Dixon v. Salvation Army

• Decision Date: 20 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-545.,04-545.
• Citation: 201 S.W.3d 386
• Parties: Guy DIXON, Deceased, Appellant, v. The SALVATION ARMY, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

201 S.W.3d 386

Guy DIXON, Deceased, Appellant, v. The SALVATION ARMY, Appellee.

No. 04-545.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

January 20, 2005.

Tolley & Brooks, P.A., by: Jay N. Tolley, Fayetteville, for appellant.

Rieves, Rubens & Mayton, by: Kent J. Rubens, Michael J. Mayton, and David C. Jones, Little Rock, for appellee.

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission that Guy Dixon was not an employee of the Salvation Army at the time he suffered injury. Based on this finding, the Commission denied worker's compensation benefits. At the time of the injury, Dixon was enrolled in and performing duties assigned him in a Salvation Army alcohol rehabilitation program. Although Dixon suffered injury while operating a forklift, he was not operating the forklift in the performance of employment duties for the Salvation Army, but instead was engaged in work therapy as part of his rehabilitation program. We affirm the Workers' Compensation Commission. This case is here on a petition for review from a decision of the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversing the Workers' Compensation Commission. Dixon v. Salvation Army, 86 Ark.App. 132, 160 S.W.3d 723 (2004). Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4.

Facts

On June 11, 2001, Dixon filled out an application asking the Salvation Army to admit him into its Rehabilitation Center. Dixon had been admitted to the Salvation Army alcohol rehabilitation program four times previously and was admitted again. Dixon agreed to the conditions of the program: that he attend services on Sunday and on Wednesday, that he live at the Rehabilitation Center for sixteen weeks, that he engage in forty hours of work each week, and that he receive a beginning stipend of seven dollars per week. Dixon also agreed to attend therapy such as Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.

On August 24, 2001, Dixon suffered injury while operating a forklift as part of his work therapy in the rehabilitation program. He was released from the program at that time because the Salvation Army had neither the facilities nor the resources to care for Dixon once he was injured. He was initially confined to a wheelchair. Later, he was able to use crutches and ultimately recovered.

On October 9, 2001, after Dixon was released from the Rehabilitation Center program, and after he recovered from his injuries, he was offered and accepted a full-time job with the Salvation Army. His duties included work that was similar to the work therapy he was provided while he was in the alcohol rehabilitation program. The Salvation Army has a practice of hiring past enrollees in its rehabilitation programs to fill full-time positions necessary to run the programs.

Standard of Review

Upon a petition for review, we consider a case as though it has been originally filed in this Court. Sharp County Sheriff's Office v. Ozark Acres, 349 Ark. 20, 22, 75 S.W.3d 690 (2002). We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission's decision, and we uphold that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993). We will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (1998).

Employee Status

In this case, we must determine whether Dixon was employed by the Salvation Army at the time he suffered injury on August 24, 2001. The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to pay benefits to workers who suffer injury or disease arising out of and in the course of employment. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-101 (Repl.2002).

Employment is defined in the statutes as "[e]very employment in the State in which three (3) or more employees are regularly employed by the same employer in the course of business. . . ." Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(11) (Supp.2003). The typical worker's compensation case on employee status presents the question of whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor. See, e.g., Madden v. Aldrich, 346 Ark. 405, 58 S.W.3d 342 (2001). In other words, the cases assume that the person is performing labor or services for the benefit of another, and the only issue is whether that person is performing services as an employee or an independent contractor. The facts in our case are different because it is not clear that Dixon was performing labor or services for the Salvation Army. Clearly, Dixon was performing labor or services, but he was performing them as part of the alcohol rehabilitation program in which he had enrolled himself with the laudable goal of freeing himself from his addiction to alcohol.

The question that must be answered is whether Dixon was performing labor and services for the benefit of the Salvation Army or for his own benefit. Typically, an employee is one who renders labor or services to another for salary or wages. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 177 F.3d 326 (5th Cir.1999). See also Colonial Ins. Co. of Cal. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 796 (Colo.App.1998). According to Donald Montgomery, Salvation Army's Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Program Director in Fayetteville, Dixon voluntarily entered a sixteen-week work-therapy program to assist him in gaining control over his alcohol addiction. Dixon was housed and fed at the facility at no cost as part of the program. Montgomery further testified that Dixon agreed to perform whatever work was assigned as a part of the program and that he agreed to attend therapy sessions and various meetings designed to assist him in his recovery.

Appellant cites Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark.App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996), for the proposition that all this court need do in determining whether workers' compensation benefits are due is decide whether Dixon provided a direct or indirect benefit to the work of the Salvation Army. The issue is a good deal more complicated than that.

The Salvation Army is a charity. Ramsey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 234 Ark. 1031, 356 S.W.2d 236 (1962). It is a religious movement. People v. Sparks, 335 Ill.App.3d 249, 269 Ill.Dec. 309, 780 N.E.2d 781 (2002). It collects and sells donated items to raise money to pay for its operations. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 289 Ark. 31, 709 S.W.2d 73 (1986). However, the Salvation Army is not in the business of selling used items. Rather it sells used items to pay in part for its religious and philanthropic programs designed to assist those in need in our society. It derives a substantial portion of its income from its investments. Coulombe v. The Salvation Army, 790 A.2d 593 (Me.2002). Its adult rehabilitation centers are only funded in part by the sale of donated items. City of Lewiston v. The Salvation Army, 710 A.2d 914 (Me.1998).

The Salvation Army operates adult rehabilitation centers in multiple states. Id. In California, the courts have made successful completion of Salvation Army drug rehabilitation programs a condition of probation. See, e.g., People v. Correll, 229 Cal. App.3d 656, 280 Cal.Rptr. 266 (1991). In Roberts v. State, 324 Ark. 68, 919 S.W.2d 192 (1996), this court observed that the circuit court sentenced appellant to perform thirty hours of public service for the substance abuse program at the Salvation Army in Fayetteville. The nature of the Salvation Army rehabilitation program was described in United States v. Rutherford, 323 F.Supp.2d 911 (E.D.Wis.2004):

On December 26, 2002, he entered a drug treatment program at the Salvation Army Rehabilitation Center in Dallas, Texas. He completed the program on May 1, 2003. Defendant complied with all requirements of the program, including passing random drug tests and attending numerous classes, such as Narcotics Anonymous, Alcoholics Anonymous, Relapse Prevention, Family Matters, Character Building and a host of others. Defendant attended Chapel every Wednesday and Sunday, and paid for his participation in the program by working as a floor person in a Salvation Army store.

Rutherford, 323 F.Supp.2d at 912. According to Montgomery, Dixon performed well and made progress.

Dixon was promised and received a gratuity that began at $7.00 per week and increased by one dollar per week to a maximum of $20.00 per week. He did not receive hourly or other compensation based...