Doe v. Norris
| Decision Date | 09 May 1988 |
| Citation | 751 S.W.2d 834 |
| Parties | Charles DOE, et al., Appellees, v. Steve NORRIS, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
W.J. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Kevin Steiling, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellants.
Andrew J. Shookhoff, Vanderbilt Legal Clinic, Nashville, David A. Kozlowski, Legal Services of South Central Tennessee, Columbia, for appellees.
The sole issue presented in this case is the constitutionality of the practice by the Tennessee Department of Correction, Division of Youth Services, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-1-131 and 37-1-132, of commingling juvenile "status offenders" with delinquent offenders in secure correctional facilities.
In 1983 this declaratory judgment action was commenced by the next friend of Charles Doe, a minor committed to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, Division of Youth Services, by a juvenile court order "because he does not get along with his parents." Doe sought a declaratory judgment that the practice by the Department of Correction of confining "unruly" children with delinquent children in secure correctional institutions was a violation of Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In addition, Doe asked the court to permanently enjoin defendants and their successors from confining other unruly children in secure correctional institutions that also house delinquent children. Defendants are Steve Norris, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction; Doyle Wood, Assistant Commissioner of the Division of Youth Services of the Tennessee Department of Correction; and Ned McWherter, Governor of the State of Tennessee. 1
This action was subsequently certified as a class action on behalf of all unruly children committed to correctional institutions housing delinquent children. In 1986 a non-jury trial was held, and the chancellor declared "defendants' practice of confining and commingling status offenders with delinquent offenders in secure correctional institutions operated primarily for delinquents" to be unconstitutional. The chancellor found that the practice violated the rights due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution and the United States Constitution. The chancellor then enjoined the defendants from placing any status offenders in correctional institutions operated primarily for delinquents and ordered defendants to transfer all status offenders confined in secure institutions for delinquents to other institutions. Finally, the chancellor found that plaintiffs were entitled, as prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to recover their costs and their attorneys' fees.
A direct appeal to this Court is authorized since the sole determinative issue is the constitutionality of the practice by the Department of Correction, pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-1-131 and 37-1-132, of commingling status offenders (unruly children) and delinquent offenders in secure corrections institutions. 2
This appeal requires this Court to examine and consider the treatment by the Tennessee juvenile court system of three groups of children. These groups, as classified and defined by the Legislature, are dependent and neglected children, unruly children, and delinquent children.
A dependent and neglected child is defined by the Legislature as either a child who does not have a parent or guardian or as a child who has not been properly cared for or supervised by his parent or guardian. T.C.A. § 37-1-102(10). A child found to be dependent and neglected is subject to a variety of dispositions by a court. The court may allow the child to remain with his parents or guardian under court supervision; or, if it is in the best interest of the child, the court may remove the child from his parents or guardian and place the child temporarily in the custody of the State Department of Human Services or any other agency authorized by law to care for the child. T.C.A. § 37-1-130(a). However, a dependent and neglected child may not be committed or confined in a facility for delinquent children unless the dependent child is also found to be a delinquent. T.C.A. § 37-1-130(b).
A delinquent child is a child who has committed an act that would have been a crime if committed by an adult and who is found to be in need of treatment. T.C.A. § 37-1-102(9). A child adjudicated delinquent is subject to the same disposition as a dependent and neglected child. T.C.A. § 37-1-131(1). In addition, a delinquent child may be fined, ordered to pay restitution, placed on probation, or committed to the custody of the State Department of Correction. T.C.A. § 37-1-131(2)-(7). If committed to the Department of Correction, a delinquent child may be placed in a foster home, group home, or "suitable state institution." T.C.A. § 37-1-137(5). Suitable state institutions include secure correctional facilities operated by the Department of Correction.
The category of concern in this case is that of unruly children. T.C.A. § 37-1-102(21) defines an unruly child as a child who:
(A) While subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually and without justification truant from school;
(B) Is habitually disobedient of the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent, guardian, or other custodian and is ungovernable;
(C) Has committed an offense applicable only to a child; or
(D) Is away from the home or residence of his parents or guardians without their consent. Such child shall be known and defined as a "runaway";
(E) If any of the foregoing is in need of treatment or rehabilitation.
Unruly children are also called "status offenders" because their conduct would not be a crime if committed by an adult and their acts are proscribed by the Legislature solely because of status--in this case, age. In Tennessee, if a child is found to be an unruly child, he may be treated by the court as a dependent or neglected child. T.C.A. § 37-1-132(a). In addition, the child may be fined. Id. However, if the proscribed act by an unruly child, though not a delinquent act, violates a valid court order, the child is subject to a disposition as if the child were a delinquent. T.C.A. § 37-1-132(b). Therefore, an unruly child who violates a valid court order may be committed to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction and may be placed in a secure facility with delinquents. In addition, an unruly child may be placed in a secure facility if that placement is found by the court to be the "least drastic or restrictive alternative" for the child. T.C.A. § 37-1-132(b).
The plaintiffs in this case are unruly children (status offenders). They have committed acts such as running away from home and being truant from school--so called status offenses. Some of these children have also been sexually abused, some have severe emotional problems, and some have emotional disorders caused by family crises. They have not committed any acts that violate the criminal statutes of this State. However, because of their actions these status offenders have been committed to the custody of the Department of Correction.
When a status offender is committed to the custody of the Department of Correction, the offender undergoes a classification process designed to determine a permanent program for the child. During the evaluation process, status offenders are given priority for remaining in the community, and an attempt is made to utilize local resources. If, during this period, the status offender does something which will harm either himself or others, the child may be placed in an institution for the remainder of the classification process.
Once the classification process is complete, the classification team makes its recommendations for a permanent program that will best facilitate the child's return to the community. It may recommend placement of the status offender in one of four correctional institutions, a Department of Correction group home, or a foster home. 3 In addition to these facilities, the Department has available for its use private contract placements in the community and residential mental health placements. If a status offender is classified to an institution or secure juvenile facility, the Assistant Commissioner of the Department of Correction, or his designee, must approve the classification before the child is placed in the facility. Transfers to secure facilities are approved when the status offender runs away either into the streets or out of state or is suspected of engaging in prostitution or being involved with drugs.
Plaintiffs in this case are status offenders who have had prior experience in either group homes or contract placements. After a disciplinary hearing and subsequent reclassification, they have been committed to the Spencer Youth Center in Nashville. The Spencer Youth Center [Spencer] is a secure correctional facility for delinquent children. 4 Spencer offers the children committed there a minimal educational program. Spencer also has counselors for the children and programs designed for correcting the anti-social and rule-breaking behavior of both status offenders and delinquents. Although they are not delinquents, status offenders at Spencer are treated in the same manner as delinquents. They are housed in the same dormitories with the delinquent children and follow the same routine; and they are subject to the same discipline as the delinquent children.
According to the testimony of the various expert witnesses and professionals there is more than one way to treat status offenders. Although treatment in the community is the preferred method, commitment to a secure facility is appropriate for status offenders who are persistent runaways. The professionals and expert witnesses all agreed however that status offenders and delinquents should not be housed together in secure correctional facilities.
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