Douglas R. Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 88-LW-1674
| Decision Date | 04 May 1988 |
| Docket Number | 88-LW-1674,1645 |
| Parties | Douglas R. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal From Judgment Entered in the Common Pleas Court County of Medina, Ohio. Case No. 86 CIV 1231.
Judith A. Nicely, Akron, for plaintiff.
Mark E Lutz, Cincinnati, for defendant.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
On September 15, 1984, defendant-appellee, Georgia-Pacific Corporation (Georgia-Pacific), discharged plaintiff-appellant, Douglas Kelly. Thereafter, Kelly filed a nine-count complaint in federal district court alleging violations of both federal and state law. The federal claims included age discrimination, handicap discrimination, and violation of ERISA Section 510. The state claims included wrongful discharge, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, promissory estoppel defamation, and negligent termination. Georgia-Pacific moved for summary judgment on all claims.
Prior to the district court's ruling on the motion, Kelly voluntarily dismissed his handicap discrimination claim. The district court then entered summary judgment for Georgia-Pacific on Kelly's claim of age discrimination and the ERISA Section 510 violation claim. Having disposed of all the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction on the state claims and dismissed the remainder of the case. Kelly filed a motion for relief from judgment which was denied by the district court.
Kelly then filed suit against Georgia-Pacific in the state trial court, alleging breach of express and implied contract promissory estoppel, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent termination, and defamation. Georgia-Pacific moved for summary judgment on all claims. Prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion, Kelly voluntarily dismissed the defamation claim. The trial court subsequently entered summary judgment for Georgia-Pacific on the remaining claims. The trial court found that Kelly failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In making this finding, the trial court determined that the issues necessary to support Kelly's claim for breach of express and implied contract and negligence were found against him by the federal district court and were barred from relitigation in the trial court under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
From this judgment, Kelly appeals, raising two assignments of error. This court affirms.
"The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Georgia-Pacific based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel."
The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues that were actually and necessarily passed upon in a prior proceeding which was based on a different cause of action. Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193. A judgment rendered by a federal court of competent jurisdiction, as was done in this case, is given full collateral estoppel effect in the courts of Ohio. Rogers v. Whitehall (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 67. The federal district court, in rendering summary judgment for Georgia-Pacific on Kelly's federal claims, made findings on issues relating to Kelly's claims for breach of contract and negligence which precluded their relitigation in the state trial court.
The federal district court specifically found that Georgia-Pacific did not promise Kelly continued employment nor did it breach its own policies in terminating Kelly. The district court further found that the sales territory in which Kelly was working had become unprofitable, that although Kelly had received favorable employment reviews in the past, Georgia-Pacific became dissatisfied with Kelly's sales performance in the two years prior to his dismissal, and that Georgia-Pacific had a legitimate business reason to eliminate Kelly's sales region. These issues were actually and necessarily decided by the district court in assessing Kelly's age discrimination claim, and may not be drawn in question in the subsequent state action between Kelly and Georgia-Pacific. Whitehead v. General Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, paragraph two of the syllabus.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding these issues were collaterally estopped from relitigation in the case below. Kelly's first assignment of error is overruled.
"The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Georgia-Pacific on Kelly's first and second causes of action in contract based on a finding of insufficient evidence; and on Kelly's fifth cause of action in tort based on civil rules of procedure 12(B)(6)."
A reviewing court must follow the standard set forth in Civ.R 56(C) which provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: 1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; 2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in...
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