, MD, was on the brief, for appellee.
Before TERRY and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and BELSON, Senior Judge.
Appellee Tinker sued the District of Columbia for injuries allegedly suffered in the course of an arrest. A jury awarded him $500,000 in damages. During the pre-trial phase of the case, the trial court denied the District of Columbia's motion for leave to amend its answer by asserting the statute of limitations as a defense, and denied the District's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. On appeal from the final judgment, the District contends that these pre-trial rulings were erroneous. We agree, reverse the judgment, and remand for further proceedings as outlined in part IV of this opinion.
The following statement of facts is based on the testimony at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Tinker. It appears from the verdict that the jury substantially accepted Tinker's version of what happened.
On the evening of September 10, 1988, Joseph Tinker, an automobile mechanic, was walking from his home on Yuma Street, S.E., toward Ninth Street, on his way to a convenience store. He had left his house without a wallet or any identification. In his back pocket Tinker was carrying a knife with a four-inch blade which he used for strippingwires in the course of his work. While walking along Yuma Street, Tinker stopped and picked up a plastic toy gun which was lying on the ground.
After crossing Ninth Street, Tinker heard the sound of people running and brakes squealing, and then he heard someone order him to halt. Turning around, he was hit and knocked down by a Metropolitan Police officer. As he lay on the ground, the officer threatened him with his service pistol and hit him with his nightstick. The officer then pulled Tinker to his feet and began to search him. Upon discovering the knife in his back pocket, the officer again shoved Tinker to the ground, handcuffed him, pulled him once again to his feet, and placed him under arrest. In the course of these events, Tinker's right shoulder and wrist were seriously injured.
Once in custody, Tinker was taken to the Seventh District police station. While being processed there, he complained of his injuries and was taken to District of Columbia General Hospital, where he later underwent extensive surgery on his right shoulder. He stayed in the hospital, and then in the infirmary at the jail, for about a month.
Upon his release from the hospital, Tinker was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon, namely, the knife that he had been carrying in his pocket. He pleaded guilty to this charge on December 6, 1988, and at a later date he was sentenced to serve nine months in prison.1
For reasons not entirely clear from the record, Tinker was mistakenly released from Lorton Reformatory on August 11, 1989. Soon thereafter, however, the District of Columbia Board of Parole issued a warrant for his arrest, stating that he was on parole from an earlier sentence for robbery and that the Board had information that he was in violation of his parole. He was re-arrested on September 15, 1989, and returned to Lorton to complete the remainder of his robbery sentence. On July 14, 1990, Tinker was transferred to a halfway house, and on September 28, 1990, he was again released on parole.
On July 19, 1991, Tinker filed a three-count civil action against the District of Columbia, seeking redress for the injuries he had allegedly suffered as a result of his arrest on September 10, 1988.2 On August 23 the District filed its answer denying the substantive allegations in the complaint. Five months later, on January 24, 1992, the parties filed a stipulation stating that "the issue of excessive force is one within the ken of the jury and will not be presented through expert testimony by either the plaintiff or the defendant."
On April 13, 1992, the District filed a motion for leave to amend its answer by adding a claim that the assault count was barred by the statute of limitations. In a memorandum filed in support of this motion, the District stated (1) that the initial omission of the statute of limitations defense in its answer was inadvertent, (2) that relevant case law "provides that leave to amend shall be freely given," and (3) that Tinker would suffer "no prejudice attributable to the timing of the request for amendment." A few weeks later, on May 27, the District filed a motion for summary judgment on the assault claim, arguing that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Tinker opposed both motions, and the court denied them both in a nine-page order.
Some time later the case was tried before a jury, which awarded Tinker $500,000 in damages. The District moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the court denied. This appeal followed.
In denying the District's motion for leave to amend its answer by adding a statute of limitations defense, the trial court gave three reasons. First, the court ruled that because discovery had already been completed, Tinker would be substantially prejudiced if the District were allowed to amend its answer. Second, the court concluded that the District's delay of approximately eight months in asserting this defense was "inexcusable," since the District was experienced in trying many cases of a similar nature, and the availability of a statute of limitations defense should have been recognized much earlier. Third, the court held that the District had "impliedly waived this defense [by taking] the affirmative step of joining with the plaintiff in filing a stipulation" that expert witnesses need not be called to testify on the issue of excessive force. Because the stipulation "speaks directly to how the parties will proceed on this count in the complaint," the court said, "the District surely was on notice of the details of the allegation" and should have "realized the time sequence of all events involving the assault and the filing of this lawsuit." On appeal the District contends that the trial court's denial of its motion was an abuse of discretion.
Super.Ct.Civ.R. 8(c) states that the statute of limitations is a defense which must be raised affirmatively by a defendant in a responsive pleading. If not pleaded promptly, this defense may be deemed waived by the trial court. Whitener v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 505 A.2d 457, 458 (D.C. 1986). On the other hand, Rule 8(f) mandates that pleadings be construed so as to do "substantial justice," and has been consistently interpreted to reflect "a preference for resolution of disputes on the merits, not on technicalities of pleading." Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, Rule 8 must be read in light of Rule 15(a), which provides that parties may amend their pleadings with leave of court after a responsive pleading is filed, and that such leave "shall be freely given when justice so requires."
When reviewing a trial court order denying a party leave to amend a pleading, this court must determine whether that denial was an abuse of discretion. In Eagle Wine & Liquor Co. v. Silverberg Electric Co., 402 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979), we said that although motions for leave to amend are not to be granted automatically, "[t]he discretion accorded the trial court in deciding a motion for leave to amend is to be considered together with the prevailing spirit of liberalism in allowing such amendments when justice will be so served." Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
Guided by these general principles, we consider the trial court's ruling on the District's motion to amend its answer.
In January 1992 both parties filed with the trial court a written stipulation which said:
It is stipulated and agreed that at the trial of the above captioned case the issue of excessive force is one within the ken of the jury and will not be presented through expert testimony by either the plaintiff or the defendant. The lack of such expert testimony at trial will result in no grounds for a directed verdict being requested or granted by either the plaintiff or the defendant on that issue.
Almost three months later, the District filed the motion for leave to amend its answer by adding a statute of limitations defense. In its subsequent order, the trial court held that, by agreeing to the stipulation, the District had addressed the merits of the case to such an extent that there was "utterly no way" for the District to account for its failure to realize that a statute of limitations defense might be available. Calling this "a major lapse on the part of the District," the court found the lapse "inexcusable" and denied the motion.
The court's reliance on the parties' stipulation as a basis for its ruling was, in our view, an abuse of the discretion vested in it by Rule 15(a). This court has held that unless there is prejudice to the opposing party, the rules of procedure cannot bar a defendant from raising the defense of the statute of limitations even after the filing of its answer. Whitener v. WMATA, supra, 505 A.2d at 460. In the present case, therefore, the trial court could not properly denythe District's motion simply because the parties had entered into a stipulation about expert testimony. There was nothing in the stipulation to suggest that the District had waived its right to raise the affirmative...
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