Doe v. Doe (In re Doe)
| Decision Date | 30 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 49010 |
| Parties | In the Matter of: Jane Doe II, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. v. JOHN DOE (2021-32), Respondent-Appellant. JANE DOE I, Petitioner-Respondent, |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon Courtnie R. Tucker, Magistrate.
Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.
Aaron Bazzoli, Canyon County Public Defender; Alex W. Brockman Deputy Public Defender, Caldwell, for appellant. Alex W Brockman argued.
Sasser & Jacobson, PLLC; Angela C. Sasser, Nampa, for respondent. Angela C. Sasser argued.
John Doe (Father) appeals from the magistrate court's order terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter, V.M. He argues the court erred by concluding that he abandoned and neglected V.M. and that the termination of his parental rights is in V.M.'s best interests. We affirm.
While living in Idaho, Mother and Father were involved in a relationship for approximately one year before moving to Pennsylvania and then to New Jersey. By February 2009, Mother was pregnant with V.M. and left Father to move back to Idaho. Although Father knew that Mother was pregnant and when the baby's due date was, Father was not present for V.M.'s birth in October 2010 and did not communicate with Mother for an extended period of time. When V.M was eight months old, Mother moved in with J.V. and eventually married him. V.M. considers J.V. to be her dad, and despite that Mother and J.V. eventually divorced and Mother later remarried, V.M. continues to consider J.V. to be her dad.
In 2011, Mother petitioned and obtained an order for sole legal and physical custody of V.M. In 2013, Father moved back to Idaho and met V.M. for the first time when she was three years old. He did not, however, request to visit V.M. for almost a year. Once he did, Mother eventually agreed to an informal visitation schedule. Conflict soon arose between the parties, however. For example, Father called Mother derogatory names and wore a body camera during custodial exchanges of V.M., accused Mother of spying, was not receptive to allowing Mother to communicate with V.M. while she was in Father's custody, took away V.M.'s watch which she used to call Mother, took V.M. out of the state without Mother's permission, and used pepper spray on J.V. during one exchange. V.M. witnessed this negativity, and it adversely affected her well-being, both physically and emotionally. For example, V.M. exhibited physical symptoms of distress on exchange days and did not want to discuss what occurred during her visits with Father.
In 2015, Father filed a petition for a modification of the custody order. For purposes of resolving this modification, an evaluator performed a court-ordered family needs assessment. In this report, the evaluator expressed concerns for V.M.'s safety based on Father's marijuana use and that Father carried a concealed weapon without a permit and brought it to custodial exchanges. In 2018, a modified custody order was entered, granting Mother legal and primary physical custody of V.M., allowing Father two hours of supervised visitation twice a week and requiring Father to submit to drug testing and to pay the cost of supervised visitation. Further, the order provided Father would be entitled to unsupervised visitation only if he completed six months of continuous, supervised visitation and provided clean drug tests.
The Child Advocacy Services (CAS) supervised Father's visitations with V.M. The cost for visitation was $11.25 per hour, although Father received a grant covering 75 percent of this cost. Regardless, Father declined to exercise his two visits a week, stating he could only afford one visit a week. Then, he reduced his visits to twice a month. In total, Father exercised six supervised visits with V.M. and never submitted to drug testing. In January 2019, Father advised CAS that he would no longer be attending visits with V.M.
Over a year later in February 2020, Father contacted CAS and requested to resume visitation with V.M. based on his attorney's advice. Discussions occurred between the parents and CAS personnel regarding Father's request for visitation, and Mother eventually communicated she would allow court-ordered visitation. Ultimately, however, Father never resumed visitation with V.M., and he has not had any contact with V.M. since he ended supervised visitation in January 2019.
In May 2020, Mother filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights, and the magistrate court held a trial spanning three days in February, March, and April 2021. During the trial, the court heard testimony from Mother, Father, the supervisor of Father's visitations with V.M., V.M.'s maternal grandmother, V.M.'s paternal grandmother, Mother's new husband, and a social worker involved with the case. In July 2021, the court issued a memorandum decision granting Mother's petition to terminate Father's parental rights.
The magistrate court concluded that Father abandoned V.M. under Idaho Code § 16-2002(5) by "willfully failing to maintain a normal parental relationship" with her and that there was no just cause for Father's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with V.M. The court also alternatively concluded that Father neglected V.M. under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(a) by "failing to provide proper care and control, subsistence, medical and other care and control necessary for the child's well-being." Further, the court found that the termination of Father's parental rights is in V.M.'s best interests.
Father timely appeals.
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652.
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court's finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court's decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144P.3d at 600.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child's best interests and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
Father challenges the magistrate court's conclusion that he abandoned V.M. Idaho Code Section 16-2002(5) defines abandonment to mean "the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact." As used in this section, the word "or" is disjunctive and expresses an alternative. Doe I v. Doe II, 148 Idaho 713, 715, 228 P.3d 980, 982 (2010). Thus, a parent's willful failure to maintain a normal parental relationship can be based upon the failure to pay reasonable support, the failure to have regular personal contact, or some other failure. Id. No universal standard for what constitutes a normal parental relationship exists; rather, whether such a relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Doe I v. Doe II, 150 Idaho 46, 50, 244 P.3d 190, 194 (2010). For a parent to willfully fail to maintain a normal parent-child...
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