Dookeran v. Cnty. of Cook

Decision Date03 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–3197.,11–3197.
PartiesKeith DOOKERAN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. COUNTY OF COOK, ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Randall D. Schmidt (argued), Lilly Becker (argued), Attorneys, Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Andrew J. Creighton, Michael Anthony Kuczwara, Jr. (argued), Attorneys, Office of the Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for DefendantAppellee.

Before MANION, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge.

Dr. Keith Dookeran was hired by John H. Stroger Hospital of Cook County in 2000 subject to biennial reappointment. In his 2004 application for reappointment, Dookeran disclosed for the first time that Mercy Hospital, his previous employer, had reprimanded him for creating a hostile work environment. This disclosure triggered an investigation and peer review by Stroger Hospital's medical staff. An administrative committee eventually revoked Dookeran's staff privileges, and the Cook County Board formally denied his reappointment application.

Dookeran sought judicial review by common-law writ of certiorari in Cook County Circuit Court. The circuit court ruled in his favor, but the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and reinstated the denial of reappointment, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. While these proceedings were ongoing in the Illinois courts, Dookeran filed charges of employment discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that his reapplication was denied based on his race and national origin and also in retaliation for an earlier charge he had filed with the EEOC. After a long delay, Dookeran received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and brought this suit in federal court against Cook County alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The County moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under RookerFeldman and also on the basis of res judicata. The district court rejected the jurisdictional argument but dismissed Dookeran's claims as barred by res judicata.

We affirm. First, the RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply, so subject-matter jurisdiction is secure. Second, the district court correctly held that Dookeran's Title VII claims are precluded. There is no real dispute that the basic requirements of Illinois preclusion doctrine are met; the main point of contention is whether Dookeran had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his federal claims in the state-court proceedings. We hold that he did. In Blount v. Stroud, 232 Ill.2d 302, 328 Ill.Dec. 239, 904 N.E.2d 1, 17–18 (2009), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the state circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear federal civil-rights claims even though the Illinois Human Rights Commission (“IHRC”) does not. Although some decisions from the Illinois Appellate Court had held otherwise, Dookeran was not prevented from bringing his Title VII claims with his certiorari petition in the circuit court to test whether this line of intermediate appellate authority was correct. The successful plaintiff in Blount did exactly that, and the state supreme court held that the appellate decisions had misread the statutory scheme. Accordingly, Dookeran could have joined his Title VII claims with the state-court certiorari proceeding. Because he did not, claim preclusion applies.

I. Background

Dr. Dookeran, a surgeon and surgical oncologist, was hired by Stroger Hospital in 2000 subject to biennial reappointment. In his 2004 application for renewal of his employment and hospital privileges, he disclosed for the first time that he had been reprimanded by Mercy Hospital, his previous employer. He certified on his earlier applications that he had not been reprimanded in the last four years, when in fact he had received a formal reprimand for creating a hostile work environment at Mercy. See Dookeran v. County of Cook, 396 Ill.App.3d 800, 336 Ill.Dec. 424, 920 N.E.2d 633, 637 (2009). More particularly, Dookeran was removed as director of surgical research and associate director of the general surgery residency program as a consequence of “unprofessional conduct toward Mercy Hospital employees.” Id.

Dr. Howard Zaren, the department chair at Stroger Hospital, submitted the matter to the hospital's credentials committee, which initiated an elaborate internal review process to determine Dookeran's fitness for reappointment. The credentials committee investigated and recommended to the executive medical staff that Dookeran be denied reappointment. The executive medical staff did not issue an immediate ruling and referred the issue to the peer-review committee. That committee recommended a 29–day suspension of Dookeran's clinical privileges—a suspension of 30 or more days would have required the hospital to report the discipline to a national databank. The executive medical staff adopted the peer-review committee's suggestion, but increased the suspension to 30 days. Because the 30–day suspension triggered the reporting requirement, Dookeran was entitled to a hearing and appeal under Stroger Hospital's medical staff bylaws.

The five-member hearing committee determined that Dookeran had falsified his 2002 reappointment application. On the basis of this and other findings, the hearing committee recommended that Dookeran's staff membership be suspended or revoked. The executive medical staff continued to recommend a 30–day suspension, but the joint-conference committee voted to revoke Dookeran's staff membership instead. That recommendation was sent for final action to the Cook County Board, which formally denied Dookeran's application for reappointment on June 20, 2006.

Dookeran thereafter filed a petition for common-law certiorari in Cook County Circuit Court seeking review of the Board's decision. In Illinois judicial review of most administrative actions proceeds under the Administrative Review Law, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat.. 5/3–101, but the common-law writ of certiorari remains available and serves the same function for judicial review of the agency decisions that fall outside the statute. See Chi. Title Land Trust Co. v. Bd. of Trs., 376 Ill.App.3d 494, 316 Ill.Dec. 1, 878 N.E.2d 723, 727 (2007). While the certiorari petition was pending in the circuit court, Dookeran filed a charge of discrimination with the IDHR and the EEOC alleging that his application for reappointment was denied because of his race (black) and national origin (Trinidadian). Dookeran also alleged that the hospital discharged him in retaliation for an EEOC charge he filed on June 27, 2005. At no time did Dookeran raise a claim of discrimination in the circuit court.

The circuit court concluded that the hearing committee's recommendation was not sufficiently supported by the record, vacated the denial of Dookeran's reappointment, and remanded for the hospital's hearing committee to reconsider and “to recommend a lesser sanction.” Dookeran, 336 Ill.Dec. 424, 920 N.E.2d at 643. After additional proceedings, the circuit court modified the judgment, ordering the Board to suspend Dookeran's clinical privileges for 30 days. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the administrative decision was adequately supported by the evidence and reinstating the denial of reappointment. Id., 336 Ill.Dec. 424, 920 N.E.2d at 650. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Dookeran v. County of Cook, 236 Ill.2d 503, 341 Ill.Dec. 198, 930 N.E.2d 408, 408 (2010).1

In January 2011, after the certiorari proceeding in the state courts concluded, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter. Dookeran then filed this suit against Cook County alleging claims under Title VII for discrimination and retaliation on the basis of race and national origin. The County moved to dismiss on two grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction under RookerFeldman; and (2) res judicata. The district court held that the RookerFeldman doctrine did not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction but dismissed the suit on the basis of res judicata. Dookeran timely appealed.

II. Discussion

The primary issue on appeal is whether Dookeran's federal claims under Title VII are precluded because he could have raised them in his state-court action.2 But the threshold question is jurisdictional. The RookerFeldman doctrine 3 holds that the lower federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over actions that seek review of state-court judgments; only the United States Supreme Court has authority to review state judgments. See Skinner v. Switzer, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1297, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011); Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir.2011). RookerFeldman is a “narrow doctrine, ‘confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’ Kelley v. Med–1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006)). Stated differently, RookerFeldman is only concerned with “situations in which the state court's decision is the source of the harm that the federal suit is designed to redress.” Simmons v. Gillespie, 712 F.3d 1041, 1043, No. 12–3381, 2013 WL 1110872, at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2013).

The RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply here. Dookeran's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims do not seek redress for harm caused by the state-court judgment. It is true that the claims involve the same basic transaction that was at issue in the state-court action; the certiorari proceeding and the claims in this case arise from the denial of Dookeran's application for reappointment to the Stroger Hospital...

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