Dougherty v. DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES

• Decision Date: 25 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 72958-1.,72958-1.
• Citation: 76 P.3d 1183,150 Wash.2d 310
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Daniel L. DOUGHERTY, Petitioner, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES FOR the STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent.

76 P.3d 1183

150 Wash.2d 310

Daniel L. DOUGHERTY, Petitioner, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES FOR the STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent.

No. 72958-1.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 15, 2003.

Decided September 25, 2003.

Stiles & Stiles Inc. PS, Brock Stiles, Sedro Woolley, for petitioner.

Assistant Attorney General, Anastasia Sandstrom, Seattle, for respondent.

CHAMBERS, J.

We are asked to decide whether RCW 51.52.110's designation of the proper county for filing workers' compensation appeals is a grant of jurisdiction, or whether it identifies venue. We hold RCW 51.52.110's requirements regarding location relate to venue, not jurisdiction.

FACTS

Daniel L. Dougherty's industrial insurance claim was denied by the Department of Labor and Industries (Department). He appealed the decision to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board). The Board entered its final order on December 21, 2000, denying Dougherty's claim. The order informed Dougherty that he had 30 days from receipt of the final order to appeal the Board's decision in the superior court "in a manner provided by law." Order Den. Pet. for Review.

RCW 51.52.110 provides that an appeal of the Board's decision shall be to the superior court in the county where the worker resides, or the county where the injury occurred, or if neither of these are within Washington State, then to Thurston County. Dougherty was living in Texas and his injury had occurred in Whatcom County. On January 19, 2001, Dougherty's attorney filed a Notice of Appeal in the superior court in Skagit County, where the attorney resided.

On February 12, 2001, Dougherty's attorney moved the Skagit County Superior Court for a change of venue to Whatcom County. The Department filed a cross-motion seeking dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The superior court denied Dougherty's motion and granted the Department's motion to dismiss. The superior court held that it had never acquired subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore, did not have authority to grant a motion to transfer venue.

Dougherty appealed to the Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the dismissal, stating that it was "[b]ound by Tennyson and its progeny," which have interpreted RCW 51.52.110's requirements as jurisdictional, rather than venue related. Dougherty v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 112 Wash.App. 322, 333, 48 P.3d 390 (2002).

We granted Dougherty's petition for review, and reverse the Court of Appeals.

ANALYSIS

Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Crosby v. Spokane County, 137 Wash.2d 296, 301, 971 P.2d 32 (1999).

The state courts' original jurisdiction over workplace injuries was abolished when the Washington legislature enacted the Industrial Insurance Act. Skagit Motel v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 107 Wash.2d 856, 857, 734 P.2d 478 (1987). The act declared that "all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy ... and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this act provided." Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 1, at 346; RCW 51.04.010. The act provides that the Department possesses original jurisdiction of cases involving injured workers, and the superior courts possess appellate jurisdiction.¹

The appeals statute, RCW 51.52.110, establishes the appellate jurisdiction over the Board's decisions in the superior courts of the state. The statute provides, in part:

Within thirty days after a decision of the board to deny the petition or petitions for review upon such appeal has been communicated to such worker, ... or other person aggrieved by the decision and order of the board may appeal to the superior court.

RCW 51.52.110. The next paragraph of the statute identifies the appropriate counties.

In cases involving injured workers, an appeal to the superior court shall be to the superior court of the county of residence of the worker or beneficiary, as shown by the department's records, or to the superior court of the county wherein the injury occurred or where neither the county of residence nor the county wherein the injury occurred are in the state of Washington then the appeal may be directed to the superior court for Thurston county.

RCW 51.52.110.

Our courts have often repeated that the superior court's appellate jurisdiction under RCW 51.52.110 is invoked only if there has been compliance with all of the statute's procedural requirements. City of Seattle v. Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 116 Wash.2d 923, 926, 809 P.2d 1377 (1991); Fay v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 197, 796 P.2d 412 (1990); Dils v. Dept. of Labor Indus., 51 Wash.App. 216, 217-18, 752 P.2d 1357 (1988). However, by intertwining procedural requirements with jurisdictional principles, the separate issues of venue and jurisdiction have been blurred. As a result, unfortunately, procedural elements have sometimes been transformed into jurisdictional requirements.

Venue and jurisdiction are distinct concepts. Jurisdiction "is the power and authority of the court to act." 77 Am.Jur. 2D Venue § 1, at 608 (1997). Jurisdiction does not depend on procedural rules. 14 LEWIS H. ORLAND & KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: TRIAL PRACTICE CIVIL § 41, at 118 (5th ed.1996). A court may acquire jurisdiction even though it is not the court of proper venue. Indus. Addition Ass'n v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 323 U.S. 310, 315, 65 S.Ct. 289, 89 L.Ed. 260 (1945) (where petition timely filed in circuit court as required by statute but in wrong venue, case need not be dismissed but can be transferred to circuit court with proper venue). However, a court is not bound to exercise its jurisdiction where venue is in another court. Indus. Addition Ass'n, 323 U.S. at 315, 65 S.Ct. 289.

The critical concept in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is the "type of controversy." Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994). "`If the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction.' "Marley, 125 Wash.2d at 539, 886 P.2d 189 (quoting Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 BYU L.Rev. 1, 28).

On the other hand, the critical term in defining venue is "location." "Venue has to do with the place of a proceeding." 2 AM.JUR.2D Admin. Law § 1, at 422 (1994). It "is the place where the power to adjudicate is to be exercised, that is, the place where the suit may or should be heard." 77 AM.JUR.2D Venue § 1, at 608 (1997).

The term venue denotes locality, referring to the county in which an action should be brought....

Venue is distinguished from jurisdiction in that jurisdiction connotes the power to decide a case on its merits while venue connotes locality. Venue is a procedural, rather than jurisdictional, issue.

92A C.J.S. Venue § 2, at 241-42 (2000). While location determines venue, the "location of a transaction or a controversy usually does not determine subject matter jurisdiction." 20 AM.JUR.2D Courts § 70, at 384 (1997) (emphasis added). Statutes which require actions to be brought in certain counties are generally regarded as specifying the proper venue and "are ordinarily construed not to limit jurisdiction of the state courts to the courts of the counties thus designated." 77 AM.JUR.2D Venue § 44, at 651 (1997); see also, Shoop v. Kittitas County, 149 Wash.2d 29, 37, 65 P.3d 1194 (2003) (filing requirements of RCW 36.01.050 relate to venue, not subject matter jurisdiction).

Applying these principles to RCW 51.52.110 reveals that the statute establishes the appellate jurisdiction of the superior courts and also designates the proper venue for those appeals. The statute provides that the worker "or other person aggrieved by the decision and order of the board may appeal to the superior court," establishing the superior court's appellate jurisdiction over such cases. The statute's references to the location of the superior courts where the appeals are to be heard refer to venue.

To hold otherwise would mean that the only type of proceeding over which the court of a particular county has subject matter jurisdiction is one involving persons who are residents of, or are injured within, the county. This is not, however, what "type of controversy" means within the doctrine of subject matter jurisdiction. "Type" means the general category without regard to the facts of the particular case. Martineau, supra, at 26-27. It refers to the nature of a case and the kind of relief sought. State v. Barnes, 146 Wash.2d 74, 85, 43 P.3d 490 (2002); see also Marley, 125 Wash.2d at 536, 886 P.2d 189. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the authority of a court to adjudicate a particular type of controversy, not a particular case. State v. Franks, 105 Wash.App. 950, 22 P.3d 269 (2001).

Generally, all superior courts have precisely the same subject matter jurisdiction because they have the same authority to adjudicate the same "types of controversies." If one superior court possesses authority to hear an appeal from the industrial insurance board, then there is no "jurisdictional" reason why another superior court could not also hear that appeal. The "type of case" is the same whether it is heard in Thurston County or some other county. We reject the theory that subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court varies from county to county. It cannot be reconciled with "type of controversy" in the context of industrial insurance appeals. In addition, if "type of controversy" depends on which county the case is filed or heard in, then all venue provisions would become subject matter jurisdiction provisions. Martineau, supra, at 26-27.

Unless mandated by the clear language of the statute, we generally...