Douglas v. State
| Decision Date | 15 October 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 67--1084,67--1084 |
| Citation | 214 So.2d 653 |
| Parties | Ira DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and Herbert M. Klein and Jeffrey Michael Cohen, Asst. Public Defenders, for appellant.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ.
The appellant, Ira Douglas, was charged in a three count information with the following offenses: (1) breaking and entering a dwelling house and assaulting a person therein; (2) robbery; (3) assault with intent to commit murder in the first decree with other than a firearm. He was tried before the court and found guilty on counts (1) and (2) and not guilty on count (3). The only question to be determined on this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the appellant's participation as a principal in the two crimes of which he was found guilty. On this appeal we must view the evidence and all inferences we may reasonably draw therefrom in the light most favorable to the conclusion of the trier of fact, 1 but we must require that the evidence so viewed establish beyond a reasonable doubt the participation of the accused in the crimes charged. 2 We hold that the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt participation of the appellant in the crimes of which he was convicted, and we reverse those convictions.
Douglas and one John Sands worked at the same place of business. On the morning of the crime they met at that place of business but did not work because the truck on which they worked had already left. John Sands was intoxicated (he had been using marijuana). He invited Douglas to ride in his car, and Douglas accepted. Sands drove to the house of the victim. Douglas remained in the passenger seat of the car, but Sands went into the house and assaulted and robbed the victim. She scuffled with Sands and bit his hand; she ran out of the house and into the middle of the street. Sands also ran out of the house and told Douglas to drive the car. He then told Douglas to run over the victim. Within 15 minutes the police apprehended Sands and Douglas. The victim's money was found on the person of Sands.
At the trial Sands pleaded guilty to the breaking and entering and the robbery. The trial court found Douglas not guilty of the attempt to run the victim down.
We think the following cases require reversal of Douglas' convictions: Gilday v. State, Fla.App.1964, 168 So.2d 205; Espinoza v. State, Fla.App.1966, 183 So.2d 560; Williams v. State, Fla.App.1968, 206 So.2d 446. The substantial holding of these cases is that before an accused may be convicted as an aider and abettor under § 776.011, Fla.Stat., 3 F.S.A., his intent to participate in the crime must be proved. While this intent may be proved in many ways, it cannot be based entirely upon circumstances unless those circumstances exclude the reasonable doubt engendered by appellant's explanation of his presence at the time and place of the commission of the crime. See Jones v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 285.
In the present instance the trial court found Douglas not guilty of attempting to participate in the crime by running the car into the victim. Douglas' presence in the passenger seat of the car does not indicate he was employed as a get-away driver. His driving of the car upon request of the actual perpetrator of the assault and robbery is not sufficient proof of his intent to participate in those crimes.
The evidence presented to the trial judge might have been sufficient to prove Douglas guilty of aiding the perpetrator of a crime after the crime had been committed. There is reason to believe that when the victim came screaming from the house and stood in the street, Douglas knew something unlawful was transpiring. He knew that Sands was intoxicated and unreliable. When Douglas aided Sands in Sands' flight under these circumstances, Douglas might have been an accessory...
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Jones v. State
...a criminal intent to participate as an aider and abetter in his companion's burglary; burglary conviction reversed); Douglas v. State, 214 So.2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (state's evidence deemed insufficient to establish defendant's guilty knowledge as an aider and abetter of his companion's ......
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Hinkle v. State
...DCA 1976); Starling v. State, 263 So.2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Dreger v. State, 228 So.2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); and Douglas v. State, 214 So.2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). See generally 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals §§ 308, 322, 340-45 (1963). I am of the opinion that, in the instant case, the record ......
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Davis v. State
...776.011, F.S., F.S.A., which requires proof of his intent to participate. Williams v. State, Fla.App.1968, 206 So.2d 446; Douglas v. State, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 653. Intent may be, and in fact usually is, shown largely by circumstantial evidence but if the proof of intent rests solely up......
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T.J.T. v. State
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