Duncan v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:07-cr-00023-EJL,Case No. 2:17-cv-00091-EJL |
| Parties | JOSEPH EDWARD DUNCAN, III, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Pending before the Court in the above-entitled matter is Petitioner's Motion for Collateral Relief seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (CV 1, 4.)1 The parties have filed their responsive briefing and matter is ripe for the Court's consideration.
This is a federal capital case arising from the events occurring in the spring of 2005 when the Petitioner, Joseph Edward Duncan III, traveled from North Dakota to Idaho onan orchestrated crime spree looking for children to abduct, abuse, and kill.2 On May 16, 2005, Duncan carefully choose his victims when he broke into a rural home near Coeur d'Alene, Idaho and savagely killed three individuals living at the home and kidnapped two of the minor children - S.G. and D.G. - who were eight and nine years old at the time. Duncan took the two children to a secluded campsite in the Lolo National Forest in Montana that he had chosen for its privacy where, for the next several weeks, he inhumanely tortured, raped, and sexually assaulted both children. Duncan eventually killed D.G. at the campsite. On June 22, 2005, Duncan returned to Coeur d'Alene, Idaho with S.G. and he was apprehended when an employee of the restaurant where he and S.G. were eating identified the two and called law enforcement.
The State of Idaho charged Duncan with three counts of kidnaping and three counts of murder relating to his killings of the three individuals at the Coeur d'Alene home. Duncan plead guilty to the state charges on October 16, 2006.3
On January 18, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Duncan on ten counts relating to his criminal conduct, including three death-eligible counts. (CR 1.) Duncan was appointed counsel and the trial was set for March 20, 2007. (CR 5, 459.)4 On January 23, 2007, theGovernment filed a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. (CR 11.) Capital counsel was appointed to represent Duncan and the Court granted a continuance of the trial date to January 22, 2008. (CR 13, 32.)5 Just prior to that trial setting, on December 3, 2007, Duncan plead guilty to all ten counts in the Indictment. (CR 188, 189, 204.) The Court scheduled the Penalty Phase to begin on January 28, 2008. (CR 189.)
Both parties filed Motions seeking to continue the start of the Penalty Phase and extend the time to file motions. (CR 192, 193, 195.) The Court agreed and extended the motions deadline to January 22, 2008 and continued the start of the Penalty Phase to April 14, 2008. (CR 202.) After the parties filed their motions, the Court held three days of hearings on the motions and then issued written decisions. (CR 230-231, 266, 314-316.) On March 26, 2008, the Court held a status conference on remaining pending matters. (CR 343, 350.) Prior to the start of the Penalty Phase, the parties submitted additional motions, a proposed Jury Questionnaire, proposed Jury Instructions, and other pre-Penalty Phase filings. The Court granted the defense's Motion to Bifurcate the Penalty Phase into an Eligibility Phase and a Selection Phase. (CR 253, 266, 316.)
The Penalty Phase began on April 14, 2008 when the entire pool of more than 300 prospective jurors was called in to complete a written jury questionnaire. (CR 387.) Jury selection resumed on April 16, 2008 but prior to the prospective jurors being brought in,Duncan made an oral motion to represent himself. (CR 391, 398.) On April 18, 2008, the Court held a hearing on that request and ordered that Duncan be evaluated to determine whether he was competent to waive his right to counsel. (CR 399, 404.) The Court suspended voir dire until Duncan could be evaluated and the Court could rule on his request to represent himself. (CR 407.) The defense also filed a Motion to Declare the Defendant Incompetent to Proceed. (CR 415.)
On July 24, 2008, the Court entered an Order finding Duncan competent and set a hearing on his request to proceed pro se. (CR 493.) The Court held that hearing on July 28, 2008, where it granted Duncan's oral motion for self-representation finding Duncan to be competent and that his waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. (CR 499, 502.) The Court also appointed his defense attorneys as standby counsel. (CR 499, 502.)
Jury selection resumed on August 6, 2008. (CR 529.) Ultimately, on August 27, 2008, the jury returned death verdicts on the three death-eligible counts of the Indictment - Count 1 (Kidnapping a Minor Resulting in Death); Count 5 (Sexual Exploitation of a Child Resulting in Death); and Count 7 (Using a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence resulting in Death) - and the Court sentenced Duncan to death on each of those three counts. (CR 582, 602.)
On November 3, 2008, the Court sentenced Duncan on the non-capital crimes to a consecutive term of life imprisonment on Count 4 (Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Minor), and concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3 (Kidnapping a Minor and Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Minor), and concurrent terms of 120 months of imprisonment on each of the remaining counts - Count 6 (Possession of a Firearm by aConvicted Felon), Count 8 (Transportation of a Stolen Firearm), Count 9 (Possession of an Unregistered Firearm), and Count 10 (Transportation of a Stolen Vehicle). (CR 599, 601, 602.)
On November 17, 2008, standby counsel filed a Notice of Appeal. (CR 605.) On November 19, 2008, the Court received a letter from Duncan dated November 15, 2008, stating "if any appeal is initiated on my behalf, it is done contrary to my wishes." (CR 607.) On the same day, the Government filed a Motion to Strike Standby Counsel's Notice of Appeal. (CR 606.) The Court held a hearing on November 24, 2008 to inquire of Duncan as to whether he desired to waive his appeal. (CR 609, 612.) Following a lengthy colloquy, the Court concluded that Duncan remained competent and that he did not desire to file an appeal. (CR 637.) Accordingly, the Court struck the Notice of Appeal. (CR 612.)
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal "for the limited purpose of reviewing the district court's competency determinations" and concluded that the Court erred by not holding a competency hearing to determine whether Duncan competently waived his right to appeal. (CR 671, 677.) The case was remanded with instructions for a retrospective competency hearing. United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2011).
New counsel was appointed to represent Duncan at the retrospective competency hearing. (CR 695, 703.) The twenty-three day retrospective competency hearing began on January 8, 2013. (CR 745, 794, 807-829.) On December 6, 2013, the Court issued its Order on Remand wherein it ruled that Duncan was competent to waive his right to appeal. (CR 843.) The defense appealed the Order on Remand. (CR 844.) On March 27, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued its Memorandum and Order affirming this Court's Order on Remandconcluding the "Defendant was competent in November 2008" and that he had "validly and affirmatively waived his right to appeal." (CR 860.) On February 29, 2016, the United States Supreme Court denied Duncan's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. On February 28, 2017, Duncan filed his § 2255 Petition which the Court now takes up. (CR 867) (CV 1, 4.)
Section 2255 permits a federal prisoner in custody under sentence to move the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence on the grounds that:
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack ....
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (). Relief under § 2255 is afforded "[i]f the court finds that...there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
The standard of review for § 2255 petitions is "stringent" and the court "presumes earlier proceedings were correct." United States v. Nelson, 177 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1187 (D. Kan. 2001) (citation omitted). To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the "defendant must show a defect in the proceedings which resulted in a 'complete miscarriage of justice.'" Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). "[R]elief is not available merely because of error that may have justified reversal on direct appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979).
The Government argues several of Duncan's claims are procedurally barred from being raised in his § 2255 Motion because he waived his right to appeal and/or the claims improperly seek to retroactively apply a new rule of law. (CV 34.) Duncan counters that many of his claims are "essentially ineffective assistance of counsel claims" which are not subject to the procedural default rule or are as-applied challenges relying on extra-record evidence. (CV 4, 37.) Further, Duncan argues the non-retroactivity doctrine does not apply to bar his claims. (CV 4, 37.)
"The general rule in federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal is [procedurally] barred from raising the claim on collateral review." Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350-51 (2006); see also United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir. 2003) (...
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