Dowler v. Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400
| Decision Date | 25 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 84048–2.,84048–2. |
| Citation | 270 Ed. Law Rep. 846,258 P.3d 676,172 Wash.2d 471 |
| Parties | Mitch DOWLER and In Cha Dowler, individually and as limited guardian ad litem for Nam Su Chong; Kathleen Davis, individually and as limited guardian for Zachary Davis and Alexias Davis; Nicole Schueneman–Dobrinski, individually and as limited guardian ad litem for Conner Schueneman; Melanie Stevens, individually and as limited guardian ad litem for Vance Stevens; Derrick and Judith Vollmer, individually and Judith Vollmer as limited guardian ad litem for Josh Vollmer; and William Stephen Sullivan and Yolanda Sullivan, individually, and William Stephen Sullivan, as limited guardian ad litem for Stephanie Sullivan, and Jeanette Moye and Anthony Moye, as limited guardian ad litem for Ralshodd Moye, and Lisa Titchell, individually and as limited guardian ad litem for Christina Eschevarria, Appellants,v.CLOVER PARK SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 400, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Philip Albert Talmadge, Emmelyn Hart, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, Tukwila, WA, Thaddeus Phillip Martin IV, Attorney at Law, Lakewood, WA, for Appellants.William a Coats, Henry Andrew Saller, Jr., Daniel C. Montopoli, Attorneys at Law, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.Sarah A. Dunne, Nancy Lynn Talner, ACLU of Washington Foundation, Seattle WA, amicus counsel for ACLU and Washington Employment Lawyers Association.Allan Kirk Arkley Marson, Mountain View, CA, Erin McCloskey Maus, Keith L. Wurster, Angela C. Vigil, Amanda T. Kotte, Melinda Laine, Baker & McKenzie, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, amicus counsel for Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates.Heather Lynn McKimmie, Disability Rights Washington, Christopher M. Henderson, Dussault Law Group, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Disability Rights Washington and The Arc of Washington State.Karen Helena Simmonds, Laura Kristine Clinton, Charles A. Chavez, K&L Gates, LLP, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Schools Risk Management Pool.Bryan Patrick Harnetiaux, Spokane, WA, George M. Ahrend, Ahrend Law Firm, PLLC, Moses Lake, WA, amicus counsel for Washington State Association for Justice Foundation.J.M. JOHNSON, J.
[172 Wash.2d 474] ¶ 1 Ten special education students and their parents and guardians (Appellants) sued Clover Park School District (Clover Park) for intentional torts, outrage, negligence, and unlawful discrimination under chapter 49.60 RCW. Clover Park moved for a summary judgment dismissing Appellants' claims, arguing that Appellants had not exhausted the administrative remedies available under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1 The trial court granted Clover Park's motion. We reverse and remand Appellants' state tort and unlawful discrimination claims to the trial court. IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply to state-law claims nor does Washington State law require exhaustion before filing such claims.
¶ 2 A group of 10 special education students, along with their parents and guardians, filed a complaint against Clover Park.2 Alleging several instances of physical, verbal, and psychological abuse by Clover Park educators, as well as discrimination based on their disabilities,3 they brought claims for intentional torts, outrage, negligence and unlawful discrimination under chapter 49.60 RCW.
¶ 3 Clover Park denied most of the allegations in Appellants' complaint and pleaded, as an affirmative defense, that Appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA.4 Clover Park moved for a summary judgment of dismissal of all claims on this basis. In response, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss all claims that could be construed as or related to a request for educational compensation under IDEA for deficiencies in educational services and benefits.5
¶ 4 The trial court simultaneously granted Clover Park's motion for summary judgment and Appellants' motion to dismiss any IDEA related claims. The motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice. The trial court invited a second round of summary judgment motions to determine if any individual plaintiff had a claim surviving dismissal.
¶ 5 Appellants moved for reconsideration, arguing that their state-law tort and unlawful discrimination claims were not subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement in IDEA. Clover Park filed a second motion for summary judgment, reiterating its argument that Appellants had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court again ruled for Clover Park.
¶ 6 Appellants moved for reconsideration a second time and asked the court to stay the case while they sought administrative determinations of whether their claims were indeed encompassed by IDEA. The trial court denied Appellants' second motion for reconsideration and granted Clover Park's second motion for summary judgment. Appellants appealed.
¶ 7 Awaiting appeal, Appellants filed a citizen's complaint with the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI) 6 to determine if their claims were covered by IDEA. OSPI responded by stating that it could only respond to allegations of violations that occurred in the past year, that it could not determine if the issues Appellants raised had occurred in the past year, and that it could not determine whether the issues Appellants raised were related to the implementation of the students' Individualized Education Program (IEP), a cornerstone of IDEA.7 OSPI's response stated that the violations it could investigate include “qualifications of staff, improper use of behavioral supports or aversive interventions or failure to provide services outlined in the IEP.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2285.
¶ 8 Appellants subsequently discovered that the director of special education for OSPI, Douglas Gill, had testified in a separate case 8 that claims of verbal and physical abuse and discrimination were not within OSPI's jurisdiction, and that the alleged actions in that case did not constitute violations of IDEA. Relying on Gill's testimony, Appellants filed a CR 60 motion for relief from judgment, asking the court to vacate its order granting Clover Park's second motion for summary judgment and denying Appellants' second motion for reconsideration. The trial court granted the CR 60 motion. It noted, however, that “Nothing herein prevents the defendant from renewing its motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 2430–33. Appellants voluntarily dismissed their appeal of the order granting Clover Park's second motion for summary judgment and denying their second motion for reconsideration.
¶ 9 Clover Park moved for summary judgment a third time, again arguing Appellants had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing suit. The trial court granted Clover Park's motion. Appellants timely appealed and successfully petitioned this court for direct review. Order granting review (July 7, 2010).
¶ 10 These Appellants are not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil action under state law. To understand why, we begin with an overview of IDEA, a description of the IDEA due-process hearing, and an explanation of IDEA's administrative-exhaustion requirement.
¶ 11 The legislation now codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1490 (IDEA) was enacted by Congress in 1970 to help address the educational needs of children with disabilities. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 174 L.Ed.2d 168 (2009); 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). It requires states receiving federal funding to make available a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) 9 to all children with disabilities residing in the state. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). To achieve this end, IDEA requires local school districts to develop an IEP for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
¶ 12 An IEP is essentially the plan of action for implementing and assessing an individual child's education. See id. It has several mandatory components. For example, the IEP must include a written statement of the child's present academic level, the needs of the child due to his or her disability, measurable goals and instructional objectives for the child, and the specific special education services and supplemental aids to be provided to the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(V).
¶ 13 Each child's IEP is to be developed, reviewed, and revised as needed by an “IEP Team” charged with working together to ensure the child receives FAPE. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3). The IEP Team consists of the child's parent(s) or guardian(s), at least one special education teacher and one general education teacher, a representative of the local educational agency, an individual who can interpret the instructional implications of evaluation results, other individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the child, and whenever appropriate, the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). If the IEP Team is unable to cooperate or does not ensure FAPE, the child's right to FAPE is safeguarded by IDEA's administrative-complaint process, the “due process hearing.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (f).
¶ 14 The IDEA due-process hearing is a formal administrative-complaint process and is available to parties in limited situations. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). These situations are as follows: (1) when any party presents a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,” 10 and (2) when there is a complaint with respect to the placement of a child in an alternative-educational setting.11
¶ 15 At the IDEA due-process hearing, the parties may be represented by counsel and may present evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and compel their attendance. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h). A hearing officer issues findings and renders a decision with respect to the...
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