Dix v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 18 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. S012342,S012342
• Citation: 807 P.2d 1063,279 Cal.Rptr. 834,53 Cal.3d 442
• Parties: , 807 P.2d 1063 William Edward DIX, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Humboldt County, Respondent; The PEOPLE of the State of California et al., Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 834

279 Cal.Rptr. 834

53 Cal.3d 442, 807 P.2d 1063

William Edward DIX, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Humboldt County, Respondent The PEOPLE of the State of California et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S012342.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

April 18, 1991.

[53 Cal.3d 447] [807 P.2d 1064] Bernard C. DePaoli, Eureka, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attys. Gen., Steve White, Arnold O. Overoye and Richard B. Iglehart, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Asst. Atty. Gen., Aileen Bunney, Laurence K. Sullivan, Morris Beatus and Enid A. Camps, Deputy Attys. Gen., Fern M. Laetham, State Public Defender, and Philip M. Brooks, Deputy State Public Defender, for real parties in interest.

BAXTER, Justice.

Alan Dale Bradley was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to prison. Thereafter, the superior court invoked Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (hereafter section 1170(d)), ¹ to recall Bradley's sentence. Petitioner William Edward Dix, the victim of Bradley's assault, sought mandate or prohibition to overturn the recall order and prevent substitution of a new sentence. Petitioner argued that section 1170(d) permits recall and resentencing only under limited circumstances not present in Bradley's case.

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate. It held that petitioner had standing to litigate the sentencing issue as a matter of "public interest." On the merits, it agreed that section 1170(d) provided no authority for the trial court's action.

We conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in both respects. Neither a crime victim nor any other member of the public has general standing to intervene in an ongoing criminal proceeding against another person. Furthermore, section 1170(d) does not limit a sentencing court to correction of a "disparate" sentence, as the Court of Appeal majority suggested. Instead, the statute allows the court to recall a sentence within the pertinent time limits, and then to resentence, for any reason that could influence the exercise of sentencing discretion generally, including events which have occurred since the original sentence was imposed. We will therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

FACTS

Bradley was charged with attempting to murder petitioner. At the January 1988 preliminary hearing, the evidence indicated that Bradley entered the Arcata house where petitioner was living, brandished a pistol, and demanded $60 petitioner owed "Dave" in a drug deal. Petitioner refused to give Bradley the money, the two men went outside, and Bradley shot petitioner in the head.

An information was filed in Humboldt County Superior Court charging Bradley with assault with a firearm. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2).) The information also alleged that Bradley personally and intentionally inflicted great bodily injury on petitioner. (§§ 1203, subd. (e)(3), 12022.7.)

On March 4, 1988, Bradley pled guilty to the firearm-assault charge and admitted the allegation of great bodily injury. The court, Judge Brown presiding, immediately sentenced Bradley to state prison. The court imposed the upper term of four years for the aggravated assault, and an additional three-year enhancement for the great bodily injury, for a total term of seven years. ²

On June 24, 1988, 118 days after sentencing, the court recalled the sentence on its own motion pursuant to section 1170(d). ³ Bradley was returned from prison to the Humboldt County jail. Resentencing was thereafter continued from time to time. In July 1988, Bradley was transferred to the custody of the Shasta County Sheriff's Department. Thereafter, both the Humboldt and Shasta County Superior Courts issued orders further continuing resentencing from time to time. Bradley was temporarily released on his own recognizance, but has since been returned to jail custody. He has never been resentenced for his assault on petitioner.

The reasons for this treatment of Bradley, though not contained in any official record, are not essentially disputed by the parties. The District Attorney of Shasta County sought to prosecute Phil Kellotat, a reputed drug kingpin, for hiring the murder of Vince Capitan. At the last minute, Capitan's assassin refused to provide crucial testimony against Kellotat, forcing one dismissal of the murder-for-hire prosecution. Bradley, already serving his assault sentence, told the authorities that Kellotat had previously hired him to kill Capitan. Bradley said he would so testify if his sentence for assaulting petitioner could be changed to "local (i.e., county jail) time."

At the Shasta County prosecutor's request, and with the consent of the Humboldt County District Attorney, Judge Brown therefore agreed to recall Bradley's sentence on his own motion, and to delay resentencing pending Bradley's testimony in the Kellotat case. In order to spare Humboldt County the costs of Bradley's interim custody, Shasta County apparently accepted a transfer of custody to its jail. ⁴

In February 1989, petitioner wrote Judge Brown to express alarm that Bradley had been recalled from prison and released. Petitioner referred to Bradley's extensive felony record and stated that Bradley had displayed a threatening note during petitioner's testimony in the assault case.

Petitioner subsequently retained counsel who assisted him in further unsuccessful attempts to have Bradley immediately returned or resentenced to prison. On February 24, 1989, petitioner's counsel appeared at a scheduled status hearing before Judge Lund; over counsel's objection, resentencing was further continued at the request of the Shasta County District Attorney.

On March 3, 1989, petitioner filed this application for prohibition and/or mandamus in the Court of Appeal. The petition sought to prevent the Humboldt County Superior Court from further continuing Bradley's resentencing, and to require Bradley's immediate return to prison to serve the original term.

The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ. On July 26, 1989, the appellate court filed its decision ordering issuance of a peremptory writ. Rehearing was granted to allow briefing by Bradley, who had not previously been represented in the proceeding.

On February 28, 1990, the Court of Appeal again ordered issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate, directing the Humboldt County Superior Court to vacate its recall order and to return Bradley to prison forthwith. The majority concluded that section 1170(d) permits recall only to correct a sentencing disparity and does not allow resentencing on the basis of events which occurred after the original sentence was imposed. The majority further ruled that petitioner had "public interest" standing to enforce these limits on the trial court's recall and resentencing authority. Justice Poche dissented on both points. We granted review at the request of the People and Bradley, real parties in interest (hereafter collectively referred to as real parties).

DISCUSSION

1. Standing.

We conclude at the outset that petitioner, who is not a party to Bradley's criminal case, has no standing to challenge the application of section 1170(d) to Bradley's sentencing. This extraordinary writ proceeding falls within the general rule that neither a crime victim nor any other citizen has a legally enforceable interest, public or private, in the commencement, conduct, or outcome of criminal proceedings against another.

Mandate lies to compel the performance of official duty (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085), and prohibition to restrain judicial acts in excess of jurisdiction (id., § 1102), where there is no adequate legal remedy. Ordinarily, the writs will be issued only to persons who are "beneficially interested." (Id., §§ 1086, 1103; Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351, 254 P.2d 6 [protection of the petitioner's "substantial right"].)

Petitioner argued in the Court of Appeal that he had a "beneficial interest" in Bradley's proper confinement because he was the victim of Bradley's crime and because Bradley had threatened to harm him further. The majority sidestepped this claim of private or personal interest by invoking the principle that " ' "where the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced." ' " (Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256, italics added; see also Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 439, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610.)

Neither petitioner's theory nor the Court of Appeal's supports the holding below that petitioner may intervene by writ in Bradley's sentencing. Except as specifically provided by law, a private citizen has no personal legal interest in the outcome of an individual criminal prosecution against another person. Nor may the doctrine of "public interest" standing prevail over the public prosecutor's exclusive discretion in the conduct of criminal cases.

The parties to a criminal action are the People, in whose sovereign name it is prosecuted, and the person accused (§§ 684, 685; Gov.Code, § 100); the victim of the crime is not a party (see People v. Parriera (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 275, 282-283, 46 Cal.Rptr. 835). The prosecution of criminal offenses on behalf of the People is the sole responsibility of the public prosecutor. (Gov.Code, §§ 26500, 26501; see Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.)

The prosecutor ordinarily has sole discretion to determine whom to charge, what charges to file and pursue, and what punishment to seek. (E.g., People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 650, 25 Cal.Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641.) No private citizen, however personally aggrieved, may institute criminal proceedings independently (e.g., Rosato v. Superior...