Doe v. Governor

• Decision Date: 30 October 1980
• Citation: 412 N.E.2d 325,381 Mass. 702
• Parties: Jane DOE et al. 1 v. The GOVERNOR et al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 325

412 N.E.2d 325

381 Mass. 702

Jane DOE et al. ¹ v. The GOVERNOR et al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 8, 1980.

Decided Oct. 30, 1980.

Edwin A. McCabe, W. Thomas Fagan and Gene K. Landy, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and E. Michael Sloman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

BRAUCHER, Justice.

The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy deficiencies in the Commonwealth's system of protective services for abused and neglected children, which is alleged to be "in a state of complete chaos and total disarray." We hold that their complaint is defective in its failure to allege any specific grievance, but that they should be given a further opportunity to amend the complaint. We defer consideration of other contentions.

The complaint as originally filed in September, 1979, described the plaintiffs as "the abused and neglected children of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts," but it was amended on November 30, 1979, to identify them by the pseudonyms "Jane Doe" and "Richard Roe," suing individually and on behalf of the abused and neglected children of the Commonwealth, and to allege that the two individual plaintiffs are abused and neglected children under age eighteen, resident in Massachusetts, and that their claims are typical of the claims of such children. Neither the individual plaintiffs nor their grievances are otherwise identified. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (9), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The motion was allowed by a judge of the Superior Court and judgment dismissing the action was entered on December 11, 1979. The plaintiffs appealed, and we granted their application for direct appellate review.

The amended complaint alleges that the defendants, officials responsible for the delivery of protective services to abused and neglected children, have failed to carry out their responsibilities in violation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the applicable statutes and regulations. Among the alleged deficiencies are delays in making critical appointments; inadequate numbers of properly trained case workers, staff, and attorneys; inadequate numbers of case workers of varied ethnic and racial backgrounds; failure to provide case workers with rudimentary furnishings; sporadic record-keeping; and failure to utilize supporting services. As a result "a substantial number of children have been left without meaningful protection from abuse and neglect." There were illegal delays and failures in investigation, evaluation, home visits, determinations whether children should be removed from the home environment, and provision of appropriate social services. The failures, it is alleged, have exposed abused and neglected children to a substantial risk of continuing harm, and without the relief sought "untold numbers of children ... will suffer, be maimed, and sometimes die." The complaint sought a declaration of the rights of abused and neglected children, an order that the defendants take necessary steps to conform the system for delivery of protective services to legal requirements, and particularized orders regarding personnel, training, facilities, preventive and remedial services, evaluating supervision, and case management.

The judge gave no reasons for allowing the defendants' motion to dismiss, but the parties argued three grounds, and they argue substantially the same grounds to us: (1) the plaintiffs' lack of "standing," (2) the absence of a justiciable controversy, and (3) a pending action in a Federal court which presents the same issues for judicial resolution. We consider only the first ground.

1. "Standing." "From an early day it has been an established principle in this Commonwealth that only persons who have themselves suffered, or who are in danger of suffering, legal harm can compel the courts to assume the difficult and delicate duty of passing upon the validity of the acts of a coordinate branch of the government." Kaplan v. Bowker, 333 Mass. 455, 459, 131 N.E.2d 372 (1956), and cases cited. This requirement of "standing" is not avoided by a prayer for declaratory relief. See Massachusetts Assoc. of Independent Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 292-293, 367 N.E.2d 796 (1977). And if the individual plaintiffs may not maintain the action on their own behalf, they may not seek relief on behalf of a class. Britt v. McKenney, 529 F.2d 44, 45 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Burden v. McKenney, 429 U.S. 854, 97 S.Ct. 149, 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976).

The issue of "standing" is closely related to the question whether an "actual controversy" exists, and we have treated it as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See Department of Community Affairs v. Massachusetts State College Bldg. Auth., --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^a, 392 N.E.2d 1006 (1979), and cases cited. Thus it could properly be raised by a motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), even though it could also be a basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Foley v. Polaroid Corp., --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^b, 409 N.E.2d 1300 (1980).

The defendants concede that in appropriate cases the judge may permit a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym to protect a privacy interest. See, e. g., Doe v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 372 Mass. 534, 362 N.E.2d 920 (1977); Jaffe v. Sharp, 463 F.Supp. 222, 224 n.1 (D.Mass.1978), aff'd and remanded, Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S.Ct. 2182, 60 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1979); Annot., 8 A.L.R. Fed. 675, 680 (1971). But a plaintiff is not thereby relieved of the requirement that the complaint allege a grievance on the part of a real and specific individual. The complaint before us also lacks specific factual allegations concerning the interest of the individual plaintiffs in the litigation. See Greenberg v. Assessors of Cambridge, 360 Mass. 418, 421, 275 N.E.2d 149 (1971). We hold that the plaintiffs' amended complaint is defective in its failure to allege injury in fact to a specific, aggrieved individual.

2. Leave to amend. The defendants' motion to dismiss was directed at the complaint as originally filed. The motion was allowed and the action dismissed after the plaintiffs had filed an amended complaint. The plaintiffs now contend that the defendants' argument on the motion was not directed to the amended complaint, and they move to strike various portions of the defendants' brief on the ground that they present new arguments not presented in the trial court. We deny the motion to strike, but we think it best to afford the plaintiffs a further opportunity to reframe their complaint. See Charbonnier v. Amico, 367 Mass. 146, 153-154, 324 N.E.2d 895 (1975). The allegations as to the deficiencies in the program for which the defendants are responsible strongly suggest that there are some...