Duck v. Jacobs

• Decision Date: 20 June 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 589-165,589-213 and 589-214.,589-197
• Citation: 739 F. Supp. 1545
• Parties: Joel DUCK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronnie JACOBS, individually and in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Nahunta; H. Wendell Herrin, Shirley H. Denty, Johnny Lee Thomas, and Doris A. Levins, in their official capacities as members of the City Council of the City of Nahunta; and The City of Nahunta, Georgia, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

739 F. Supp. 1545

Joel DUCK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ronnie JACOBS, individually and in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Nahunta; H. Wendell Herrin, Shirley H. Denty, Johnny Lee Thomas, and Doris A. Levins, in their official capacities as members of the City Council of the City of Nahunta; and The City of Nahunta, Georgia, Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 589-165, 589-197, 589-213 and 589-214.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division.

June 20, 1990.

Eugene Highsmith, Brunswick, Ga., for plaintiffs.

John T. Woodall, Savannah, Ga. and Delman L. Minchew, Waycross, Ga., for defendants.

ORDER

ALAIMO, District Judge.

In the above-numbered cases, the plaintiffs, Joel Duck, Timothy Hollingsworth, Ronald Muchison and Robert Mastroianni each separately sued the City of Nahunta, Georgia, and its various officials, alleging that their terminations from employment as city police officers and police chiefs violated their rights under the United States Constitution. These cases are currently before the Court on the defendants' and the plaintiffs' cross-motions for summary judgment. Since these motions raise many common questions of law and fact, the Court has consolidated the cases for the limited purposes of this Order.¹ As set out more fully below, these motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

FACTS²

The Police Chiefs

Robert Mastroianni's employment by the City of Nahunta as the chief of police was terminated by Nahunta Mayor Ronnie Jacobs on March 7, 1988. Joel Duck succeeded Mastroianni as chief of police; but he, too, was fired by Mayor Jacobs on March 22, 1989. Ostensibly, the men were fired for poor job performance. At the time that they were terminated, however, neither Mastroianni nor Duck was notified of the reasons for his dismissal. Nor was either given any opportunity to respond prior to being fired. On May 18, 1990, well after the institution of this litigation, defendants for the first time offered to hold termination hearings for Duck and Mastroianni. To date, the plaintiffs have not responded to this offer.

Mastroianni and Duck contend that they were deprived of a property interest in continued employment without being afforded due process of law. They further contend that the defendants deprived them of a liberty interest in their reputations, by filing with the Georgia Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (hereinafter "POST") and other governmental agencies certain malicious and false information regarding the bases for their terminations.

The Rank-and-File Police Officers

Timothy Hollingsworth and Ronald Muchison were employed as police officers with the Nahunta police department. They were fired by Mayor Jacobs, respectively, in March and October of 1988, ostensibly for misconduct in the performance of their duties. At the time of their terminations, however, neither man was given any explanation of the bases for his dismissal. As with Mastroianni and Duck, these plaintiffs were not offered a hearing on their terminations until May 1990. Hollingsworth and Muchison contend that they were deprived of a property interest in continued employment without being afforded procedural and substantive due process. Hollingsworth also contends that the defendants filed with POST certain false and malicious information regarding the bases for his termination, thus depriving him of a liberty interest in his reputation without due process of law. The complaint filed by Muchison, however, does not raise a liberty interest claim.

DISCUSSION

Property Interests in Employment

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly has become one of our Constitution's most familiar and fundamental proscriptions on the use of governmental power. That clause provides, in pertinent part, that "no state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1. Although written in broad and sweeping terms, it is clear from the face of the amendment that only the certain enumerated interests — life, liberty and property — fall within its protection. The due process clause "is not a general guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions." Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). Rather, the terminated public employee is entitled to the protections of due process only if he is found to have a property interest in continued employment. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) ("Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment."); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-06, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (same).

The Constitution, however, does not create or define property interests: "They are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law...." Roth, supra, at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. The Court must, therefore, look to state law in determining whether plaintiffs had a property interest in continued employment with the Nahunta police department.

Under Georgia law, a public employee has a property interest in employment when that employee can be fired only for cause. Crowell v. City of Eastman, 859 F.2d 875, 877 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Brownlee v. Williams, 233 Ga. 548, 212 S.E.2d 359 (1975)); Barnett v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, 707 F.2d 1571, 1576 (11th Cir.1983). The public employee's right to be fired only for cause can arise from an explicit or implied contract, a state statute or a local ordinance. Bishop, supra, at 344, 96 S.Ct. at 2077. In the absence of a contractual or statutory "for cause" requirement, however, the employee serves "at will" and may be discharged at any time for any or no reason, with no cause of action for wrongful termination under state law. Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978); Runyan v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 147 Ga.App. 53, 248 S.E.2d 44 (1978). Such "at will" employees have no legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment and, thus, have no property interest protected by the due process clause. Blanton v. Griel Memorial Psychiatric Hospital, 758 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir.1985).

Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on their due process claims. They contend that the Nahunta City Personnel Ordinance gives them a protected property interest in continued employment — since it explicitly states that policemen and other city employees can be fired only for cause — and that they were deprived of this property interest without being afforded the prior hearing required by due process.

The defendants also have moved for summary judgment on this issue. They concede that the City Ordinance purports to give employees a right to be fired only for cause, but they contend that this ordinance is invalid under the Nahunta City Charter. The defendants argue that the charter vests the Mayor with the right to fire city employees at will and that any ordinance passed by the City Council purporting to restrict the Mayor's power in this regard is invalid as violative of the charter. The defendants cite § 2.22(b) of the City Charter in support of their position. That section provides as follows: "As the chief executive of the City of Nahunta, the mayor shall ... appoint and remove all officers, department heads, and employees of the city...." Nahunta City Charter, § 2.22(b).

The plaintiffs respond to this argument by citing § 3.51 of the charter. That section provides as follows:

Personnel Policies. The council shall adopt rules and regulations consistent with this charter concerning: (1) the method of employees selection and probationary periods of employment; and (2) the administration of the position classification and pay plan, methods of promotion, and application of service ratings thereto, and transfer of employees within the classification plan; (3) hours of work, vacation, sick leave, and other leaves of absence, overtime pay, and the order and manner in which layoff shall be effected; and (4) such other personnel policies as may be necessary to provide for adequate and systematic handling of the personnel affairs of the City of Nahunta.

The plaintiffs contend that the Mayor's authority to fire city employees under § 2.22(b) of the charter is limited by § 3.51 of the charter. They argue that the City Council's enactment of the personnel ordinance, with the "for cause" standard contained therein, constitutes a valid exercise of the Council's authority to formulate personnel policies under § 3.51.

This Court is mindful of the caution it must exercise in overruling a legislative enactment. Although the Nahunta City Council is perhaps not so lofty and august a body as the United States Congress, it is an elected, representative body nonetheless. The Council has determined that it possesses authority under the charter to enact policies concerning the method of terminating city employees, and this determination should not lightly be cast aside.

The Court cannot accept the interpretation of Charter § 2.22(b) pressed by the defendants. That section is clearly devoid of any mention of the Mayor's claimed power to fire city employees "at will." Although § 2.22(b) provides that the Mayor, "as chief executive," has the authority to "appoint and remove" city employees, it does not mention whether this authority can be exercised at will or whether it must be exercised for cause only. Rather, the section is merely a general outline of the duties of the city's chief executive.

By contrast, the unequivocal language of § 3.51 vests in the City Council the plenary power to formulate personnel policies. That section specifically provides the Council with authority to promulgate policies regarding employee selection, salaries, promotions, vacations, "th...