Doubleday v. People

• Decision Date: 11 January 2016
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC916
• Citation: 364 P.3d 193
• Parties: John Andrew DOUBLEDAY, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

364 P.3d 193

John Andrew DOUBLEDAY, Petitioner,

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 12SC916

Supreme Court of Colorado.

January 11, 2016

Attorneys for Petitioner: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Alan Kratz, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, John J. Fuerst III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 A jury found the petitioner, John Andrew Doubleday, guilty of felony murder, despite finding him not guilty, based on the affirmative defense of duress, of the charged predicate offense. A division of the court of appeals affirmed Doubleday's conviction, and we granted certiorari.¹ We now reverse.

¶ 2 Under the plain language of section 18–3–102(1)(b), C.R.S. (2015), to be convicted of felony murder, a defendant must have committed or attempted to commit one of the enumerated predicate offenses. The question presented in this case is whether Doubleday can be said to have committed the charged predicate offense of attempted aggravated robbery when he was acquitted of that offense based on the affirmative defense of duress.

¶ 3 We conclude that to establish that a defendant committed a predicate offense within the meaning of the felony murder statute, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the predicate offense, including the inapplicability of any properly asserted affirmative defense to the predicate offense. Because the prosecution did not meet this burden here, Doubleday's felony murder conviction cannot stand.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 4 According to Doubleday's testimony at trial, a gang member threatened to kill him and his family if he did not repay a $1300–$1500 debt. Another gang member then hit him in the back of the head and knocked him unconscious.

¶ 5 The next night, the gang member to whom Doubleday allegedly owed the debt told Doubleday to commit a robbery in order to obtain the money due. The gang member threatened to kill Doubleday and his family if he did not return with the money, and the gang member gave Doubleday a shotgun to facilitate the robbery. One of the gang member's friends then drove Doubleday to a convenience store.

¶ 6 While attempting to rob the convenience store, Doubleday shot and killed a store clerk. He then fled.

¶ 7 Doubleday was arrested and charged with, as pertinent here, first degree murder after deliberation, first degree felony murder, and attempted aggravated robbery. Robbery or attempted robbery was the predicate offense for the felony murder charge.

¶ 8 At trial, Doubleday tendered a proposed jury instruction that stated, "If you find Mr. Doubleday not guilty of attempted aggravated robbery due to the affirmative defense of duress, or for any other reason, then you must find him not guilty of first degree murder (felony murder)." The court refused this instruction and ultimately instructed the jury that the affirmative defense of duress applied to the charge of attempted aggravated robbery but not to the charge of felony murder.

¶ 9 In the course of its deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court, asking, "If found not guilty due to duress for aggravated robbery are we forced to eliminate first degree felony murder[?]" The jury's question then specifically referenced elements 4 and 5 of the elemental instruction for felony murder. Element 4 was "committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery." Element 5 was "in the course of or in furtherance of committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery, or in the immediate flight from committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery."

¶ 10 Doubleday asked the court to answer the jury's question affirmatively. The court refused to do so, however, and responded by referring the jury to the instruction on the affirmative defense of duress, which advised the jurors that duress is an affirmative defense to aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery but not to felony murder.

¶ 11 Later that day, the court told the parties that the jury had reached a verdict and asked if the prosecution was ready to receive that verdict. The prosecution responded by tendering a special interrogatory that the prosecution said was based on the above-described jury question. Over Doubleday's objection that the interrogatory was improper because the jury had already reached its verdict and because such an interrogatory would be "delving into the why of their verdict," the court agreed to submit an interrogatory to the jury. The interrogatory that the court submitted, which was a modified version of what the prosecution had tendered, provided:

If you find the defendant GUILTY of Count 3, Attempted Aggravated Robbery, disregard this instruction.

If you find the defendant NOT GUILTY of Count 3, Attempted Aggravated Robbery, your foreperson should check one of two lines below with an "X". Only one line should be checked, and this Interrogatory should be signed by the Foreperson. Your decision in this Interrogatory must be unanimous.

___ We the jury find the defendant, JOHN ANDREW DOUBLEDAY, NOT GUILTY of Attempted Aggravated Robbery because we do not believe the People proved, with the exception of the affirmative defense of duress, one or more of the elements of Attempted Aggravated Robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.

___ We the jury find the defendant, JOHN ANDREW DOUBLEDAY, NOT GUILTY of Attempted Aggravated Robbery because we do not believe the People disproved one or more of the elements of the affirmative defense of duress beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 12 The jury returned verdicts finding Doubleday guilty of second degree murder (as a lesser included offense of first degree murder after deliberation) and of felony murder. The jury, however, found Doubleday not guilty of attempted aggravated robbery and completed the portion of the special interrogatory noting that the acquittal was based on the jury's finding that the prosecution did not disprove the affirmative defense of duress beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 13 Doubleday moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing, as pertinent here, that the felony murder conviction could not stand without a conviction on the predicate felony of attempted aggravated robbery. After a hearing, the court denied this motion.

¶ 14 Subsequently, the court merged Doubleday's two murder convictions and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

¶ 15 Doubleday appealed, arguing, among other things, that (1) the felony murder conviction had to be vacated because the jury acquitted him of the predicate offense, (2) the trial court violated CRE 606(b) by submitting the special interrogatory to the jury, and (3) the felony murder conviction had to be reversed because the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury that duress was not a defense to felony murder.

¶ 16 A division of the court of appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed Doubleday's convictions. People v. Doubleday, 2012 COA 141, ¶¶ 1, 11–42, 70, 2012 WL 3746184. Regarding Doubleday's first contention, the division opined that the absence of duress is not an essential element of an offense that the prosecution must prove in order to establish that the defendant committed that offense. Id. at ¶ 27. Accordingly, the division observed that the prosecution could prove that Doubleday committed attempted aggravated robbery without necessarily proving that he was not under duress at the time. Id. at ¶ 28. Applying this reasoning to the facts before it, the division then concluded that because the prosecution had proved that Doubleday attempted to commit aggravated robbery as well as the other elements of felony murder, the division would not disturb Doubleday's felony murder conviction. Id. at ¶ 30.

¶ 17 We subsequently granted Doubleday's petition for certiorari.

II. Analysis

¶ 18 Doubleday contends that his felony murder conviction cannot stand because the jury acquitted him of the predicate offense, which is an essential element of felony murder. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Construction

¶ 19 We review issues of statutory construction de novo. People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Colo.2011). Our primary purpose in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 621, 624. We look first to the language of the statute, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 387 (Colo.2005). We read statutory words and phrases in context, and we construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Diaz, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d at 624.

¶ 20 In addition, we must interpret a statute so as to effectuate the purpose of the legislative scheme. Smith, 254 P.3d at 1161. In doing so, we read the scheme as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. We must avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results. People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 679 (Colo.2010). If the statute is unambiguous, we need not conduct any further statutory analysis. Diaz, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d at 624.

B. Statutory Analysis

¶ 21 The felony murder statute, section 18–3–102(1)(b), provides, in pertinent part:

A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if: ... [a]cting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit ... robbery ... and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone....

¶ 22 Under the plain language of this statute, to be convicted of felony murder, a defendant must have "commit[ted] or attempt[ed] to commit" one of the enumerated predicate offenses and in the course of...