Doctor's Business Service, Inc. v. Clark

• Citation: 498 So.2d 659,11 Fla. L. Weekly 2444
• Decision Date: 20 November 1986
• Docket Number: BH-117,Nos. BE-449,s. BE-449
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2444 DOCTOR'S BUSINESS SERVICE, INC. and General Accident Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Barbara S. CLARK, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 659

498 So.2d 659

11 Fla. L. Weekly 2444

DOCTOR'S BUSINESS SERVICE, INC. and General Accident Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Barbara S. CLARK, Appellee.

Nos. BE-449, BH-117.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Nov. 20, 1986.

J. Dixon Bridgers, III, of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Pensacola, for appellants.

William J. Millsap of McKenzie & Associates, P.A., Pensacola, for appellee.

ON REHEARING EN BANC

SMITH, Judge.

Upon motion of appellee, Barbara S. Clark, the court has determined to grant rehearing en banc pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.331(c) and to substitute this opinion on rehearing for the panel's opinion previously issued. The majority of the court en banc is of the view that the deputy commissioner was correct in ruling that Barbara S. Clark, who was injured on a public sidewalk while proceeding from the employer-owned parking lot to the entrance of her employer's office building, suffered a compensable accident under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act. We therefore affirm.

The employer, Doctor's Business Service, which processes billings for doctors, is closely associated with an accounting firm which has an office nearby, on the same block. The two businesses share a computer. The normal route for the employees between the two businesses, which are only a few doors apart, is the city sidewalk. The businesses also share an employee parking lot which is owned by Doctor's Business Service. The lot is located in the same block but is around the corner from the employer's office. There is no entrance to the employer's business from the parking lot as it is not contiguous to the business premises. The most direct and usual path to and from the parking lot requires the employees to walk on the public sidewalk.

Upon returning from her lunch break on April 19, 1984, Clark parked in the employer-owned parking lot and proceeded to the employer's office on the public sidewalk. She slipped on the sidewalk near the entrance to the employer's business injuring her left ankle and both knees. According to her undisputed testimony, her fall was caused by a misstep on a rough and uneven part of the public sidewalk. The deputy commissioner ruled that Clark's injuries, which occurred on a public sidewalk while she was taking the most direct route between two portions of the employer's premises were compensable and constituted an exception to the going and coming rule, citing 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 15.14 (1985) and Horrobin v. Parkway General Hospital, IRC Order 2-3340 (1978). The deputy recognized that the result would have been different had the claimant not used the company parking lot and accidentally fallen on the sidewalk outside her place of employment. Greenberg v. Creative Group Advertising, 6 F.C.R. 281 (1968).

In a second order, answering points raised by the employer/carrier in their motion for rehearing, the deputy explained his reasoning thusly:

A quick review of Larson's treatise, indicates that injuries occurring on the premises during a regular lunch hour arise in the course of employment and have been determined compensable in almost every jurisdiction. Although a superficial analysis of the situation might lead one to the conclusion that lunch hour accidents are not related to the employee's work, more penetrating study has led most courts and legal scholars to the opposite conclusion. The personal needs of the claimant are considered important in maintaining an efficient worker. A hungry worker is not considered desirable in these enlightened times. Thus compensation has been awarded employees who are injured while engaging in such incidental acts as eating, drinking, sleeping, resting, washing, smoking, seeking fresh air, or trying to get either warm or cool. 1A Larson's Law of Workmen's Compensation § 21.10.

Once one accepts the idea that on premises accidents are compensable, it is then necessary to ascertain the boundaries of the premises. As discussed in depth in Larson's treatise, accidents occurring going to and from work are generally held not compensable for practical reasons and not for any particularly conceptual prohibition against such liability. The act of getting to work in the morning or returning to work after lunch is conceptually "work related." Why else would an employee undertake to leave his or her home each day? Considering the fact that millions of workers are involved in travel to and from work each day and are subjected to the hazards of the highway, the system could not afford to cover the thousands of accidents which routinely occur. Add to that the enormous difficulty of determining the compensability of claims involving the homeward journey when millions of workers scatter in all directions to engage in shopping and the like; it becomes clear that the premises rule is a practical solution to a difficult problem. There is little doubt that the public sidewalk or street between two parts of the business premises is considered part of the premises for workers' compensation purposes. Fernandez v. Consolidated Box Co., 249 So.2d 434 (Fla.1971). There is no doubt that the direct route between a company owned or leased parking lot is considered "on premises" for the purposes of workers' compensation coverage. Jenkins v. Wilson, 397 So.2d 773 (1st DCA Fla.1981) and Horrobin v. Parkway General Hospital, IRC 2-3340 (1978).

Although it may seem conceptually strange to hold an employer responsible for an accident occurring on a public sidewalk during lunchtime, the practical considerations outweigh the intellectual ones. It must be remembered that the act is basically no-fault in nature. The employer's liability has nothing to do with fault. Liability is based on the employment relationship. So it is that the negligent claimant is entitled to benefits against the totally innocent employer. As previously noted the key element in establishing benefits in this case is the company-owned parking lot. The parking lot extends the employer's premises to include the direct route to and from the office. Had the claimant used public parking and sustained the same accident in the same location, she would not have been covered for workers' compensation purposes. Greenberg v. Creative Group Advertising, 6 F.C.R. 281 (1960). (footnotes omitted)

We find the deputy's order well-reasoned and his conclusion justified under the facts and applicable law.

Under the "going and coming" rule, the hazards encountered by an employee while he is going to, or returning from, his regular place of work are not ordinarily incidental to the employment, and injuries resulting from such hazards do not arise out of and in the course of the employment. 57 Fla.Jur.2d, Workers' Compensation, § 90. However, as to employees having fixed hours and place of work, injuries occurring on the premises while they are going to and from work before or after working hours or at lunchtime are compensable, but if the injury occurs off the premises, it is not compensable. This is known as the premises rule. 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 15.00 (1985). This rule is subject to several exceptions, underlying which is the principle that course of employment should extend to any injury which occurred at a point where the employee was within the range of dangers associated with the employment. Id. Some of the most notable exceptions permitting recovery are: (1) special hazards on normal route; (2) travel between two parts of employer's premises; and (3) area where injury occurred actually used by the employer for his purposes. Id., § 15.00, et seq. As can be seen from the following discussion of cases, Florida follows the premises rule and adheres to its exceptions.

Florida decisions agree that an injury is deemed to have occurred in the course of employment if it is sustained by a worker, on the employer's premises, while preparing to begin a day's work or while doing other acts which are preparatory or incidental to performance of his or her duties, and which are reasonably necessary for such purpose. City of St. Petersburg v. Cashman, 71 So.2d 733 (Fla.1954) (claimant who fell and was injured as she entered City Hospital to begin work was doing something necessarily incidental to such work and was "engaged in employment" the moment she entered the hospital premises); and Johns v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 485 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (employee, who customarily arrived twenty to thirty minutes early, who was waiting to begin her shift at hospital in the lobby normally used by employees when she was assaulted by a hospital patient, and who had no reason for being in the lobby other than a desire to be punctual at work, which purpose is reasonably incident to her employment, was in the course and scope of employment at the time of her assault). In Greenberg v. Creative Group Advertising, 6 F.C.R. 281 (1968), although the Industrial Relations Commission denied the claimant's claim on the grounds that she had not entered the employer's premises when she slipped and fell on the public sidewalk at the entrance of the hotel where her employer's office was located, it recognized the rule that an employee going to and from his work while on the premises where his work is to be performed and within a reasonable time before and after working hours is presumed to be in the course and scope of his employment.

Further, Florida courts have followed the majority of jurisdictions in construing the exception to the premises rule for special hazards on a normal route. This exception provides that where there is a special hazard on a normal route used by an employee as a means of entry to and exit from his place of work, the hazards of that route under appropriate circumstances become the hazards of that employment. In Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, 74 So.2d 282 (Fla.1954), the...