Douglas County Bd. of Equalization v. Clarke
| Decision Date | 24 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | 95SC398,Nos. 95SC45,s. 95SC45 |
| Citation | 921 P.2d 717 |
| Parties | DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, Petitioner, v. Edith CLARKE and Board of Assessment Appeals of the State of Colorado, Respondents. DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Petitioner, v. MISSION VIEJO BUSINESS PROPERTIES and Board of Assessment Appeals of the State of Colorado, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Thomas W. McNish, Assistant County Attorney, Office of Douglas County Attorney, Castle Rock, for Douglas County Board of Commissioners and Douglas County Bd. of Equalization.
Downey & Knickerrehm, P.C., Thomas E. Downey, Jr., Henry J. Rickelman, Denver, for Mission Viejo Business Properties.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Maurice Knaizer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Larry A. Williams, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Mark W. Gerganoff, Assistant Attorney General, General Legal Services Section, Denver, for Board of Assessment Appeals.
Holland & Hart, Alan Poe, Mary D. Metzger, Englewood, for Edith Clarke.
We granted certiorari in two related cases, Clarke v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, 899 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1994), and Douglas County Board of Commissioners v. Mission Viejo Business Properties, No. 93CA2115 (Colo.App. April 20, 1995) (), to determine whether the definition of "agricultural land" for ad valorem taxation purposes in section 39-1-102(1.6)(a)(I), 16B C.R.S. (1994), requires that actual grazing take place in the tax year in question and in the prior two years. 1
We conclude that the plain meaning of the statute requires the taxpayer to prove that the land was actually grazed unless (1) the reason the land was not grazed related to a conservation practice; or (2) the land is part of a larger functional agricultural unit on which grazing or conservation practices have been occurring. Because we are unclear as to the basis for the Board of Assessment Appeals' (BAA) conclusions that the taxable land here at issue was agricultural, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals with directions to return the cases to the BAA for additional findings and conclusions consistent with the standards set out in this opinion.
The two cases implicate the same legal principle but different facts. We first address the Clarke case, which involves a 23.7 acre parcel of land now located within the Town of Parker. The record before the BAA indicates that the Clarke family purchased the 23.7 acre parcel in 1951 as part of a much larger unit and used the entire tract for farming and ranching for almost forty years. In 1990, Edith Clarke sold a portion to a third party for use as a manufacturing and distribution facility. At that time, the 23.7 acre parcel here at issue, which was adjacent to the portion that had been sold, was subdivided into a lot known as Lot 2, Block 1 Clarke I C.P.F. Commercial Addition Filing # 1 (hereinafter "Lot 2").
In 1990, Clarke leased Lot 2 together with other property to Martin Cockriel who operated a horse and cattle business. The only income to Clarke from Lot 2 was the rental income from Cockriel. In tax years 1991 and 1992, the Douglas County Assessor reclassified Lot 2 from agricultural to commercial vacant land. Clarke appealed the Assessor's 1992 classification 2 to the BAA.
At the hearing, the evidence was undisputed that Lot 2 was not used for grazing livestock in 1991, in part because of unavailability of water. During 1991, Lot 2 was used only as a polo field. In 1992, Cockriel began to use Lot 2 for grazing in conjunction with other adjacent property to the north that he had leased from a third party on which water was available. During 1992, Cockriel grazed approximately fifteen to eighteen head of horses on Lot 2.
The BAA concluded that the 1992 classification of the subject property should be restored to agricultural. The BAA stated:
After careful consideration of all of the evidence and testimony presented, the Board determined that the classification of the subject property was improper. Petitioner has a lease for the subject property, evidence indicating that there was grazing on the subject property in 1992. The lessee has leased this property and other properties to obtain a monetary profit. There are times in a farming and ranching operation that some portion of a farm or ranch will not be used for grazing in a particular year. Most operators have excess pasture to be prepared for the changes in weather and seasons.
The Douglas County Board of Equalization appealed the BAA's ruling to the court of appeals and the court of appeals affirmed. See Clarke v. Douglas County Bd. of Equalization, 899 P.2d 240 (Colo.App.1994).
In 1987, Mission Viejo Business Properties (Mission Viejo) purchased 21,437 acres of land from the Phipps family, who had operated it as a ranch. Mission Viejo continued to ranch the land under the auspices of Sand Creek Cattle until 1987. At that time, Mission Viejo entered into a grazing lease with LEI Farms. Initially, the lease did not specifically include the four parcels that are the subject of this action; however, in 1990, the lease was amended to include them. The earlier version of the lease did refer to all undeveloped land owned by Mission Viejo, and there was evidence before the BAA that the parties had intended to include the four parcels.
The four parcels are variously described as: Filing 57A, Lots 2-6 (Docket No. 23670) consisting of five platted lots totalling 22.098 acres (Parcel 1); Filing 26, Lot 3 (Docket No. 23671) consisting of one platted 10 acre lot (Parcel 2); Parcel 0328429 (Docket No. 23672) consisting of one unplatted 8.1 acre parcel adjacent to Lot 3 in Filing 26 (Parcel 3); and Filing 20, lots 2-11 (Docket No. 23673) consisting of ten platted lots totalling 27.45 acres (Parcel 4). The parcels are scattered throughout northern Douglas County and the record reflects that each parcel is bounded by at least two roads.
The evidence in the record indicates that in 1987 and 1988, no grazing occurred on Parcels 2 and 3, and that in 1988 no grazing took place on Parcel 1. In 1989, grazing did occur on those parcels. There was further evidence that Parcel 4 was grazed in both 1988 and 1989, but the evidence as to 1987 is unclear. In 1989, the Douglas County assessor reclassified the four parcels as commercial vacant land. Mission Viejo filed an unsuccessful petition for abatement or refund of taxes based on the 1989 classification and then sought recourse before the BAA.
After a hearing, the BAA concluded that the parcels should have retained their agricultural classification. The BAA stated:
After careful consideration of all testimony and evidence presented, the Board determined the subject properties should be classified agriculture for 1989. The Board determined the operation of the ranch was continued with the lease to Mr. Bob Walker [LEI Farms] in October 1987. The evidence indicates the parcels were used or could have been used in the normal operation of the ranch. The evidence indicated there has been a plan in place, as the property is developed, fences are built or removed by the developer in order to utilize the fenced property as part of the ranch. The fences are then maintained by the lessee.
The Douglas County Board of Commissioners appealed the BAA's ruling to the court of appeals and the court of appeals affirmed. See Douglas County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Mission Viejo Business Properties, No. 93CA2115 (Colo.App. April 20, 1995) ().
The Douglas County Board of Equalization and the Douglas County Board of Commissioners (collectively "Douglas County") petitioned for certiorari review in their respective cases. We granted certiorari to determine:
Whether the definition of "agricultural land" for ad valorem tax purposes in section 39-1-102(1.6)(a)(I), 16B C.R.S. (1994), requires that actual grazing take place in the tax year in question and in the prior two years.[ 3
We now hold that section 39-1-102(1.6)(a)(I), 16B C.R.S. (1994), requires that the parcel of land in question actually be used in conjunction with grazing of livestock. This requires either that actual grazing take place in the tax years in question unless the reason for the non-use relates to conservation of the land or the parcel is part of a larger unit on which grazing or conservation is occurring. In the Clarke case, the BAA found that grazing did not take place in each year; however, its findings could be read to indicate that the reason for the non-use was somehow related to conservation. Similarly, in the Mission Viejo case, we cannot determine whether either of the necessary criterion have been met, thus, we reverse the decision of the BAA and the court of appeals. We remand the case to the court of appeals with directions to return the case to the BAA for further fact-finding under the guidelines set forth in this opinion.
Agricultural land in Colorado receives favorable ad valorem tax treatment, calculated on the basis of the earning or productive capacity of the land. See Colo. Const. art. X, § 3; § 39-1-103(5)(a), 16B C.R.S. (1994). Therefore, classification of property as agricultural is a benefit that was carved out to encourage and to protect ongoing agricultural use. 4 Our task in the cases before the court is to construe the statutes framing and defining that tax classification.
Specifically, we are called upon to determine the meaning of the two statutes that govern this issue. The first is section 39-1-102(1.6)(a)(I), which provides in pertinent part:
(1.6) (a) "Agricultural land" means either of the following:
(I) A parcel of land ... regardless of the uses for which such land is zoned, which was used the previous two...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Welby Gardens v. Adams County Bd. of Equalization
...capacity of such lands capitalized at a rate as prescribed by law." Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(a); Douglas County Bd. of Equalization v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717, 720 (Colo.1996); Boulder County Bd. of Equalization v. M.D.C. Constr. Co., 830 P.2d 975, 978 (Colo. The General Assembly has enacte......
-
Bd. of Cty. Com. Cty. of Logan v. Vandemoer
...§ 39-1-103(5)(a), C.R.S.2007 (providing statutory scheme for favorable tax treatment of agriculture); Douglas County Bd. of Equalization v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717, 720 (Colo.1996) ("Agricultural land in Colorado receives favorable ad valorem tax treatment, calculated on the basis of the earni......
-
Mook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Summit Cnty.
...Thus, we decline to find the statute ambiguous.¶40 Second, the Mooks contend that this court's decision in Douglas County Board of Equalization v. Clarke , 921 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1996), indicates that contiguous land can include non-touching parcels. In Clarke , we considered the definition of......
-
SDI, Inc. v. Pivotal Parker Commercial, LLC
...To determine the meaning of a statute, we “first look to the plain language of the statute.” Douglas Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Clarke, 921 P.2d 717, 721 (Colo.1996). If the statute is unambiguous, we look no further. Devora v. Strodtman, 2012 COA 87, ¶ 10, 282 P.3d 528, 531. ¶ 19 Section......