Doe v. Com.

• Citation: 396 Mass. 421,486 N.E.2d 698
• Parties: John DOE v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Decision Date: 17 December 1985
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 698

486 N.E.2d 698

396 Mass. 421

John DOE v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 7, 1985.

Decided Dec. 17, 1985.

Willie J. Davis, Boston, for the juvenile.

Maria I. Lopez, Asst. Atty. Gen., (Joan Entmacher, Asst. Atty. Gen., with her), for the Com.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

RESCRIPT.

WILKINS, Justice.

A single justice of this court has reported to us a case that presents the question whether a complaint may be brought in the Superior Court against a juvenile for criminal contempt of an order entered in a Superior Court civil action. The juvenile moved in the Superior Court to dismiss the complaint, contending that the Commonwealth could only have proceeded against him as a delinquent child (G.L. c. 119, §§ 61, 74 [1984 ed.] ), and that the Superior Court had no authority to consider the complaint for criminal contempt. A judge of the Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss. The juvenile brought this action seeking relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3.

The relevant facts, although not agreed on or found by the single justice (see Mass.R.Civ.P. 64, 365 Mass. 831 [1974] ), are not in dispute. On August 30, 1984, pursuant to G.L. c. 12, § 11H (1984 ed.), the Attorney General obtained a Superior Court restraining order in a civil action brought against the juvenile, a white male, who was accused of harassing a black family that lived in a housing project in Somerville. The juvenile was ordered to refrain from harassing the black family and to stay clear of the housing project. Within one week, the Attorney General filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the juvenile for criminal contempt of court. The denial of the motion to dismiss, the petition for relief from the single justice, and the reservation and report followed.

A court has the inherent power to impose sanctions for contempt of its orders. See Furtado v. Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 142-143, 402 N.E.2d 1024 (1980); Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 315-316, 128 N.E. 429 (1920). See also Mass.R.Crim.P. 44, 378 Mass. 920 (1979). The question here is whether any statute denies the Superior Court its inherent power to punish a juvenile for contempt of its own order. ¹ A statutory mandate denying a court the power to try a person for criminal contempt of its orders should not be found by implication.

The juvenile relies on G.L. c. 119, § 74, which provides (as relevant here) that "no criminal proceeding shall be begun against any person who prior to his seventeenth birthday commits an offense against the law of the commonwealth " (emphasis supplied), unless proceedings against him as a juvenile have been begun and dismissed under G.L. c. 119, § 61. The juvenile concedes that a court has authority to punish a juvenile for direct criminal contempt, such as contumacious conduct before a judge in the courtroom. In the face of statutes concerning exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction over criminal charges against juveniles, courts elsewhere have uniformly recognized the right of a nonjuvenile court to punish direct contempt by a juvenile. See Application of Balucan, 44 Haw. 271, 280, 353 P.2d 631 (1960) (juvenile refused to testify); Bryant v. State, 256 Ind. 587, 591, 271 N.E.2d 127 (1971) (same); Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Ky.1959) (same); State v. DeLong, 456 A.2d 877, 880 (Me.1983) (same); Thomas v. State, 21 Md.App. 572, 578-579, 320 A.2d 538 (1974) (misconduct in the courtroom); State v. Tripp, 36 Or.App. 141, 144, 583 P.2d 591 (1978) (refusal to testify).

The juvenile argues that alleged contemptuous conduct committed in violation of a court order, but not in open court, is different, however, because it is an offense against the law of the Commonwealth which, pursuant to § 74, must first be presented through the juvenile justice system. A similar argument concerning the power of a Federal District Court to consider contempt charges against juveniles who violated a court order was rejected in Matter of Williams, ...