Duke v. State
| Decision Date | 15 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S97A0998,S97A0998 |
| Citation | 268 Ga. 425,489 S.E.2d 811 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 3438 DUKE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Daniel J. Sammons, Gainesville, for Eric Steven Duke.
Lydia Jackson Sartain, Dist. Atty., Leonard C. Parks, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville, Allison Beth Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
A jury found Eric Duke guilty of the malice murder of Bonifacio Carbajal-Munoz, the aggravated assault of Carbajal-Munoz and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on the jury's guilty verdicts and sentenced Duke to life imprisonment for the murder, to a 20-year term for the aggravated assault and to a 5-year term for each of the possession of a firearm offenses. The trial court denied Duke's motion for new trial and he appeals. 1
1. At trial, the State produced the following evidence: Ms. Kelly Scoggins and Ms. Tabatha Hightower informed Duke that they had been accosted. In a car driven by Alex Barger, Duke, accompanied by Ms. Scoggins, Ms. Hightower and Ms. Tabatha Hammock, set out for the scene of the alleged assault. They passed the victim, who was walking down the road. One of the women said that Carbajal-Munoz resembled her assailant. Duke fired a shot at the victim, but missed. After instructing Barger to drive around the block, Duke fired a fatal shot into the victim's back. Duke was arrested in connection with an unrelated matter. During the course of in-custody questioning, Duke gave a statement admitting that he drove the car on the night of the murder, but identifying Barger as the actual shooter. At trial, however, Duke testified that it was he who had become enraged and shot the victim. This evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Duke's guilt of the possession of the firearm offenses and of a malice murder, committed after completion of a separate non-fatal aggravated assault. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 410, 411(1)(b), 478 S.E.2d 762 (1996). Compare Fitzpatrick v. State, 268 Ga. 423 (1), 489 S.E.2d 840 (1997); Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 373(5), 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993).
2. Duke urges that his in-custody statement is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50, because it was induced by "hope of benefit." According to Duke, the officers implied that he would not be charged with any crime if he made the statement. It appears, however, that the officers merely told Duke that, if it was Barger who committed the crimes, then Duke should tell the officers what happened or risk being charged himself. By informing Duke that he could be a witness against Barger or, if he withheld evidence, risk becoming a defendant himself, the officers clearly did not imply that Duke would not be charged if he was himself involved in the murder. By encouraging Duke to implicate Barger, if Barger was guilty, the officers were only encouraging Duke to tell the truth. Duke certainly could not reasonably have believed that, if he implicated himself in his statement, officers who were charged with enforcing the law would ignore his criminal conduct and would not charge him with any crime whatsoever. Encouraging a suspect to tell the truth is not a "hope of benefit" within the meaning of OCGA § 24-3-50. Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 736(4)(c), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995). Once Duke made the statement indicating that he also was involved in the crime, but falsely attributing the actual firing of the shots to...
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Edenfield v. State
...statements to mean that he would never be charged or arrested for his crimes.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Duke v. State, 268 Ga. 425, 426(2), 489 S.E.2d 811 (1997) (“Duke certainly could not reasonably have believed that, if he implicated himself in his statement, officers who wer......
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Morales v. State
...encouragement to tell the truth, which did not amount to a hope of benefit under former OCGA § 24–3–50 ); see also Duke v. State , 268 Ga. 425, 426, 489 S.E.2d 811 (1997) ; Davenport v. State , 277 Ga.App. 758, 759, 627 S.E.2d 133 (2006) (victim's mother's promise that if the defendant “con......
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...v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 800(2), 514 S.E.2d 1 (1999); Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690, 692(3), 492 S.E.2d 185 (1997); Duke v. State, 268 Ga. 425, 426(2), 489 S.E.2d 811 (1997); Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 736(4)(c), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995); Kettman v. State, 257 Ga. 603, 607(10), 362 S.E.2d 342 ......
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