Douglass v. Gendron

• Decision Date: 29 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 00-0409.,1 CA-CV 00-0409.
• Citation: 20 P.3d 1174,199 Ariz. 593
• Parties: Bedford DOUGLASS, Jr., an individual, Petitioner-Appellee, v. John S. GENDRON, Administrative Hearing Officer, Respondent, and City of Mesa, Real Party in Interest-Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

20 P.3d 1174

199 Ariz. 593

Bedford DOUGLASS, Jr., an individual, Petitioner-Appellee, v. John S. GENDRON, Administrative Hearing Officer, Respondent, and City of Mesa, Real Party in Interest-Appellant.

No. -0409.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

March 29, 2001.

Bedford Douglass, Jr., Mesa, Petitioner-Appellee in propria persona.

Neal J. Beets, Mesa City Attorney, Mesa, by M. Regina Huerta, Assistant City Attorney and Joseph Padilla, Deputy City Attorney, Attorneys for Respondent and Real Party in Interest-Appellant.

OPINION

EHRLICH, Judge

¶ 1 The City of Mesa appeals from the superior court's dismissal of the citation of Bedford Douglass, Jr., for violating the City's regulation regarding the height of grass and weeds on his property. It claims that the court erred in its interpretation of the phrase "developed parcel" as used in Mesa City Code section 8-6-3(O). We agree, and we therefore reverse the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Douglass is the owner of a 2.613-acre parcel of property in Mesa. The property carries one address, and it is described as a single parcel of property in the records of the Maricopa County Assessor's Office. Specifically, the Maricopa County Assessor's Office lists Douglass as the owner of a single-family residence, Parcel Number XXX-XX-XXX, 3634 East Oasis Circle, Mesa, Arizona. While the property allegedly is large enough to be divided into three lots under existing zoning if proper steps are taken to effectuate that division, Douglass has not done so. For convenience, though, we will call the three portions of Douglass' property "lots."

¶ 3 When Douglass purchased the property, it was part of a citrus grove. Douglass built a house on what he deemed the middle lot, and he has maintained the lots on either side of his residence as a grove from which he has harvested the fruit for periodic sale.

¶ 4 Over the years, Douglass has received frequent warning letters from the City to the effect that the grass and weeds growing on the lots on either side of his residence violated Section 8-6-3(O) of the Code, which regulates the height of grass and weeds on both developed and undeveloped parcels. The pertinent section provides:

No owner or occupant of a parcel of land within the City shall allow thereon weeds or grass which occupy more than fifty (50) contiguous square feet on a developed parcel to attain a predominant height in excess of nine inches (9"), or more than ten percent (10%) of the area of an undeveloped parcel to attain a predominant height in excess of twelve inches (12").

¶ 5 On May 29, 1998, the City notified Douglass by letter that he would no longer receive warning letters but would instead be cited if he were found to be in violation of the Code. Approximately three months later, Douglass indeed was cited for violating that portion of Code Section 8-6-3(O) addressing "developed parcels." The citation stated that Douglass "[d]id allow weeds/grass to occupy more than fifty contiguous square feet with a predominant height in excess of nine (9") inches."

¶ 6 An administrative hearing was held at which Douglass argued that the lots where the grass and weeds were growing were "undeveloped parcels," that he had been cited pursuant to the wrong portion of the Code and that, in any event, the phrases "developed parcel" and "undeveloped parcel" were ambiguous. The hearing officer ruled against Douglass and imposed a civil sanction of $200, concluding that "[t]he subject property constitutes a single, developed parcel listed as Book 141, Map 24, Parcel 25 in the Maricopa County Assessor's Office."

¶ 7 Douglass filed a special action in the Maricopa County Superior Court, arguing that the hearing officer's determination was "arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion." The court granted relief to Douglass because it concluded that the phrases at issue were too vague to give Douglass sufficient notice.¹ Accordingly, it found that Douglass could not be held responsible for the violation with which he was charged and dismissed the citation. The City appeals from that decision.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 When a special action challenges an administrative decision, review by the superior and appellate courts is "limited to finding error" in the administrative decision. Gannett Outdoor Co. of Ariz. v. City of Mesa, 159 Ariz. 459, 461, 768 P.2d 191, 193 (App.1989). Thus, neither court may substitute its opinion of the facts for that of the administrative tribunal. Id. However, when the issue is one of statutory interpretation, this court draws its own legal conclusions. Arizona State Bd. of Accountancy v. Keebler, 115 Ariz. 239, 241, 564 P.2d 928, 930 (App.1977).

¶ 9 The City's hearing officer determined that, because Douglass' property was listed as a single parcel in the records of the Maricopa County Assessor's Office, Douglass' residential use of the property, even if only on a one-third portion of that property, rendered the entire parcel a "developed" parcel. The superior court, however, seemingly concluded that each hypothetical lot should be considered separately to determine whether it was a "developed" or "undeveloped" parcel. Because the Code did not define those terms, the court concluded, its classifications were vague and ambiguous, and, thus, to be interpreted against the City.

¶ 10 Municipal ordinances are construed in the same manner as state statutes, Abbott v. City of Tempe, 129 Ariz. 273, 275, 630 P.2d 569, 571 (App.1981), and "we apply a practical and commonsensical construction." State v. Alawy, 198 Ariz. 363, 365 ¶ 8, 9 P.3d 1102, 1104 (App.2000). The objective is to accomplish the legislative intent by considering the ordinance as a whole and giving harmonious effect to all of its sections. Abbott, 129 Ariz. at 275, 630 P.2d at 571; Sandblom v. Corbin, 125 Ariz. 178, 182-83, 608 P.2d 317, 321-22 (App.1980). Since the Code offers no direct guidance as to what is meant by "developed parcel," which also would serve to distinguish an "undeveloped parcel," we...