Drake v. State

Decision Date24 November 2014
Docket NumberNo. S14A0935.,S14A0935.
Citation766 S.E.2d 447,296 Ga. 286
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court
PartiesDRAKE v. The STATE.

Richard M. Darden, for appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Dep. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Ryan A. Kolb, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Margaret Ellen Heap, Dist. Atty., Reginald Charles Martin, Sarah L. Moorhead, Asst. Dist. Attys., Savannah, for appellee.

Opinion

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Jamere Drake was convicted of felony murder and related offenses in connection with the November 2011 shooting death of James Woods in downtown Savannah. Drake now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in admitting his statements to police, which he alleges were obtained through the use of improper interrogation techniques and in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Finding no error, we affirm.1

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence adduced at trial established as follows. In the early morning hours of November 19, 2011, James Woods, a taxi cab driver, was shot from behind and killed in the driver seat of his cab. A witness testified that, on the night in question, she returned to her home after midnight and noticed a taxi cab parked across the street. After going inside, she heard gunshots outside and saw the cab roll down the street and crash into a fence. The witness then saw a man on the passenger side of the car who appeared to be searching through the front seat of the cab. Another vehicle then approached, apparently startling the person, who ran from the scene. The witness called the police.

Savannah–Chatham County police arrived at the scene, where they found the dying victim, whom they were unable to revive. Investigators immediately contacted the taxi cab company to obtain the victim's identity and information about his final fare. Cell phone records obtained on an exigent basis reflected that the phone call requesting that final dispatch had come from a cell phone number registered to Drake. The records further revealed that two phone calls had been placed from Drake's cell phone number to the taxi cab company: the first shortly before midnight, using a “star six seven” prefix, which blocks the caller's identity from the receiving phone, and the second, three minutes later, without that prefix. Further evidence reflected that the taxi cab company's policy prohibited the dispatch of cabs to a caller who blocked his identity.

Having identified Drake, investigators located him that same morning at work at a local McDonald's. Drake accompanied them to the police station, where he underwent a series of video-recorded interviews, beginning at approximately 7:00 a.m. Drake first told investigators that, shortly before midnight on the previous night, he had been robbed at gunpoint of his cell phone, money, and the black thermal shirt he had been wearing. Drake subsequently admitted that this story was false and told the officers he had been driving around that night with an associate, Jeremy Smith. Drake stated that Smith had used Drake's cell phone to call a cab; that he dropped Smith off to catch the cab; and that he then received a call from Smith, who said the cab did not work out and asked Drake to pick him up at a nearby park. Drake further stated that he picked up his friend, who then told him he had shot the cab driver.

Drake subsequently changed his story again, admitting that he and Smith had planned to go downtown to find someone to rob; that he had driven Smith, who had a gun, downtown; that he then changed his mind about participating in the robbery and thus dropped Smith off so that Smith could take a cab; and that he gave Smith his cell phone, which Smith used to call the cab company. Drake further stated that, after he dropped Smith off, he parked his car and heard gunshots, and that Smith called him a few minutes later asking to be picked up at a nearby park.

After Drake recited this version of events, he was placed under arrest and was read his Miranda rights, which he waived. He then repeated the most recent version of his account. Eventually, Drake indicated his desire to stop talking, and the investigator terminated the interview.

At this point, Drake and Smith were placed together in an interview room, where they were offered food and water. Unbeknownst to them, their interactions were recorded. Drake told Smith he was considering confessing and spoke of himself as an “accessory” to the crimes. After an hour, Drake asked to speak with one of the officers again, and, after being reminded of his Miranda rights, he told the officer that he and Smith had planned to rob a cab driver, with Smith committing the actual robbery and Drake being the getaway driver. Drake admitted that he had called the cab company, dropped Smith off at the location to which the cab had been summoned, and picked Smith up at a nearby park after the robbery attempt. Drake also admitted that he knew Smith was armed with a nine-millimeter gun and that after the shooting he crushed his cell phone and threw it over a fence.

In a search of Smith's home, investigators uncovered a Smith & Wesson nine-millimeter firearm and nine-millimeter ammunition. Shell casings recovered from the victim's cab were later determined by a firearms expert to have been fired from this gun. In addition, clothing found at Smith's home matched that described by a witness who saw an individual fleeing the area after the shooting. One article of this clothing, a pair of jogging shorts, was stained with blood.

1. Though Drake has not enumerated the general grounds, we have concluded that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Drake was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; see also OCGA § 16–2–20 (parties to a crime).

2. Drake contends that his statements to law enforcement officers were improperly admitted because the officers failed to inform him of his Miranda rights before they began interrogating him. See Reaves v. State, 292 Ga. 582(2)(a), 740 S.E.2d 141 (2013) (Miranda warnings required before law enforcement authorities conduct a custodial interrogation). The trial court rejected this claim after holding a pre-trial Jackson–Denno2 hearing, concluding that Drake was not in custody during the interview portion of his first interview and thus that no Miranda violation occurred.

On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court must affirm the trial court's findings on disputed facts and witness credibility unless they are clearly erroneous. See Reaves, 292 Ga. at 584, 740 S.E.2d 141. As to facts which are captured on recordings made part of the appellate record, our review is de novo. Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 765 S.E.2d 896, 2014 WL 6090705 (decided November 17, 2014) ; Reaves, 292 Ga. at 586, 740 S.E.2d 141. In all cases, we independently apply the law to the facts. Mack, 296 Ga. at 248, 765 S.E.2d 896 ; Reaves, 292 Ga. at 584, 586, 740 S.E.2d 141. The admissibility of a defendant's statements is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. Fennell v. State, 292 Ga. 834(2), 741 S.E.2d 877 (2013).

Miranda warnings are required only when a person is interviewed by law enforcement while in custody.” Reaves, 292 Ga. at 584, 740 S.E.2d 141.

One is considered to be “in custody” for Miranda purposes if he has been formally arrested or his “freedom of movement has been restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id.; accord Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279(1)(A)(1), 695 S.E.2d 604 (2010). The determination of custody in this context requires assessing whether a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive that he was at liberty to terminate the interview and leave. Reaves, 292 Ga. at 584, 740 S.E.2d 141 ; Sosniak, 287 Ga. at 280, 695 S.E.2d 604.

At the Jackson–Denno hearing, Savannah–Chatham County police Sergeant Andre Jackson testified that once police had identified Drake as a person of interest, Jackson and two other investigators went to the McDonald's where Drake was employed. Jackson testified that they first approached the store manager and asked whether they could talk to Drake for “an hour or so,” promising to bring him back afterwards. The manager agreed, and Jackson testified that we told [Drake] that we were going to talk to him and bring him down and bring him back when we finished talking to him.” Jackson further testified that Drake was not handcuffed, was never threatened, and agreed willingly to accompany the officers, who transported him in the front seat of an unmarked patrol car. Jackson also testified that during the interview, Drake “was free to leave” and, if he had indicated his desire not to speak with police, they would have been required to let him go.

As reflected in the video recording, during the first interview, Drake was explicitly told he was not under arrest. The recording confirms that Drake was not handcuffed or physically restrained during the interviews and further reflects that the officers treated him with civility, provided him water and, at one point, food, and conducted the interviews in a calm, non-confrontational tone.

We conclude based on the totality of the circumstances that Drake was not in custody during his initial interview. The evidence reflects that investigators requested rather than demanded to speak with Drake and that Drake agreed voluntarily to accompany them to the police station, with the understanding that he would be returned to work...

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31 cases
  • Matthews v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 17 Mayo 2021
    ...brutality, deception or other type of deliberate tactics calculated to break the will of the suspect.); Drake v. State , 296 Ga. 286, 290 (3), 766 S.E.2d 447 (2014) (A suspect's statement was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, which included interrogating officers’ pleas to ......
  • Price v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 4 Marzo 2019
    ...or that it offered "a slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury." As such, it, too, was permissible. See Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286 (3), (766 S.E.2d 447) (2014) (exaggerations of incriminating evidence and false representations concerning the victim not impermissible during non-......
  • Dozier v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 3 Junio 2019
    ...motion to suppress, this Court must accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Drake v. State , 296 Ga. 286, 288, 766 S.E.2d 447 (2014). However, when, as here, "[t]here is no dispute about what took place during the police interview in question, since ......
  • Gialenios v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 1 Marzo 2021
    ...would perceive that he was at liberty to terminate the interview and leave.(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Drake v. State , 296 Ga. 286, 288-289 (2), 766 S.E.2d 447 (2014). The circumstances surrounding the admissibility of a defendant's statement are determined by the trial court and ......
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