Shaker Community, Inc. v. State Racing Commission

• Decision Date: 05 June 1963
• Citation: 346 Mass. 213,190 N.E.2d 897
• Parties: SHAKER COMMUNITY, INC. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION et al. (and three companion cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 897

190 N.E.2d 897

346 Mass. 213

SHAKER COMMUNITY, INC. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION et al. (and three companion cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

Argued May 27, 1963.

Decided June 5, 1963.

Rudolph A. Lewis, Pittsfield (Charles R. Crimmin, Pittsfield, with him), for petitioner.

Joseph B. Abrams, Boston (Robert T. Abrams, Boston, and John A. Barry, Pittsfield, with him), for Hancock Raceway, Inc.

James W. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Racing Commission.

John N. Alberti, North Adams, for Berkshire County Fair Ass'n, Inc. (William A. Murray, Milford, for Franklin Fair Ass'n, Inc., with him).

Before SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

These are petitions for review under the State Administrative Procedure Act (G.L. c. 30A, § 14) of our decisions of the State Racing Commission. See G.L. c. 128A. Hancock Raceway, Inc. (Hancock), Berkshire County Fair Association, Inc. (Berkshire), and Franklin Fair Association, Inc. (Franklin), were allowed to intervene. See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(2). The State Racing Commission (commission) demurred to each petition; Hancock demurred to the two petitions in which it was involved; and Berkshire demurred to the petition relating to it. Interlocutory decrees were entered sustaining the demurrers in each case, and from final decrees dismissing the petitions the petition appealed. G.L. c. 30A, § 15.

All four petitions were substantially the same and we summarize their averments as follows: On January 21, 1963, the commission held, in the town of Hancock, a public hearing upon four applications for racing dates. The petitioner, a charitable corporation having its place of business in the town of Hancock, appeared at this hearing to oppose the granting of the racing dates sought by the applicants, and requested 'to be recorded as a party' but this request was denied by the commission. The commission's decisions granted the following racing dates: June 17, 1963, to June 29, 1963; to Hancock; July 1, 1963, to July 6, 1963, to Berkshire; July 8, 1963, to July 20, 1963, to Hancock; and July 22, 1963, to July 27, 1963, to Franklin.

After reciting the foregoing, the petitioner alleged that it owned land in the town of Hancock that abutted the property of Hancock and asserted that '[b]efore, during and after some of the racing hours the buildings of the Petitioner * * * will be unreachable by motor vehicle or any other means of surface transportation.' The petitioner also alleged that the decisions of the commission were tained by numerous errors of law. Some of these alleged errors arose out of the manner in which the hearing was conducted; others were based on alleged infirmities in the commission's decisions.

Numerous grounds were set forth in the demurrers, but one ground common to all was that the petitioner was not a 'person * * * aggrieved' within the meaning of G.L. c. 30A, § 14. Since, as will presently appear, we are of opinion that the demurrers were rightly sustained on this ground, it is not necessary to discuss the other grounds.

These petitions for review are governed by G.L. c. 30A, § 14. That the commission is an agency within the meaning of § 1(2), and that the application for a racing license is an 'adjudicatory proceeding' under § 1(1) was decided in Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc. v. State Racing Commn., 342 Mass. 694, 700-701, 175 N.E.2d 244.

Despite the somewhat broader allegations in its petitions, the petitioner in this court asserts that it is a 'person * * * aggrieved' within the meaning of § 14 because it owns land in the town where the racing is to be conducted, and because its property abuts the race track. These facts standing alone do not make the petitioner a 'person * * * aggrieved.'

Cases which give landowners standing to appeal decisions of a zoning or planning board affecting the zone in which they own property are readily distinguishable. See, for example, Ayer v. Commissioners on Height of Bldgs. in Boston, 242 Mass. 30, 136 N.E. 338; Carey v. Planning Bd. of Revere, 335 Mass. 740, 743-744, 139 N.E.2d 920; Colabufalo v. Board of Appeal of Newton, 336 Mass. 213, 216, 143 N.E.2d 536. Landowners or persons with an economic interest in land within a zone were specifically intended to be protected by legislation governing the use and control of land within the zone. The boards dealing with these matters usually must consider the character of a neighborhood in making their decisions. See G.L. c. 40A, § 15. Compare Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (proprietor in a less restricted zone is not a 'person aggrieved' by the introduction into a more restricted zone of any use permitted in the zone in which the proprietor's property is located).

The petitioner does not bring itself within cases holding that persons whose business interests are directly affected by administrative decisions are entitled to have such decisions reviewed. See Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Assn., Inc. v. State Racing Commn., 342 Mass. 694, 175 N.E.2d 244 (where applicant and competitor sought mutually exclusive racing dates it was held that applicant was a 'person * * * aggrieved'); A. B. & C. Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 327 Mass. 550, 100 N.E.2d 560 (carrier held an aggrieved party where competing...