Johns v. State, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services

• Decision Date: 13 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. BH-285,BH-285
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 652 Lizzie M. JOHNS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 857

485 So.2d 857

11 Fla. L. Weekly 652

Lizzie M. JOHNS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, Appellee.

No. BH-285.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

March 13, 1986.

Joel S. Perwin, of Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin, Miami, for appellant.

Paul M. Harden, of Smith, Davenport, Bloom & Harden, Jacksonville, for appellee.

NIMMONS, Judge.

Lizzie M. Johns, plaintiff in a negligence action against the appellee/defendant, appeals from an order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the trial court holding that her exclusive remedy is under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law. We affirm.

On December 4, 1982, Johns arrived at the Florida State Hospital, her place of employment, 20 to 30 minutes prior to the beginning of her shift. She customarily planned her arrival at that time because of concern over possible car failure, and she wanted to be sure that she was punctual. Upon her arrival she ordinarily waited in the lobby of building # 13 until her shift began. She was required to pick up a key in that building before she could start work in building # 12.

On the morning of December 4, as Johns sat in the lobby waiting to begin her shift, she was assaulted, 20 to 30 minutes prior to the beginning of her shift, by a Hospital patient. She filed this negligence action against the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). On motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that appellant was within the course and scope of her employment when the assault occurred and that her exclusive remedy was that provided for under the Workers' Compensation Law. ¹ This appeal followed.

In Hill v. Gregg, Gibson & Gregg, Inc., 260 So.2d 193 (Fla.1972), the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following from Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495, 496 (1940):

" '[F]or an injury to arise out of and in the course of one's employment, there must be some causal connection between the injury and the employment or it must have had its origin in some risk incidental to or connected with the employment or that it flowed from it as a natural consequence. Another definition widely approved is that the injury must occur within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental to it.' (Emphasis supplied.)"

260 So.2d at 195. See also Evans v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 313 So.2d 663, 664 (Fla.1975). Obviously, the fourth category articulated is particularly pertinent to the instant case and the following comments of Professor Larson are instructive on the question of when an incident occurring on the premises of the employer is within the course and scope of employment:

The course of employment, for employees having a fixed time and place of work, embraces a reasonable interval before and after official working hours while the employee is on the premises engaged in preparatory or incidental acts. The rule is not confined to activities that are necessary; It is sufficient if they can be said to be reasonably incident to work. What constitutes a reasonable interval depends not only on the length of time involved but also on the circumstances occasioning the interval and the nature of the employee's activity.

1A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Section 21.6 (1985). Larson cites to awards that have been made to employees who arrived up to an hour early because of transportation requirements. ²

In Florida, where the undisputed facts are susceptible of several inferences, one of which will support the plaintiff's theory, then the employee's status is for the trier of fact to determine. Aloff v. Neff-Harmon, Inc., 463 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, where there are no disputed issues of material fact, the issue of an employee's status is for the court to decide. Sosa v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 435 So.2d 821 (Fla.1983). In the present case, there is no inference available from the undisputed facts which would allow the trier of fact to determine that the appellant was outside the course and scope of her employment.

The undisputed facts show that Johns customarily arrived 20 to 30 minutes early. ³ The lobby in which she was waiting was one normally used by employees. ⁴ She had no personal reason for being there. Her only concern was arriving at work punctually. We are of the view that this purpose was reasonably incident to her employment and that thirty minutes is not an unreasonable interval in light of the undisputed facts.

Aloff, supra, relied upon by appellant, is distinguishable. There, this court reversed a summary judgment for the employer where the employee stayed several hours after the closing of a bar where she was a waitress. She stayed to discuss primarily personal matters with her employer. In that case, this court held that the facts could give rise to an inference that she was there on "purely...