Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin
| Decision Date | 30 November 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 33710,33710 |
| Citation | 242 Ga. 612,250 S.E.2d 442 |
| Parties | , 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4310 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY et al. v. BUSBIN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Robert L. Pennington, Frederick E. Link, Atlanta, Tillman, Brice, McTier, Coleman & Talley, Wade H. Coleman, Valdosta, for appellants.
Jack J. Helms, Berrien L. Sutton, Brooks E. Blitch, III, Homerville, for appellee.
Gambrell, Russell & Forbes, E. Smythe Gambrell, W. Glen Harlan, David M. Brown, Frederick G. Bynton, Alston, Miller & Gaines, G. Conley Ingram, Franklin R. Nix, King & Spalding, Charles L. Gowen, Nolan C. Leake, Andrew W. Estes, Atlanta, G. Gerald Kunes, Tifton, for amicus curiae.
Certiorari was granted to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 145 Ga.App. 438, 244 S.E.2d 26 (1978).
1. In Division 1 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented a jury question as to whether Busbin's employment was for a definite term or was, instead, at will. This court disagrees. The evidence was not in dispute as to the terms and conditions of Busbin's contract of employment. He was employed until his retirement date as long as his work was satisfactory. Instead, the dispute centers around the meaning in law of such a contract and, hence, is a question for the court, which question has been consistently resolved in many cases, such as Land v. Delta Air Lines, 130 Ga.App. 231, 203 S.E.2d 316 (1973), by holding that in the absence of a controlling contract, "permanent employment," "employment for life," or " employment until retirement" is employment for an indefinite period, terminable at the will of either party, which gives rise to no cause of action against the employer for alleged wrongful termination. See also Ely v. Stratoflex, Inc., 132 Ga.App. 569, 570(1), 208 S.E.2d 583 (1974).
2. In Division 1 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized the rule that even though a person's employment contract is at will, he has a valuable contract right which may not be unlawfully interfered with by a third person. Ott v. Gandy, 66 Ga.App. 684(1), 19 S.E.2d 180 (1942). Insofar as Division 1 of the opinion recognizes that a jury issue existed as to whether or not the defendant Moore had the right to discharge Busbin, and, accordingly, insofar as the Court of Appeals held that it was for the jury to determine whether or not Moore was such a "third person" as may be liable to Busbin for unlawful interference with Busbin's employment contract, this court agrees and affirms. The evidence was in conflict on the question of whether Moore had authority to discharge Busbin without the concurrence of his superiors with whom he conferred or whether, instead, Moore could have discharged Busbin, had he chosen to do so, without consulting with his superiors. The relevance of this question lies in the fact that if Moore had the absolute right to discharge Busbin without consulting his superiors, he could not be liable to Busbin for wrongful discharge, regardless of his motives (McElroy v. Wilson, 143 Ga.App. 893, 895, 240 S.E.2d 155 (1977)); whereas, on the other hand, if Moore lacked such authority, he could be determined to be a "third person" tortfeasor who could be liable to Busbin in an action for wrongfully procuring Busbin's discharge. Schaeffer v. King, 223 Ga. 468, 155 S.E.2d 815 (1967). The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court on this point.
3. In Division 2 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized the rule that corporations act by and through their agents. It is the misapplication of this rule to the facts of this case which must be corrected, for the Court of Appeals held in Division 3 that ". . . it was a jury issue as to whether Georgia Power Company became liable for the wrongful conduct of Moore and others . . ." Regardless of whether Moore did or did not himself, and by himself, have authority to discharge Busbin, the evidence establishes beyond contradiction that one or more of Moore's superiors who participated in or ratified Moore's actions did have authority in behalf of Georgia Power Company to discharge Busbin. Accordingly, since Busbin's employment was terminable at will, and Busbin was discharged or his discharge was ratified by one or more of his supervisors who did have authority to discharge him, Busbin's allegations and evidence as to improper motives for his discharge are legally irrelevant and presented no issues for resolution by the jury regarding the right of Georgia Power Company to discharge him. McElroy v. Wilson, 143 Ga.App. 893, 895, 240 S.E.2d 155, supra. The allegations of, and attempts to prove, conspiracy between the various Georgia Power Company supervisory employees add nothing to the claim for wrongful discharge because neither the supervisory employees of Georgia Power Company who had authority to discharge Busbin, nor they and Georgia Power Company, can conspire to do that which they legally were entitled to do. Hill v. Delta Air Lines, 143 Ga.App. 103, 104(3), 237 S.E.2d 597 (1977); McElroy v. Wilson, supra. Under the facts of this case, any attempt to impute to Georgia Power Company any conduct of Moore in procuring the discharge of Busbin that the jury might have deemed to be without authority and wrongful would be an improper application of the rule that corporations are liable for the acts of their agents because Moore could not lawfully be held to be liable to Busbin unless, as aforesaid, he was a "third party" who induced the employer to discharge the employee, rather than an agent acting for the corporation. Schaeffer v. King, 223 Ga. 468, 155 S.E.2d 815 (1967). Anything to the contrary expressed in the case of Wiley v. Ga. Power Co., 134 Ga.App. 187, 213 S.E.2d 550 (1975), is disapproved and will not be followed. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in Division 3 of its opinion in holding that a jury issue existed as to whether or not Georgia Power Company was liable to Busbin for the actions of its supervisory agents. Moore, of course, cannot have conspired with himself to injure Busbin since two or more persons are required to form a conspiracy. Hence, the case against Moore erroneously was submitted to the jury on the theory of conspiracy.
4. In Division 3 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals erroneously concludes that there was...
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