Dowell v. Dowell
| Decision Date | 19 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 59556.,WD 59556. |
| Citation | 73 S.W.3d 709 |
| Parties | Charles Clifford DOWELL, Respondent, v. Crystal Dean DOWELL, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Carla G. Holste, Jefferson City, for appellant.
James S. Grantham, Versailles, for respondent.
Before JAMES M. SMART, JR., Presiding Judge, HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, Judge and JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge.
Crystal Dean Dowell ("Mother") appeals the trial court's judgment terminating Charles Clifford Dowell's ("Father") obligation to pay child support for the parties' daughter, Amber Dowell.
On October 22, 1999, the Circuit Court of Morgan County entered a judgment dissolving the marriage between Mother and Father. The dissolution decree granted Mother primary physical custody of the parties' minor child, Amber Dowell. Father was ordered to pay Mother $338 each month for child support. He was also ordered to pay an additional $169 per month toward an arrearage of $2,740. On July 19, 2000, Father filed a motion to modify the dissolution decree, in which he alleged that Amber was emancipated and prayed that his obligation to pay child support be terminated. After a hearing, on January 18, 2001, the trial court formally entered its judgment terminating child support. Mother brings this appeal.
Amber was born on September 8, 1982. She was 17 years old when the court entered its dissolution decree. At the time, she had borne a son, and both she and her son were living with Mother. Sometime in May 2000, Amber decided to move out of Mother's house. Amber and her son moved in with Amber's boyfriend and her son's father,1 Josh Reed, at his apartment. Shortly thereafter, on May 27, 2000, Amber and Mr. Reed signed a lease for a different apartment and moved into the new premises.
Amber, Mr. Reed and the baby acted and represented themselves as an independent household. Mr. Reed was employed as a cook at the Rail Fence Café. Amber stayed home to care for their child. Mr. Reed's income paid most of the household expenses. However, Amber, on behalf of the family, applied for and received food stamps. When she applied for the food stamps, she declared her household to consist of herself, Mr. Reed and their son. In addition, Amber had previously applied for and was receiving Medicaid benefits for their son.
Father had no objection to Amber's decision to live on her own. Mother was opposed to the arrangement but took no action to stop it. Amber received no support from her parents while she was living with Mr. Reed. Mother did pay her $20 for cleaning her house once, but did not give her additional money because she did not want to give Amber the impression that she supported her living arrangements.
On July 19, 2000, after Amber and Mr. Reed had been living together for approximately two months, Father filed his motion to modify alleging that Amber was emancipated. Approximately a month later, Amber, her son and Mr. Reed left the apartment and moved in with Mother because they were unable to support themselves financially. They were still living with Mother at the time of trial. Amber was once again attending school as a high school senior and had applied and been accepted to business college. She was not working, and Mother stated that she was providing for all of Amber's living expenses, including her clothes, car insurance, gas money and necessary car repairs.
The trial court determined that Amber became emancipated from her parents on June 1, 2000, and that Father's child support obligation ended on that date. All support that Father paid after June 1, 2000, was credited toward the arrearage he owed Mother. This appeal follows.
In her only point on appeal, Mother argues the trial court's finding that Amber became emancipated on June 1, 2000, was not supported by the evidence. She contends that Amber never became self-supporting. In addition, Mother claims she did not relinquish parental control by express or implied consent.
This court will uphold the trial court's judgment unless it is "not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." Beckwith v. Giles, 32 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). The trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence, and we should affirm the judgment "under any reasonable theory supported by the evidence." Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the trial court's determination of witness credibility. Cutting v. Cutting, 39 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Mo.App. W.D.2001).
"Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child." § 452.370.4.2 "The purpose of this statutory provision is to `make it absolute' that unless there are contrary provisions in the dissolution decree or the separation agreement, the child support obligation ends upon the child's emancipation and does not automatically continue during the child's minority." Ragan v. Ragan, 931 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Mo.App. S.D.1996) (quoting Bushell v. Schepp, 613 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo.App. E.D.1981)).
Missouri courts have stated that emancipation occurs when a minor child is freed from the care, custody, control and service of her parents. Id. This is generally accomplished when there is a relinquishment of parental control, the child is given the right to receive and retain her own earnings, and the parent's legal obligation to support her is terminated. Id. "Emancipation is never presumed, and the burden is upon the party asserting it to show facts proving the emancipation." Randolph v. Randolph, 8 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Mo.App. W.D.1999). "A minor child may be emancipated in one of three ways: (1) by express parental consent, (2) by implied parental consent, or (3) by a change of the child's status in the eyes of society." Denton v. Sims, 884 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo.App. E.D.1994). The third category usually refers to a child who has married or joined the military. Id. "However, it may also be shown when a child who is physically and mentally able to care for herself voluntarily chooses to leave the parental home and attempts to `fight the battle of life on [her] own account.'" Id. (quoting Specking v. Specking, 528 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Mo.App.1975)) (quoting Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo.App. 657, 136 S.W. 18 (1911)). Indeed, in Brosius v. Barker, the court declared:
[W]e hold that where the child, who is physically and mentally able to take care of himself, has voluntarily abandoned the parental roof and turned his back to its protection and influence, and has gone out to fight the battle of life on his own account, the parent is under no obligation to support him.
136 S.W. at 20. Finally, and consistent with the latter holding, a child must be old enough to take care of and provide for herself for emancipation to occur. Randolph, 8 S.W.3d at 164.
Many of these concepts were incorporated into the child support provisions of the Dissolution of Marriage Act, Chapter 452, with the Legislative amendment of § 452.340 in 1988, and further amendments in subsequent years.3 Ragan, 931 S.W.2d at 890. Section 452.340.3 provides:
Unless the circumstances of the child manifestly dictate otherwise and the court specifically so provides, the obligation of a parent to make child support payments shall terminate when the child:
(1) Dies;
(2) Marries;
(3) Enters active duty in the military;
(4) Becomes self-supporting, provided that the custodial parent has relinquished the child from parental control by express or implied consent;
(5) Reaches age eighteen, unless the provisions of subsection 4 or 5 of this section apply; or
(6) Reaches age twenty-two, unless the provisions of the child support order specifically extend the parental support order past the child's twenty-second birthday for reasons provided by subsection 4 of this section.
In ruling that Amber was emancipated, the trial court stated in its judgment:
3. Somewhere around the end of May, 2000, Amber Nicole Dowell chose to leave the parental home of Respondent, along with her child, and set up residence with her boyfriend, Josh Reed. Amber testified that it was her intention t[o] make a home for herself, her child and boyfriend, and to `fight the battle of life' on her own. Respondent did not approve of Amber moving in with her boyfriend, but took no steps to stop her.
4. From the end of May, 2000, until mid-August, 2000, Amber resided with her child and boyfriend, first in his apartment and then in an apartment leased by her and Mr. Reed.
5. During this period of time, Amber conducted herself as an adult in the eyes of society. She and Mr. Reed leased an apartment. Amber applied for and received public assistance benefits, declaring her household to be herself, her child and Mr. Reed.
6. During this same period of time, Amber received no financial assistance from her parents, except $20.00 paid to her by Respondent for cleaning Respondent's home.
7. Sometime around mid-August, 2000, Amber, her child and Josh Reed moved back into the home of the Respondent. Amber testified she did this because financially they weren't able to make it on their own.
8. The Court finds that from the end of May, 2000, when Amber moved from the Respondent's home that she was free to make her own decisions concerning herself and her child, that she was under no parental control and received no parental support, that she conducted herself as an adult in the eyes of society, and that but for the fact that she was having financial difficulties, she would not have returned to Respondent's home.
In the instant appeal, Mother focuses exclusively on § 452.340.3. She reasons that the only provision in that section which arguably could be applicable to Amber is subsection (4), which provides that child support terminates if the child "[b]ecomes self-supporting, provided...
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