Doe v. Angelina County, Texas

• Decision Date: 19 March 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. L-88-58-CA.
• Citation: 733 F. Supp. 245
• Parties: John DOE, Plaintiff, v. ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS and Mike Lawrence, Sheriff, sued in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

733 F. Supp. 245

John DOE, Plaintiff, v. ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS and Mike Lawrence, Sheriff, sued in his individual and official capacity, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. L-88-58-CA.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Lufkin Division.

March 19, 1990.

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Timothy B. Garrigan, Nacogdoches, Tex., for plaintiff.

Alan N. Magenheim, Houston, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUSTICE, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his claims that his incarceration in the Angelina County Jail from November 2 to November 9, 1987 was unconstitutional and in violation of Texas Common Law is presented for consideration. Because there are a number of inconsistencies and several contradictions in the affidavits and deposition testimony of the Angelina County Sheriff and his subordinates, a review of the principles that govern the disposition of motions for summary judgment is required.

The standard for summary judgments is set out in rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The mere existence of a factual dispute does not by itself preclude the granting of summary judgment. "The requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact."

St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (5th Cir.1987) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).

"A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for his motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court's inquiry in ruling on a motion for summary judgment "necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. At the same time, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

The procedural posture of this case and its complexity require a detailed presentation of the facts that are presented with particular attention to factual issues concerning which there are inconsistencies, contradictions or disputes.

A. Facts

On the evening of Monday, November 2, 1987, the plaintiff was arrested for hunting without a license by Walter Kirby, a game warden. Plaintiff was taken by Kirby to the home of Hulen McClure, a justice of the peace. Plaintiff pled guilty. The offense being a class C misdemeanor,¹ he was assessed fines and fees totalling $80.50. After he had been sentenced, plaintiff was taken to the Angelina County Jail, according to McClure, "to make a bond or pay, or ... stay." Def.Ex. # 7, p. 12.

McClure stated that this procedure of taking persons fined in connection with misdemeanor offenses to the jail so that they might "make a bond or pay, or either ... stay" was "routine." In response to the question "Has that been the policy for the 18 years that you've been Justice of the Peace," McClure answered "Yes, it is. No complaint about it. That's what we always did." Def.Ex. # 7, p. 12. Angelina County Jailer G.E. Warner states in his sworn affidavit that his instructions to plaintiff that "he could `lay out' the fine imposed by the Justice of the Peace by remaining in jail" were "in accordance with the policy and orders of the Justice of the Peace." Def.Ex. # 1. However, at his deposition, which occurred prior to submission of plaintiff's motion, Warner stated that plaintiff was not incarcerated pursuant to McClure's order. Pl.Ex. # 6, p. 36. Sheriff Mike Lawrence also stated at his deposition that a person who had failed to pay a fine imposed as sentence for committing a class C misdemeanor could not be jailed without first going before a judge. Pl.Ex. # 5, pp. 80-81. He further testified that plaintiff was not incarcerated pursuant to McClure's order. Pl.Ex. # 5, p. 92. However, Lawrence, like Warner, states in his subsequently prepared, sworn affidavit, submitted as an exhibit to the defendants' opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, that it was his understanding that "Judge McClure ordered John Doe jailed ... for failure to pay a fine imposed by conviction by a Justice of the Peace." Def.Ex. # 4.²

While plaintiff was being processed at the jail, it was discovered that an outstanding warrant for his arrest existed, because of his failure to pay $268.00 in fines assessed as a result of a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated.³ This warrant was in certain respects irregular. Lawrence states in his affidavit:

Often, warrants for unpaid fines are not delivered on a form entitled `Capias Pro Fine' but, rather, are delivered to the Sheriff's Office, by the Clerk of the Court, on a Capias Warrant Form with the indication of the offense as "unpaid fines" and the amount of the fine which remains outstanding. In these instances, notwithstanding the form used, the Sheriff's Office and jail personnel have recognized the document as a Capias Pro Fine at the instruction of the County Court Judge. This particular procedure was not initiated by myself but, instead, existed prior to my election as Sheriff and has been carried out at the direction of the County Court Judge. More specifically, when the Sheriff's Office receives a warrant which appears to be executed by lawful authority such as a Justice of the Peace, County Court Judge or District Court Judge, the employees of the Angelina County Sheriff's Office act in accordance with the Order of that Court and do not research whether the issuing Judge acted appropriately in ordering such warrant issued.

Def. Ex. # 4. Likewise, Warner states in his affidavit, "Generally, when the Sheriff's Office receives a Capias warrant from the Court in Angelina County for unpaid fines, that warrant is treated as a Capias Pro Fine warrant." Def.Ex. # 1.

In his affidavit, Lawrence states that, at the time of plaintiff's incarceration, records at the Angelina County Sheriff's Office revealed that this capias was issued by the county judge because plaintiff's probation had been revoked on his conviction for driving while intoxicated. Def.Ex. # 4. See also Def.Ex. # 1. This testimony conflicts with that of Judge Joe Martin, who testified that a capias for unpaid fines had been issued for plaintiff, but made no mention of having revoked his probation. Def.Ex. # 3, p. 6. Copies of the records on which Lawrence based his testimony were not attached to his affidavit nor to that of G. E. Warner. No document revoking or amending the terms of plaintiff's probation has been submitted.⁴

There is conflicting testimony concerning the exact point in time at which this capias was discovered. Although he testified at his deposition, "I don't even recall the plaintiff," Pl.Ex. # 6, p. 31, Warner states in his affidavit that the capias relating to plaintiff's $268.00 in unpaid fines was not discovered until after plaintiff had made telephone calls and failed to raise funds to pay the $80.50 fine. According to Warner's affidavit, plaintiff "advised me that he would not be able to find someone to bring him money at the jail that evening to pay the $80.00 fine. At that time ... I advised plaintiff that he could `lay out' the fine imposed by the Justice of the Peace by remaining in jail and that, for each day he remained in jail, he would be credited $45 in accordance with state statute." Def.Ex. # 1. Warner states that it was in the process of booking plaintiff into the jail, after plaintiff had failed to raise the funds for the $80.50 fine, that the "Capias Pro Fine" mentioned above was discovered.

In contrast, plaintiff's affidavit states that, after the "capias pro fine" had been discovered, "the jailer directed me to a telephone to attempt to raise money to pay both fines." Pl.Ex. # 1. Similarly, Sheriff Lawrence states in his affidavit that "a review of the records relating to John Doe's incarceration indicate sic that he was given an opportunity to use the telephone to raise sufficient funds to pay his fines and avoid incarceration prior to being placed in the inmate population in the Angelina County Jail." Def. Ex. # 4.⁵

Plaintiff failed to raise the funds necessary to pay these fines. "At the time of my arrest," he states in his affidavit, "I had no money, owned no house or other assetts sic and owed money on a car that was subsequently repossessed." Pl.Ex. # 1. "I informed the jailer that I was not able to raise the money to pay the fines at that time. The jailer said I would have to `lay out' the fine for eight (8) days at Forty-Five Dollars ($45.00) per day." Pl.Ex. # 1.

Notwithstanding his deposition testimony that he did not recall plaintiff, Warner states that plaintiff "did not identify a financial inability to satisfy his fines or a desire to work to satisfy his fines ..." According to Warner, plaintiff "elected" to "lay out" the $80.50 fine. When the "capias pro fine" was discovered, plaintiff "indicated that he also would not be capable of paying the $268.00 fine that evening. Again, Doe was advised of the ability to remain in jail and receive credit against the unpaid fine at the rate of $45.00 per day.... At that time, Doe elected to remain in jail to `lay out' both of his fines." Def.Ex. # 1.

Although the "Inmate Money Card"...