Doering v. WEA Ins. Group, 93-3386.
| Decision Date | 31 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-3386.,93-3386. |
| Citation | 532 N.W.2d 432,193 Wis.2d 118 |
| Parties | Alexandria DOERING, Jason Doering, John H. Priebe, Guardian ad Litem for minor plaintiffs, Jason Doering and Troy Doering and Kersten A. Schmelzer, a person under a disability by her general guardian, Attorney Curtis M. Kirkhuff, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. WEA INSURANCE GROUP and Wisconsin Physicians Service Health Insurance, Nominal Plaintiffs, v. Thomas J. STAMPER, Linda J. Stamper, Alias Insurance Company No. 1, and Alias Insurance Company No. 2, Defendants, Deanne J. VON ARX, d/b/a Alpine Bar & Resort and Scott A. Meland, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
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For the defendants-appellants there were briefs (in the Court of Appeals) by Mark P. Wendorff, Wausau and oral argument by Mark P. Wendorff.
For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief (in the Court of Appeals) by James A. Johnson and Johnson, Houlihan, Paulson & Priebe, S.C., Rhinelander.
For the plaintiffs-respondents, Kersten A. Schmelzer & Curtis M. Kirkhuff, there was a brief (in the Court of Appeals) by Curtis M. Kirkhuff and Pellino, Rosen, Mowris & Kirkhuff, S.C., Madison and oral argument by Susan Blesener.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by David M. Skoglind, counsel, Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Barry L. Chaet, Katherine L. Williams and Beck, Chaet, Loomis, Molony & Bamberger, S.C., Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Restaurant Association, The Bowling Proprietors of Wisconsin, Inc. and The Wisconsin Innkeepers Association.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Steven C. Brist, counsel, Madison for The Tavern League of Wisconsin, Inc.
Amicus curiae brief was filed by W. Barton Chapin and Riordan, Crivello, Carlson, Mentkowski & Steeves, Milwaukee for the Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin.
Amicus curiae brief for the Attorney General was filed by Charles D. Hoornstra, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.
The defendants appeal from an order of the circuit court for Oneida County, Mark A. Mangerson, circuit judge, refusing to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The court of appeals granted the defendants' petition for leave to appeal a nonfinal order. We granted plaintiff Schmelzer's petition to bypass the court of appeals. Section (Rule) 809.60, Stats. 1991-92.
The single issue in this case is whether sec. 125.035, Stats. 1991-92, violates the equal protection clause of either the United States or Wisconsin Constitution.1 The statute immunizes a person from civil liability arising out of the act of supplying alcohol beverages to another person. At the same time, the statute exposes to civil liability certain persons who provide alcohol beverages to a person under the legal drinking age when that person injures a third party and the alcohol beverages were a substantial factor in causing the injury.2
Relevant parts of sec. 125.035, Stats. 1991-92, read as follows:
The circuit court determined that sec. 125.035 violates equal protection guarantees, even under a rational basis test. We reverse the order of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
Because this case comes before us on a motion to dismiss, we assume the facts presented in the complaint to be true for the purposes of this review. Ford v. Kenosha County, 160 Wis. 2d 485, 490, 466 N.W.2d 646 (1991). On September 1, 1992, defendant Thomas J. Stamper drove into an intersection, ignoring a stop sign. Stamper's automobile collided with the automobile in which plaintiffs Alexandria Doering and Kersten Schmelzer were riding. Both plaintiffs suffered devastating injuries as a result of the collision, including irreversible brain damage and permanent physical injuries. No part of their damages has been compensated.
Prior to the incident Stamper, who had attained the legal drinking age, had been drinking alcohol beverages at the defendant Alpine Bar & Resort, owned by defendant Deanne J. Von Arx. Defendant Scott A. Meland, the bartender who served Stamper, and Von Arx knew that Stamper was intoxicated and under the influence of marijuana when Meland served him. Additionally, both these defendants knew that Stamper had driven to the Alpine Bar & Resort and that his driving privileges had previously been revoked. The complaint alleges that when Von Arx and Meland witnessed Stamper leave the bar, both of them knew that Stamper would be driving without a license, while intoxicated and under the influence of marijuana.
Finally, the complaint alleges that defendants Von Arx and Meland were negligent in serving alcohol beverages to Stamper while he was intoxicated, in violation of sec. 125.07, Stats. 1991-92, and that their negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries.
Relying on the civil immunity statute, sec. 125.035, Stats. 1991-92, defendants Von Arx and Meland moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion, ruling that the statute violated equal protection guarantees. To reach this conclusion, the circuit court first determined that the statute creates two separate classifications of persons injured by intoxicated persons. One class of victims—the victims of underage consumers of alcohol beverages—may bring a cause of action against providers of alcohol beverages. A second class of victims—the victims of intoxicated consumers of alcohol beverages who have attained the legal drinking age—are barred from instigating a cause of action against persons supplying alcohol beverages. The circuit court concluded that this distinction was not rationally related to the statutory scheme in Chapter 125. Section 125.07(2)(a)1, Stats. 1991-92, imposes a criminal penalty on those persons who supply alcohol beverages to an intoxicated person,3 but sec. 125.07(1)(a)1, Stats. 1991-92, assesses only a civil forfeiture on those who provide alcohol beverages to a person who has not attained the legal drinking age.4 The circuit court reasoned that had the legislature intended the civil immunity statute to protect underage persons, the legislature would have reflected this concern by more severely penalizing those who provide alcohol beverages to underage persons.
Before probing the constitutionality of the statute we must point out that our constitutional inquiry does not seek to determine whether it is wise, advisable or in the public interest to immunize persons from civil liability for injury arising out of the act of supplying alcohol beverages. Indeed, there are ample reasons for questioning the soundness of sec. 125.035.
The devastating personal, social and economic consequences of drinking are detailed in the media each day and in various other publications.5 In 1985, the year the legislature enacted the civil immunity statute, 51.5% of the fatal motor vehicle accidents nationwide involved alcohol beverages; these accidents resulted in over 20,000 deaths.6 Applying this percentage to Wisconsin traffic fatalities, an estimated 400 state deaths can be attributed to motor vehicle accidents involving alcohol beverages during the year the legislature debated the statute at issue.7
Not even these staggering statistics accurately portray the devastating effects of the harm caused by alcohol-impaired persons. They fail to account for the many people whose injuries by alcohol-impaired drivers do not result in death. This case is an example in point. Furthermore, these statistics fail to account for injuries and deaths caused by alcohol-impaired persons without the instrumentality of a motor vehicle.
In an attempt to decrease alcohol-related fatalities and injuries several states have enacted statutes making many negligent suppliers of alcohol beverages liable for injuries caused by their patrons.8 The Wisconsin legislature, on the other hand, has chosen to grant immunity from civil liability to most of those who provide alcohol beverages to others. Although the court may disagree with the wisdom of sec. 125.035(2), it is the constitutionality of the statute, not its wisdom, which the court must address.
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo, benefitting from the analysis of the circuit court. Our constitutional inquiry is guided by the presumption that the legislative act is constitutional. Furthermore, when a statutory classification is challenged as violative of the equal protection clause, the challenger bears a heavy burden of proving abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable doubt. Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 370, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
Our first task is to determine the level of scrutiny with which we will review sec. 125.035. If the classification in secs. 125.035(2) and (4) impedes a fundamental right, or categorizes people based on suspect criteria,9 we subject the statute to strict scrutiny. Szarzynski v. YMCA, 184 Wis. 2d 875, 886, 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994). The plaintiffs contend...
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